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This thesis is a project of intellectual history which focuses on the development of 
notions of power and the nation-state in realist thought. The main aim of the thesis is 
to offer a comprehensive account of how different conceptions of power in the work 
of various realist thinkers influence their perceptions of the nation-state. Although 
both power and the state are considered as central to realism, their connection has not 
been adequately discussed and remains largely implicit. The thesis aims at 
illuminating such a connection.  
The authors under examination are both key realist thinkers and representative of the 
diversity of realist thought as well as of the development from classical to structural 
realism.  As such, the thesis focuses on the works of E.H. Carr, H. Morgenthau (as 
classical realists), J. Herz (as a transitional figure) and J. Mearsheimer (as a structural 
realist). The thesis engages with each realist’s theory in a three-step process. First, it 
analyses their conceptualisation of power and the role it plays in their ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. Then, using that conceptualisation of power as a 
starting point, it discusses its impact on the way the realist under examination 
understood the nation-state. Finally, the way the aforementioned realists engaged 
with the foreign policies of given nation-states is employed as an illustration of their 
theoretical framework.  
The thesis identifies a close interplay between power and the nation-state in all 
realists examined. Power plays a central role in each realist’s ontology and as such 
influences profoundly the way they conceptualised the nation-state. The latter can 
thus be approached as a manifestation of power which is unfixed in time. The realists 
examined approach the state as a historically conditioned entity. As such, it is argued 
that it is power that constitutes the core analytical category of realism rather than the 
state whose very conception is dependent upon that of power. In terms of the 
development of realism, a process of gradual narrowing down of the concept of 
power from classical to structural approaches is observed. The multifaceted 
conception of power advanced by early realists is abandoned in favour of an 
approach which understands power as material capabilities. While this approach is 
compatible with a scientific vision of politics as manifested after the second debate it 
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reduces significantly realism’s analytical purchase both in understanding power and 
the nation-state. This is evident in the precarious balance that neorealists have to 
attain when theorising nationalism, the ideological corollary of the nation-state, 
which can more fully be accounted for by classical realists. Finally, by removing 
power from the field of epistemology, structural variants of realism lack the 
reflexivity of earlier realists and as such find it difficult to engage in foreign policy 
debates without compromising the core assumptions of their theory.  
The thesis is structured as follows: In the introduction, the thesis is put in the context 
of existing literature on realism and the way questions of power and the nation-state 
have been addressed in the past. Questions of methodology and selection of authors 
are also addressed in the introduction. The following four chapters are dedicated to 
analysing the theories of the selected realists. The concluding section summarises the 
findings and main argument of the thesis. 
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In his defence of realism against emerging tendencies in international theory in the 
1990s, Colin Gray made special reference to the enduring legacy of the realist 
tradition. Such a tradition, and more specifically classical realism, he claimed, might 
look unattractive in the wake of the Cold War but this does not necessarily make it 
less accurate: “much that is apparently boring and old-fashioned happens also to be 
true, or true enough”.1 It is the eternal truths of realism, he claimed, that can aid the 
student of international relations to avoid confusing what is ephemeral for what is 
lasting.2 It is the interrelation of two concepts central to realism, one of them 
ephemeral and the other one lasting that this thesis seeks to elucidate. The lasting 
concept is that of power, while the ephemeral one is the nation-state.3 Of course the 
question of what is lasting and what is ephemeral does not necessarily have a 
straightforward answer, especially within the context of a diverse tradition like that 
of realism.  
In the first part of this chapter, I will focus on the different ways that scholars in the 
field have tried to tackle the diversity of the realist tradition. I identify two broad 
approaches, one focusing on distilling a set of core assumptions common to all 
realists and one emphasising the complexity of the school and the contrasts between 
its different strands. While I do not aim to resolve the question of “what is realism” 
the discussion of such approaches is essential for answering the key question of the 
thesis. It is in the framework set by those two distinct attitudes that the discussion on 
realism and its core concepts currently happens. As such, the role of power and the 
nation-state in realism has been examined in the literature under both of the different 
lenses outlined. In the second section of the part I examine the different ways power 
                                                 
1 C. Gray, “Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the past: With GPS” in Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 25, Special Issue, Dec 1999, pp. 161-182: p. 182 
2 Ibid. p. 164 
3 The nation-state is for the purpose of this thesis understood as a distinctly modern manifestation of 
the sovereign state, one that is associated with nationalism. The differentiation between the nation and 
the state is essential since the two are distinct. Indeed, as Connor suggests, the very coining of the 
term ‘nation-state’ “illustrated an appreciation of the vital differences” between the two. As such the 
term ‘nation-state’ “was designed to describe a territorial-political unit (a state) whose borders 
coincided or nearly coincided with the territorial distribution of a national group”. W. Connor, “A 
nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a…” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
1978, pp. 377-400: p. 382.  
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and the nation-state have been conceptualised in literature on realism. In the third 
section, I identify the gap in the literature that I will try to address in the thesis and 
explain my approach to realism. I claim that rather than trying to fit realism within 
the narrow confines of a paradigm, it is more fruitful to approach it as a ‘family 
resemblance’. 
The second part addresses issues of methodology and provides an outline of the 
thesis. More specifically, in the first section I explain my approach to intellectual 
history and the way it is applied in this thesis. I claim that an approach that focuses 
both on the text itself and its context is the most balanced way to address the 
question. In the second section I justify the selection of the key realist authors under 
examination, namely E.H. Carr, H. Morgenthau, J. Herz and J. Mearsheimer. The 
three criteria employed are that the authors under examination should be important 
for the realist tradition; representative of its development; and that said realists were 
willing to apply their theories to foreign policies pursued by specific states. Finally, 
in the third section, I will explain the structure of the thesis and offer an outline of 
the argument.   
 
I. Realism, power and the state: the gap in the literature and 
the research question  
 
Preliminary remarks: Approaching realism(s) 
When John Mearsheimer responded to his critics in an article titled “the more –isms 
the better” he most probably did not have in mind more real-isms.4 Recent 
scholarship by and about realists abounds and there is a marked proliferation of 
realisms. Apart from the traditional categories of ‘classical’ and ‘structural’ realisms, 
the debate between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ realists within the latter camp, or the 
introduction of ‘neoclassical’ realism, there is a continuing process of invention and 
                                                 
4 Mearsheimer was referring to –isms such as institutionalism and constructivism: J. Mearsheimer, 
“The more isms the better” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 354-359 
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re-invention of new categories of realism.5 As a result, the same realist can be now 
classified under several, often overlapping, subcategories of realism.6 Fortunately the 
number of realist labels has not so far exceeded the number of realists available for 
categorisation, but the literature on realism has become vast. The necessity to 
somehow deal with what Gilpin, rather modestly, described as the ‘richness’ of 
realist tradition has triggered two main responses.7  
Both reactions can be traced back to the period following the publication of Waltz’s 
seminal Theory of International Politics and his self-professed break with ‘classical 
realism’.8 One response was to try and distil a set of core assumptions, common to all 
realists, which can form the basis of a coherent realist tradition while glossing over 
the existing tensions.9 Various efforts to approach realism as a paradigm fall within 
this category. The number of core assumptions identified might vary from just one, 
namely power optimisation in the model forwarded by Fozouni, to several as 
displayed in the efforts of Vasquez, Legro and Moravcsik, Keohane and others.10  
                                                 
5 Writing in 2006, S. Molloy, counted a few realisms that could be added to the 49 already identified 
by J. Der Derian in an earlier work. Der Derian’s realisms were not all related to international 
relations, but given recent developments in the effort to recover older variants of realism the overall 
number has most likely further increased. S. Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism: a Genealogy of 
Power Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 149-150. The term ‘neoclassical realism’ 
was introduced by G. Rose in a review of works by R. Schweller, F. Zakaria, W. Wohlforth and others 
to describe a variant of  structural realism which integrates intervening variables at the domestic level. 
G. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” in World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, 
1998, pp. 144-172; for a summary of offensive vs defensive realism see: J. Taliaferro, “Security 
Seeking under Anarchy” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000, pp. 128-161. Brooks 
attempted to introduce the label of ‘postclassical realism’ in 1997 which, however, has not gained 
significant traction. S. Brooks “Dueling Realisms” in International Organisation, Vol. 51, no. 3, 
1997, pp. 445-477.  
6 Indicatively, Carr apart from a ‘classical’ realist is also a ‘critical realist’ for Babik and Falk, a 
‘progressive realist’ for Scheuerman, and a ‘utopian realist’ for Howe. 
7 R. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” in R. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and 
its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 301-321 
8 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. For the differences 
between his variant of realism and classical realism see: K. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist 
Theory” in Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, pp. 21-37, passim 
9 B. Buzan, C. Jones and R, Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 2-5 
10 For Fozouni, the key tenet of realism as derived from Morgenthau’s work is the claim that “power 
optimisation is the only (i.e. a necessary and sufficient) determinant of international political 
behaviour”: B. Fozouni, “Confutation of Political Realism” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
39, No. 4, 1995, pp. 479-510: p. 481. Vasquez, based also on Morgenthau, identifies nation-state 
centrism, distinction between domestic and international politics, and the identification of 
international politics as the domain of struggle for power and peace as the three main assumptions of 
the realist paradigm: J. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to 
Neotraditionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 52-59; J. Vasquez, “The 
Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Vs Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of 
Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition” in The American Political Science 
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The second response was originally identified with early criticisms of neorealism 
such as the ones coming from R. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, who emphasised the 
differences between the two schools and, at least initially, represented a minority 
position.11 R. Cox for instance attempted to recover a historicist realist tradition as 
represented by E.H. Carr and explore its affinities to critical theory as opposed to the 
gradual transformation of American realism to what he called a ‘problem-solving 
theory’.12 Walker highlighted the tensions inherent in realism by focusing on the 
distinction between historicism and structuralism and in a similar fashion Ashley 
advocated a return to some of the insights offered by classical realists as part of a 
model that “would more than surpass neorealism”.13  
This tendency was continued in the early 2000s perhaps even more successfully than 
previously due to the more favourable environment in IR theory by that time, as 
Steele claims, by a number of authors he described as “reflexive realists”.14 What 
unites authors like Lang, Lebow, Williams is for Steele their attempt to shift focus 
from the explanatory theories offered by neorealism or neoclassical realism and 
recover “classical realist principles of agency, prudence, and the recognition of 
limitations”.15  One could add here the various efforts in recent scholarship that aim 
at recovering important aspects of the thought of classical realists, often in direct 
                                                                                                                                          
Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, pp. 899-912: p. 899. In response to the latter, despite emphasising the 
diversity in realism that Vasquez neglects, Walt also identifies some key assumptions that all realists 
subscribe to, namely state-centrism, international anarchy, and the centrality of power. S. Walt, “The 
Progressive Power of Realism” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, pp. 
931-935: pp. 932-933. Keohane’s three realist fundamental assumptions are similar to Walt but he 
substitutes anarchy for the rationality assumption. R. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural 
Realism and Beyond” in R. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 158-203: pp. 163-170. 
Legro and Moravcsik offer a version of the realist paradigm that comprises of three core assumptions: 
rational, unitary political units in anarchy, fixed and conflictual state goals, and primacy of material 
capabilities. J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” in International Security, 
Vol. 24, No. 2, 1999, pp. 5-55: pp. 9-18. For a critical evaluation of paradigmatic approaches to 
realism see S. Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism, pp. 15-34. For the responses to the argument 
proposed by Legro and Moravcsik see P. Feaver et al. “Brother, Can you Spare me a Paradigm? (Or 
Was Anybody ever a Realist?)” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 165-193  
11 B. Buzan et al, The Logic of anarchy, pp. 3-5; J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 45 
12 R. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory” in R. 
Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 204-254 
13 R. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism” in R. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 255-
300: p. 297; R. Ashley. “Political Realism and Human Interests” in International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 24, No. 2, 1981, pp. 204-236; R. B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political 
Theory” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1987, pp. 65-86 
14 B. J. Steele, “‘Eavesdropping on honoured ghosts’: From classical to reflexive realism” in Journal 
of International Relations and Development, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2007, pp. 272-300: pp. 291-292 
15 Ibid. p. 273 
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opposition to the main premises that are represented by contemporary realists. 
Revisionist historiography is not limited to realism but the latter is singled out as its 
main beneficiary.16 Some of those efforts concentrated on re-investigating neglected 
insights in the works of realists that by now are considered classics. The renewed 
interest on realists like Carr, Morgenthau and Herz which was displayed in 
monographs or edited volumes is an example of such efforts.17 Others are focused on 
recovering the contribution of classical realists in the study of specific themes. Here 
Scheuerman’s work on realist visions of global reform and Molloy’s challenge of the 
paradigmatic reading of realism come to mind.18 Finally, there are collective efforts 
that combine both approaches.19 
Revisionist scholarship on realism certainly managed to reinterpret realism as “a 
sophisticated, albeit amorphous body of political thought” as Bell claims, but the 
recovery of this complexity comes at a cost.20 If realism is indeed as amorphous as 
recent efforts have demonstrated and there are “nearly as many realisms as realist 
protagonists” as Guzzini claims, then the question arises whether it makes any sense 
to continue applying the label at all.21 Indeed some authors seem to believe that 
realism is in fact too rich for its own good. The general label ‘realism’, they claim, 
obscures so many differences that it would be preferable to abandon it altogether or 
use its categories very cautiously and only as starting points.22 In the following 
section, I will discuss how the key concepts for this thesis, power and the nation-
state, have been understood by those two broad approaches.  
 
                                                 
16 D. Bell, “Writing the World: disciplinary history and beyond” in International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 
1, 2009, pp. 3-22: pp. 6-8  
17 For works on Carr and Herz, Ibid: p. 7; fn 16. For Morgenthau see indicatively M. Williams (ed), 
Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007; W. E. Scheuerman Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2009 
18 W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, Cambridge: Polity, 2011; S. Molloy, 
Hidden History of Realism 
19 D. Bell (ed), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. For a more recent attempt see the relevant special issue in 
International Politics: H. Behr and S. Molloy (eds) “Realism Reconsidered: New Contexts and 
Critiques” in International Politics, Vol. 50, No. 6, 2013, pp. 735-894 
20 D. Bell, “Writing the World”, p. 7 
21 S. Guzzini, Power, Realism and Constructivism, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 111  
22 W. Scheuerman, “The (classical) Realist vision of  global reform” in International Theory, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, 2010, pp. 246-282 
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Power and the nation-state in the literature about realism 
As mentioned in the previous section, even within the approach that tries to identify 
core elements of realism the identification of such elements varies from author to 
author. The examination of the core assumptions collected in paradigmatic readings 
of realism reveals that power is central to all of them and state-centrism to most.23 As 
such, both concepts are considered central for the realist intellectual agenda for most 
of the relevant literature. In this section I offer a summary of the way power and the 
state have been approached in the existing literature. I claim that the concepts 
themselves are often theorised insufficiently in an effort to fit realism into a 
paradigmatic reading and examine how revisionist literature has contributed in 
forming a more nuanced approach. First, I examine the notion of power since this is 
present in virtually all secondary readings of realism. Second, I examine the 
assumption of state-centrism.  
The concept of power has been associated with realism in IR for so long that the 
former is often interpreted as the exclusive domain of realism.24 For some 
commentators it is precisely this centrality of power that accounts for the very 
“continuity of the realist tradition”.25 Identifying power as the key element of realism 
poses, however, a problem for the coherence of the tradition due to the indeterminacy 
of the concept. Power is an essentially contested concept and, while Ringmar’s 
insistence that IR scholars are particularly prone to displaying a poor understanding 
of it based on intuition might have some merit, it does not imply that other fields of 
political science have managed to tackle the elusiveness of power conclusively.26 A 
                                                 
23 From the paradigmatic readings outlined above it is only Fouzouni who singles out power 
optimization as the core realist assumption whereas all other views include state-centrism in one form 
or another. See, supra fn. 10 
24 M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics” in International Organization, Vol. 59, 
No. 1, 2005, pp. 39-75: p. 40; F. Berenskoetter, “Thinking about power” in F. Berenskoetter and M. J. 
Williams (eds), Power in World Politics, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1-22: p. 1 
25 B. Buzan, “The timeless wisdom of realism?” in S. Smith, K. Booth, M. Zalewski (eds), 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 47-
65: p. 51; also see S. Molloy’s claim that the emphasis on power is perhaps the only thing that the 
paradigmatic reading of realism got right. S. Molloy, Hidden History of Realism, pp. 145-147; 
Williams too claims that “power is central to any understanding of realism”: M. Williams, The realist 
tradition and the limits of international relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 6  
26 For power as an essentially contested concept see S. Lukes, “Power and the Battle for Hearts and 
Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power” in F. Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (eds), Power in 
World Politics, pp. 83-97:p. 83. Since Dahl’s attempt to define power the inadequacy of previous 
efforts to capture the elusive character of power is best demonstrated by the continuous addition of 
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second problem arises with placing power alone at the core of realism. Despite some 
authors’ lamentations that realism’s monopolisation of power is preventing other 
scholars from developing alternative discourses of power, the focus on power is not 
exclusive to realism.27 As such, having not only an elusive concept at its core but 
also not uniquely so, can bring to question the distinctiveness and coherence of 
realism as a tradition.  
The elusiveness of the concept of power often goes unnoticed in debates about its 
role in realist thought. Most of the debate about realist conceptions of power, and 
indeed most paradigmatic representations, focuses on the repetition of the idea that 
realists approach power in terms of material capabilities with a particular emphasis 
on military capabilities.28 Furthermore, it is often associated with R. Dahl’s famous 
formulation that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do”.29 Indeed, if one summarises realist 
conceptualisations of power as “the ability of states to use material resources to get 
others to do what they otherwise would not”, as Barnett and Duvall do, the 
connection between realism and Dahl’s formulation seems natural.30 Whilst the 
                                                                                                                                          
‘faces’ to the concept. See R. A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power” in Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
1957, pp 201-215; P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power” in The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1962, pp. 947-952; S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; P. Digeser, “The Fourth Face of Power” in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 
54, No. 4, 1992, pp. 977-1007. Yet the concept remains controversial and elusive. Lukes attributes the 
controversy around power to the fact that it is a ‘primitive’ concept i.e. a concept whose analysis 
would involve the utilisation of other also controversial concepts: S. Lukes, “Power and the Battle for 
Hearts and Minds”, p. 93. For Ringmar’s claim that IR scholars posses poor understandings of power 
see: E. Ringmar, “Empowerment among nations: a sociological perspective” in F. Berenskoetter and 
M. J. Williams (eds), Power in World Politics, pp. 189-203: p. 190 
27 For the complaint that domination by realist conceptions of power hindered the development of 
alternatives see indicatively: F. Berenskoetter, “Thinking about power”, p. 1; M. Barnett and R. 
Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, pp. 40-42. There are however other approaches to 
international relations that are centred around power. Buzan mentions feminism and Marxism as other 
schools that focus on power: B. Buzan, “The timeless wisdom of realism?”, p. 51. Power, albeit in its 
productive rather than coercive function, is also of cardinal importance for poststructuralism: A. Neal, 
“Michael Foucault” in J. Edkins and N. Vaughan-Williams (eds), Critical theorists and international 
relations, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 161-170; J. Sterling-Folker and R. E. Shinko, “Discourses of 
power: traversing the realist-postmodern divide” in F. Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (eds), Power 
in World Politics, pp. 244-264 
28 M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, p.40; J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, 
“Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, pp. 16-18; D. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations” in W. 
Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds) Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, 2013, 
pp. 273-297: passim; S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations” in 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2004, pp. 533-568: pp. 535-538 
29 R. Dahl, “The Concept of Power”, pp. 202-203 
30 M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, p. 40, pp. 49-51; F. Berenskoetter, 
“Thinking about power”, pp. 47; E. Ringmar, “Empowerment among nations”, pp. 190-191 
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connection of realism to Dahl is somewhat inaccurate and should not be overstated, 
the temptation to narrow down the concept of power in realism is understandable.31 
In fact, some realists themselves have often contributed to this entrenchment by 
favouring conceptualisations of power that focus exclusively on material capabilities 
and their accurate measurement.32  
The diversity of realist conceptualisations of power, however, has not gone entirely 
unnoticed. Schmidt for instance cautioned against conceiving realist 
conceptualisations of power in a monolithic way that does not do justice to the 
diversity of the tradition.33 Molloy discussed the different conceptualisations of 
power in classical realists to demonstrate that they do not fit the paradigmatic reading 
of realism and that power is not for all realists analogous to money or synonymous to 
coercion.34 And even within the body of literature that claims that the dominant role 
of realist conceptualisations of power should be challenged, it is often recognised 
that realists’ views on power often transcend the narrow interpretations normally 
attributed to them.35 
The second commonly associated with realist assumption is state-centrism. Bell 
correctly observed that regardless of distinctions between classical or structural 
realism, the school “is routinely defined in terms of its state-centrism”.36 Indeed one 
                                                 
31 Baldwin in particular has contrasted the realist “elements-of-power” approach to the relational one 
forwarded by Dahl: D. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, passim. While realists such as 
Mearsheimer have rejected Dahl’s conceptualisation, there are those who claim contra Baldwin that 
realists are in fact attentive to the relational aspects of power. J. Sterling-Folker and R. E. Shinko, 
“Discourses of power: traversing the realist-postmodern divide”, p.263: fn. 3; also Schmidt’s claim 
that different realists can subscribe to either of the broad approaches Baldwin outlined or both: B. 
Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of power” in  F. Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (eds), Power in 
World Politics, pp. 43-63. For Mearsheimer’s views on Dahl see infra, Chapter IV.    
32 This is revealed by the debate about the fungibility of power between realists and their critics. For a 
summary see: S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, pp. 537-
544; for a more detailed overview: D. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends 
versus Old Tendencies” in World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1979, pp. 161-194. Realists that are more 
prone to emphasise the measurability of power derive the analogy largely from the construction of 
neorealism as a theory of international relations based on microeconomics. See: K. Waltz, “Realist 
Thought and Neorealist Theory”, passim; and infra Chapter IV, for Mearsheimer who also employs 
the analogy.   
33 B. Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of power”, pp. 43-63 
34 S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 29-34 
35 See for instance Barnett and Duvall’s comments on E.H. Carr’s realism and the comment of 
Guzzini on classical realists in general: M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, 
pp. 66-69; S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, p. 544 
36 D. Bell, “Introduction: Under an Empty Sky – Realism and Political Theory” in D. Bell (ed), 
Political Thought and International Relations, pp. 1-25: p. 10  
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point raised often by critics of realism is its tendency to take states as given.37 This is 
not to assume that realists ignore the variety of forms that political units can take 
throughout history. As Waltz himself and several commentators of realism 
acknowledge, units can take various forms ranging from empires or city-states to 
modern states but they are ‘like units’ in that they diachronically perform similar 
functions due to the external constraints imposed to them by anarchy.38 As such, 
realism’s alleged state-centrism could be better defined as group-centrism as Gilpin 
suggests.39 Of course, this preposition can too be challenged to the extent that it 
assumes that all units will behave in the same way under a condition (anarchy) that is 
presumed to be static. Much of the conversation about realism and the state has thus 
been concentrated around questions about the validity of such a generalisation and 
whether it is capable of effectively accounting for structural change.40 Under this 
light, the criticism of realist state-centrism can be reformulated more realistically to 
the criticism that realists tend to anachronistically universalise the experience of the 
modern state.    
The alleged state-centrism of realism has gained some attention in revisionist 
literature. Works by revisionist scholars contributed significantly in recovering 
classical realist visions of the state and challenge the dominant approach. Molloy 
identified incompatibilities between conceptions of the state as displayed in the 
works of Carr and Morgenthau and the paradigmatic reading of state-centrism.41 
Scheuerman engaged with a wide range of classical realist authors in order to 
demonstrate that not only they were sceptical about the nation-state but also that they 
embraced the prospect of global reform.42 Bell observed that even for contemporary 
                                                 
37 See indicatively: M. Griffiths and M. Sullivan, “Nationalism and International Relations Theory” in 
Australian Journal of Politics & History, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1997, pp. 53-66; R. Ashley, “The Poverty of 
Neorealism”, pp.  268-273. Also, the discussion in: W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global 
Reform, p. 39 
38 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 93-97; see also J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is 
Anybody Still a Realist?”, pp 12-13; for Mearsheimer’s similar take on states see infra Chapter IV  
39 R. Giplin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism”, pp. 313-318 
40 See the excellent summary in B. Buzan and R. Little, “Waltz and World History: The Paradox of 
Parsimony” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2009, pp. 446-463; also G. Sørensen, “‘Big and 
Important Things’ in IR: Structural Realism and the Neglect of Changes in Statehood” in 
International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2009, pp. 223-239; J. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation 
in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis” in R. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, 
pp. 131-157 
41 S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 139-143 
42 W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, in particular Chapters 2 and 3  
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realists the state should not be a core concept. What follows from assumptions of 
anarchy and power, he claims, is not necessarily state-centrism but, rather, 
sovereignty-centrism.43 To these works one can add the pioneering work of J. M. 
Hobson who tried to transfer the ‘second state debate’ from sociology to IR. Through 
his distinction between the domestic agential power of the state and its international 
agential power he managed to offer an alternative angle of the way the state is 
approached in realism. More specifically he claimed that there is a sharp distinction 
between neorealists, who grant the state very high domestic agential power but no 
international; and classical realists, who see domestic agential power as varying and 
allow the state sufficient international agential power. This, he claims, allows 
classical realism to engage more seriously with the state while neorealism actually 
marginalises it.44   
The present project: research question and approach to 
realism 
In the previous sections, I outlined the two broad approaches employed in the 
literature to engage with realism and how they have been utilised to understand the 
key concepts of power and the nation-state. In this section, I will first identify the gap 
in the literature and the research question I seek to address with the present thesis, 
namely to spell out the presently largely implicit connection between power and the 
nation-state. Second, I will situate the present project within the two broad 
approaches discussed. Although I do not purport to offer a concise definition of 
realism I claim that the paradigmatic version cannot do full justice to the diversity of 
the tradition and thus I situate the thesis within the revisionist literature.   
As has been discussed in the previous part, both power and the state have been the 
subjects of extensive discussion in the literature about realism both in its 
conventional variant and in the efforts of revisionist scholars to challenge the former. 
By demonstrating the mostly peripheral importance of state-centrism, revisionist 
                                                 
43 For Bell the state became so important for contemporary realism because of its increased 
prominence, which led to its conflation with sovereignty in the relevant literature. D. Bell, “Anarchy, 
power and death: contemporary political realism as ideology” in Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 
7, No. 2, 2002, pp. 221-239: pp. 230-234. He repeated a similar point when addressing state-centrism 
in classical realism where he concluded that “realism is not theoretically committed to any particular 
type of political association”. D. Bell, “Under an Empry Sky”, pp. 10-11; p. 10 
44 J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 1-14, pp. 17-63 
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scholarship has helped demonstrate that Buzan was accurate in claiming that it is 
power that is probably the most persistent theme in realism. The precise relationship 
between those two concepts however, has not been directly addressed. At the most 
basic level, Buzan’s claim that the state is important for realism insofar as it “is the 
dominant wielder of power in the international system” summarises the most obvious 
connection between the two concepts.45 Power can be understood as something that 
states possess and can exercise “over” other states. Supremacy in terms of power 
accumulation can lead to state adaptation which mostly accounts for transformations 
in the form of political units.46 This view, however, presupposes a conception of 
power in terms of capabilities as represented by the conventional view of realism. 
The connection becomes much less clear in existing literature when one takes into 
account the diversity of realist conceptualisations of power. Hobson’s work, while 
persuasively making the case for different levels of international agential power of 
the state between classical and structural realism does not focus on the 
conceptualisations of power underpinning the theories of the realists under 
examination.47 Molloy recovered the complexity of realist visions of both power and 
the state but his primary focus is to demonstrate the difficulty of realism to be 
accommodated within a paradigm and as such does not deal with the connection 
between the two extensively.48 The most detailed account of classical realism and the 
nation-state comes from the work of Scheuerman. Not only does he focus on the 
nation-state specifically (rather than the ‘state’ in general), but he also identifies the 
importance for power both for the successes and for the expected downfall of the 
nation-state in the work of classical realist authors.49 Scheuerman is mostly 
concerned with demonstrating what classical realism has to offer in terms of 
discussions in cosmopolitan theory and the potential of a world state. As such, while 
he elucidates aspects of the connection between power and the nation-state, he does 
so without focusing on the variety of realist conceptualisations of power. Secondly, 
given the focal point of global reformism in his work, he does not examine any 
                                                 
45 B. Buzan, “The timeless wisdom of realism?”, p. 51 
46 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 73-78, 127-128 
47 J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 17-63 
48 S. Molloy, Hidden History, passim 
49 W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, passim but in particular pp. 39-97 
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structural realists since their scepticism towards the latter is grounded on a presumed 
perpetuality of international anarchy.  
In the present thesis, I aim at making explicit the connection between power and the 
nation-state, a connection which is largely implicit or unidirectional in existing 
literature. For that purpose, I employ as a starting point the diverse 
conceptualisations of power found in realist authors. The recovery of realist 
conceptualisations of power is, I claim, an essential requirement in order to 
understand the different approaches to the nation-state offered by them. As such, I 
will build on the insights gained by revisionist scholarship both on the complexity of 
realist visions of power and the role of state-centrism in realism and develop them on 
a direction that this scholarship has not so far focused on. Before outlying the 
methodology of the thesis and the structure of the argument I will position the 
present thesis within the two broad approaches outlined in the previous section. 
The main argument in support of a paradigmatic reading of realism is that “realism 
has become just one box in the typologies of the Inter-Paradigm Debate”.50 As such, 
realism must be clearly demarcated in order to be distinct from competing 
paradigms.51 I argue that this position is unsatisfactory. Guzzini’s claim that “all 
classical realists have travelled on institutionalist or constructivism-inspired terrain” 
is indicative of the problems associated with efforts to define realism narrowly.52 The 
problem with this statement is not primarily that Guzzini, anachronistically, caught 
the classical realists trespassing on ‘enemy territory’. For the classical realists 
themselves, given the comparative novelty of constructivism and institutionalism in 
IR, the claim would probably mean as much as it would to the ancient Romans if 
someone accused them of trespassing on the territory of the Italian Republic. The 
main problem is, rather, the implications of such narrow definitions for any 
meaningful engagement with international relations’ theory.  
Narrowing down realism or any other tradition for that matter, to only a few core 
assumptions, can only aggravate the academic tribalism that is deplored by some 
authors.53 Lake aptly summarised some of the pathologies associated with such an 
                                                 
50 S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, p. 537 
51 Idem. Also in J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, pp.48-53 
52 S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, p. 544 
53 See indicatively: D. Lake, “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as 
Impediments to Understanding and Progress” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2011, 
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approach. In their effort to identify “easily recognisable schools”, he claims, IR 
scholars have of necessity to reduce subtlety and oversimplify; the need to innovate 
encourages them to take more extremist positions; they mistake traditions for 
theories and try to pit them against each other; they will be partial to evidence that 
supports their own theories; and finally, they will strive for intellectual hegemony.54 
While Lake paints a particularly bleak and somewhat exaggerated image, his remark 
that such tendencies “transform research traditions into insular ‘sects’ that eschew 
explanation in favour of theology” is revealing of the implications of such an over-
simplification for the sake of paradigmatic rigidity.55 The result of such a process is a 
division of the discipline into warring tribes that often talk past each other.56  
A second and related implication is the encouragement of the tendency to caricature 
traditions one is critical of. This applies to all traditions and realists for their part are 
not innocent of the practice as revisionist scholarship on the first debate 
demonstrated.57 There are of course, practical reasons for the tendency to caricature, 
especially given the broad scope of the discipline and the available literature. As 
Scheuerman observes, “critics of realism have made things too easy for themselves 
by embracing a simplistic and occasionally caricatured interpretation”.58 Given the 
amount of existing literature illustrating the diversity of realist tradition, such a 
position is untenable. Scheuerman is thus right to claim that, despite its obvious 
practical merits, the replication of conventional wisdom is unsatisfactory for “anyone 
who is committed to intellectual integrity”.59 For those reasons for the purposes of 
this project I will not employ a paradigmatic reading of realism. 
                                                                                                                                          
pp. 465-480; also K. Booth’s introduction in J. Mearsheimer et. al., “Roundtable: The Battle Rages 
On” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 337-360: p. 337 
54 D. Lake, “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil”, pp. 467-471 
55 Ibid. p. 468 
56 J. Mearsheimer et. al., “Roundtable: The Battle Rages On”, p. 337 
57 W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 3-4; for the myth of the first debate see 
P. Wilson, “The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate’” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 24 (special 
issue), 1998, pp. 1-15; L. Ashworth, “Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? a 
Revisionist History of International Relations” in International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2002, pp. 
33-51; and more recently B. Schmidt, “Introduction” in B. Schmidt (ed), International Relations and 
the First Great Debate, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 1-15 and P. Wilson, “Where are we now in the 
debate about the first great debate?” in B. Schmidt (ed), International Relations and the First Great 
Debate, pp. 133-151. Guzzini, despite advocating a narrow definition of realism, recognises that such 
an approach might be criticised for being “consciously skewed in favour of realism’s critiques”. See 
S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, p. 537 
58 W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 4 
59 Idem  
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This thesis is a project that is complementary to existing revisionist efforts such as 
the ones discussed in the previous parts. As such, particular emphasis will be placed 
on the diversity of realism and the authors will be examined on their own merits 
rather than subsumed to a pre-conceived set of assumptions. That said I am also 
sceptical of the extreme manifestation of this way of approaching realism i.e. the 
claim that the label is meaningless and it might be better to dispense of it altogether. 
In their paradigmatic manifestation “isms” have been problematic, but as some 
authors note, they still facilitated intellectual debate about theoretical assumptions 
and commitments.60 One does not need to return to the rigidity of a paradigm in 
order to salvage the utility of general labels such as ‘realism’. I rather propose to 
approach realism here under a framework that allows for the use of the term but still 
keeps intact the diversity of the authors that belong to the school.  
As Hellmann notes in his response to Legro and Moravcsik, what realist scholars 
share is not a set of assumptions, but family resemblances as defined by 
Wittgenstein.61 For Wittgenstein, family resemblance does not require a 
predetermined set of similarities since the latter can “crop up and disappear”. 
Similarities form a “complicated network” and are “overlapping and criss-crossing”. 
If one succumbs to the temptation of drawing a boundary for the term one tries to 
define, that can only be valid for “that special purpose” for which the definition was 
designed and corresponds to.62 As such, family resemblance can be employed to 
signify that “individuality and similarity can be thought of as useful surrogates for 
generality and identity”.63 When it comes to realism, the concept has been applied to 
it by some authors in an effort to transcend the limits of a paradigmatic version.64 
                                                 
60 Jackson and Nexon for instance  observed that “Participants may have overplayed… claims about 
incommensurability, but their debates made clear that different theoretical and analytical 
commitments can generate different conclusions about world politics” and added that critics of “isms” 
often “tend to obscure the degree to which their own commitments are far from neutral when it comes 
to studying world politics”. P.T. Jackson and D. Nexon, “International theory in a post-paradigmatic 
era: From substantive wagers to scientific ontologies” in European Journal of International Relations, 
Vol. 19, No. 3, 2013, pp. 543-565: pp. 545-547. See also H. Nau, “No Alternative to ‘isms’” in 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2011, pp. 487-491 
61 D. Feaver et al. “Brother, Can you Spare me a Paradigm?”, p. 173 
62 See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1968, paragraphs 65-69 
63 D. Feaver et al. “Brother, Can you Spare me a Paradigm?”, p. 173 
64 Idem. Also in: D. Bell, “Under an Empty Sky”, p. 3; M. Williams, The realist tradition and the 
limits of international relations, p. 16; and particularly Jones’ paraphrase of Wittgenstein’s passage on 
games to account for realism: C. Jones, E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 5-6; p.6, fn 8 
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The flexibility inherent in such an approach allows for a study of different realists 
that does not try to marginalise aspects of their thought that do not fit with 
preconceived sets of assumptions. Furthermore, it allows for the reoccurrence of core 
themes without having to limit them conceptually.  
 
II. Methodology and structure of the thesis 
 
On intellectual history: methodological issues 
This thesis is a project of intellectual history which aims to examine the development 
of the interrelation between the notions of power and the nation-state in realist 
thought. In order to trace that development I focus on four realist authors that are 
considered important figures in the discourse of realism and representative of the 
development from classical to structural realism. Before outlining the structure of the 
thesis, there is a series of methodological questions that ought to be addressed. First, 
I explain how I approach intellectual history for the purposes of the present thesis. 
Second, I discuss some issues faced by interpretative projects such as the present one 
and how I will address them in this thesis. Finally, I justify the reason for selecting to 
approach the question through individual authors.  
In one of his early engagements with the topic, Skinner identified two conflicting 
methods for approaching the history of ideas and found them both wanting. On the 
one hand, the historian of ideas can focus solely on the text itself in an effort to 
identify universal meanings regardless of the historical or social context of its 
production. Conversely, the approach that focuses on the context of a text’s 
production be it historical, social or cultural is placing more importance in that 
context rather than the text itself.65 The problem with intellectual history, as Minogue 
observed while criticising Skinner’s work, lies with the dualism inherent in ideas. 
Ideas can be “abstract and universal” but at the same time, when uttered by a 
                                                 
65 Q. Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” in History and Theory, Vol. 8, No 
1, 1969, pp. 3-53; for a discussion of the applicability of Skinner’s framework in the study of 
international relations see: G. Holden, “Who contextualizes the contextualizers? Disciplinary history 
and the discourse about the IR discourse” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2002, pp. 
253-270 
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particular thinker they also become “a specific occurrence which has a spatio-
temporal location and a social context”.66 While philosophers are interested in the 
first aspect of ideas and historians in the second, the intellectual historian is in the 
unenviable position of having to identify the via media between the two.67   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, efforts to identify an ideal balance or provide the ‘right’ 
methodology for engaging with intellectual history, including Skinner’s own 
contextualism, have not been conclusive.68 The attempt to adopt the ‘right’ 
methodology might, as Minogue’s overview of different such methodologies reveals, 
be problematic in that it commits the intellectual historian to a philosophical 
background that is not necessarily helpful in addressing the question set.69 This, 
however, does not mean that the insights gained through such debates should be 
ignored. The most honest position seems to be one advocated in recent overviews of 
the debate and hints to the direction that “either a pure universalism or a pure 
contextualism” should be rejected in favour of the middle ground which allows for a 
more pluralistic view of politics.70 As such, any effort to engage in intellectual 
history should be able to take into account both the text and its context.71  
For the purposes of the present thesis thus, both the intellectual background of each 
author examined and the historical context of the period in which they were working 
will be taken into account. I do not claim to offer the only valid reading of the 
authors I am about to engage with. As Welch’s discussion of text interpretations 
revealed, the reader “inevitably contributes something to a text that affects what he 
or she gets out of it”.72 The authors examined here can be said to present a less acute 
problem than the one discussed by Welch, namely that Thucydides is separated by 
                                                 
66 K. R. Minogue, “Methods in Intellectual History: Quentin Skinner’s Foundations” in Philosophy, 
Vol. 56, No 218, 1981, pp. 533-552: p. 544  
67 Idem.  
68 D. Bell, “International relations: the dawn of a historiographical turn?” in British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2001, pp. 115-126: p. 116 
69 He summarises his views as follows: “Even if he merely flips a coin in order to choose between 
these and other forms of methodological salvation being marketed, the historian will find that he has 
taken on board a cargo of philosophical theory on whose validity-not easily testable-his work as a 
historian will be dangerously dependent”. K. R. Minogue, “Methods in Intellectual History”, p. 546; 
pp. 544-549 
70 S. Lawson, “Political Studies and the Contextual Turn: A Methodological/Normative Critique” in 
Political Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2008, pp. 584-603: p. 586 
71 D. Bell, “The dawn of a historiographical turn?”, p. 116 
72 D. A. Welch, “Why International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides” in Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2003, pp. 301-319: p. 312 
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modern international relations’ scholars not only by time but also by belonging to a 
different ‘interpretative community’, but the core of the issue remains. While it is 
impossible for the reader to extract the precise meaning of the text they study, 
awareness of this limitation can help the reader to at least try and minimise the 
projection of their own ideas upon the author under examination.73  
The first aspect of the thesis thus entails a close examination of the original writings 
and their background in an effort to recover the writers’ take on the question 
addressed. Such an examination however does not merely aim to reconstruct 
neglected aspects of the realists’ works but also to critically evaluate them in order to 
identify their merits but also their limits and what they can contribute to current 
debates about power and the nation-state. For that purpose, engagement with the 
secondary literature on those authors, whether favourable or critical, is as essential as 
the attention placed to the original texts. The approach followed in that context, does 
not differ significantly from the “explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement” 
and the “scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition” that characterised 
what Bull described as the ‘classical approach’ some decades ago.74  
The last methodological issue to be addressed regards the selection of the appropriate 
way to engage with realists. In the first section of this introduction I outlined two 
conflicting views about how we are to understand realism and claimed that, given the 
limits of paradigmatic approaches, an engagement with a catch-all and 
oversimplified version of realism is to be rejected. Other ways to offer a narrative of 
the discipline that have been recently identified by Bliddal et al are ‘great debates’ 
and the study of classic texts. The first, as the authors claim, are problematic in that 
they are often historically inaccurate. The second, based as it is on the study of 
individual texts, can only offer snapshots of the development of the discipline and is 
not applicable to a project of intellectual history that is focused on the development 
of the interplay between two key concepts.75 As such the only option left is to follow 
the fourth strategy of engaging with individual authors rather than paradigms or 
                                                 
73 Ibid. pp. 308-312 
74 H. Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach” in World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 
3, 1966, pp. 361-377: p. 361 
75 H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest and P. Wilson, “Introduction” in H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest and P. Wilson (eds) 
Classics of international relations: essays in criticism and appreciation, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, pp. 
1-12: pp. 6-7  
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particular texts. This too, is an imperfect approach since it is “particularly 
predisposed to hagiography”.76 It is the only approach, however, that can be followed 
if one is to keep both the idea of a realist tradition (even if in the broad sense outlined 
in the previous part) and being attentive to the diversity of that tradition. 
Furthermore, the problem of bias in favour of the authors examined can be at least 
somewhat mitigated through critical engagement with the original texts as well as by 
taking into account the work of other authors who often challenge said texts. 
 
The selection of authors under examination 
The examination thus of individual authors has been selected as the most appropriate 
way to engage with the question of the thesis. In this section I will explain the criteria 
for the selection of authors, namely why I restricted my focus to four authors and 
why I selected the specific ones from the wide range of high-quality realist sources 
available. In that sense, as I will explain in the following paragraphs, this project has 
to deal with some problems that are common amongst efforts in the field of 
intellectual history and the solutions selected are not dissimilar to those favoured by 
other authors engaging in such efforts. 
The first problem is the range of authors discussed. Ashworth outlined the limits of a 
maximalistic endeavour which would entail the study of a wide range of authors 
succinctly. Such an effort, he claims, “would give only a cursory understanding of 
the various authors, while leaving no room for discussing the influences on, and the 
contexts of, these authors”.77 Since the aim of the thesis is to recover the impact of 
different conceptualisations of power on notions of the nation-state as displayed in 
the more than 70 years of realist scholarship in IR, the only way of allowing an in-
depth engagement with said concepts is to restrict the number of authors under 
examination. Such a restriction would also be compatible with the methodological 
premise outlined above, namely that engagement with intellectual history 
presupposes that adequate attention is paid to both the texts and their context. Having 
established that in-depth engagement with a limited range of authors is preferable to 
                                                 
76 Ibid. p. 6 
77 L. Ashworth, Creating international studies: Angell, Mitrany and the liberal tradition, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1999, p. 7 
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superficial engagement with a wide range of authors, at least for a project of 
intellectual history, the question of which authors needs to be addressed.  
A set of three criteria was employed to identify the specific authors to engage with. 
Similarly to the effort undertaken by Ashworth, the first criterion is that the 
combination of their writings can reveal the development of realism.78 As such, the 
authors selected should belong to different strands of realism and be representative of 
different stages in its development. The second criterion is one of importance. The 
realists under examination should be important figures that had considerable 
influence on the development of the tradition. Things such as ‘importance’ or 
‘influence’ of a certain author, however, are neither self-evident nor static in time. 
There are of course, realist authors whose status as seminal is demonstrated by the 
profound impact of their work on the discipline as well as from the continuous 
engagement with such work and the general acknowledgement of that work as 
groundbreaking in the literature. There are, however, others who despite being 
neglected in contemporary discussions have been influential in earlier periods or 
contributed key ideas that then attained a life of their own in the discipline’s 
vernacular.79  
A final, third criterion was employed in light of the effort to engage critically with 
the realists in question. The way realists applied their theories to empirical cases is 
not only indicative of the context in which those theories were developed but also 
can help reveal inconsistencies, flaws or strengths of their respective theories that an 
engagement with their theoretical premises alone would not take into account. As 
such, the third criterion employed was whether the realist in question applied their 
theory extensively in order either to understand the policies of specific states or 
influence them (or most commonly, both). The selection of the authors to be 
examined was based on the combination of all of the above criteria.  
The authors selected for this thesis are E.H. Carr, H. Morgenthau, J. Herz and J. 
Mearsheimer. The former two need little justification in terms of their importance. 
They have been described as “towering figures” in realism and their work still 
                                                 
78 Ibid. p. 8. Ashworth applies this method to liberal internationalism  
79 Perhaps the typology of classics developed by Bliddal et al despite being designed for texts has 
some applicability to the authors of such texts too. For instance their ‘undisputed classic’ would 
describe the first element of the discussion presented here whereas the ‘overlooked classic’ 
corresponds to the latter. H. Bliddal et al, “Introduction”, pp. 4-5 
 31 
triggers vivid intellectual debates.80 J. Mearsheimer is one of the most important 
contemporary realists and his Tragedy of Great Power Politics is already considered 
by some as a classic in the field.81 The case of J. Herz is less straightforward. Until 
recently, he was a relatively neglected figure who did not get the same attention as 
Carr and Morgenthau in the revival of classical realism.82 As such, he is often 
described as a secondary figure.83 There is, however, indication of a tendency to re-
consider Herz’s importance for the field and recover his insights as regards various, 
and often unexpected, aspects of international politics.84 In addition to the renewed 
interest on Herz in recent literature his importance for the purposes of the present 
project is two-fold. First, like all aforementioned realists, Herz placed particular 
emphasis on understanding the nature of the nation-state as part of one of his most 
influential works.85 Second, despite being approached as a classical realist, Herz was 
less sceptical than other mid-century realists as regards the turn to systems’ theory 
and was willing to embrace some of its aspects. He can thus be understood as 
encapsulating a moment of transition between classical and structural realism, 
sharing elements with both worlds.  
Perhaps the most obvious omission is the exclusion of K. Waltz from the list of 
authors to be studied. Booth claimed in 2009 that Waltz was “the discipline’s 
commanding theorist of the past half-century” and with this comment he certainly 
captured the sentiment of many more IR scholars.86 The reason for this exclusion is 
that Waltz subscribed to a strict methodological commitment which presupposed the 
analytical separation between a theory of international politics and foreign policy. 
                                                 
80 W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 5 
81 B. Schmidt, “A modest realist in a tragic world: John J. Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics” in H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest and P. Wilson (eds) Classics of international relations, pp. 230-239 
82 A notable exception was the special issue dedicated to J. Herz in International Relations: J. 
Puglierin (ed), “A Universalist in Dark Times: John H. Herz, 1908-2005” in International Relations, 
Vol. 22, No.4, 2008, pp. 403-528 
83 As Scheuerman put it, Herz is a “relatively neglected today but widely respected at mid century 
figure”. W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 6 
84 See for example Scheuerman’s emphasis on Herz’s work on technology and social acceleration: W. 
E. Scheuerman, “Realism and the critique of technology” in Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2009, pp. 563-584 
85 C. Sylvest, “The conditions and consequences of globality: John H. Herz’s International Politics in 
the Atomic Age” in H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest and P. Wilson (eds) Classics of international relations, pp. 
89-98 
86 The statement belongs to the introduction of a two-part special issue dedicated to the work of K. 
Waltz in International Relations. K. Booth, “Introduction” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
2009, pp. 179-181: p. 180 
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This is not to claim, as is often assumed, that he neglected the latter; in fact as 
Williams demonstrated, this was not the case.87 It is rather, Waltz’s insistence that 
the same theory cannot account for both and therefore that different theories are 
necessary that is problematic for the purposes of this project.88 Due to this position, 
Waltz self-consciously lacked the unified framework that the other realists examined 
here employed in order to examine the policies pursued by certain countries.89 As 
such, his inclusion would not fit with the third criterion outlined above. Of course the 
fact that Waltz is not the subject of a separate chapter does not imply that he can be 
overlooked. His impact on the study of international relations is such that this would 
have been impossible. He rather assumes the role that Ashworth assigned to “the 
other protagonists” in his own project of intellectual history, namely that they 
“appear, but in supporting roles that underscore their connections to both the 
background events and the main characters”.90 Waltz is indeed in the background 
both in the shift from classical to structural realism discussed in the third chapter, and 
even more so in the fourth chapter.  
 
Structure of the argument and thesis outline 
In this final section I explain the structure of the thesis and offer an outline of the 
argument. First, I provide an overview of the sequence of the four main chapters of 
the thesis and why this particular approach was taken. Second, I explain the 
organisation followed for each particular chapter. Finally, I offer an outline of the 
thesis and the argument. 
The thesis is divided into four main chapters, one for each of the authors examined. 
The sequence of the chapters is intended to display the development of realism from 
its early formulation by Carr to Mearsheimer’s variant of structural realism. The 
pattern followed corresponds broadly to the actual sequence in which the most 
important works of the authors under examination appeared, with Carr’s Twenty 
                                                 
87 M. Williams, “Waltz, Realism and Democracy” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2009, 
pp. 328-340 
88 K. Waltz, “International politics is not foreign policy” in Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1996, pp. 
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90 L. Ashworth, Creating international studies, p. 8 
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Years’ Crisis appearing in 1939, Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations in 1948, 
Herz’s Political Realism and Political Idealism in 1951 and Mearsheimer’s Tragedy 
of Great Power Politics in 2001. It would have been, however, misleading to base 
the organisation of the chapters solely on such a periodisation. With the partial 
exception of Mearsheimer, who belongs to the present generation of realists, all three 
remaining thinkers were intellectually active for roughly the same period i.e. the 
middle of the 20th century.91  
Even if one excludes Carr, who both made his debut earlier and then shifted his focus 
to history, the careers of Morgenthau and Herz were largely overlapping. It is in their 
case that the focal point of the thesis as a project of intellectual history plays a crucial 
role. While Morgenthau can be solidly placed within the traditional approach to 
international politics and opposed vocally the behavioural revolution, Herz was more 
open to new approaches. As explained in the previous part, he can be understood as a 
transitional figure between classical and structural realism. Consequently, despite 
being a contemporary of Morgenthau, his examination follows that of the former and 
serves as a bridging point between early realists and the work of Mearsheimer. It 
must be clarified here that this order of authors, despite revealing some tendencies, 
does not imply a linear progression.92 Despite, for instance a gradual transition from 
intuition to more deductive approaches in terms of broad assumptions the same 
trajectory is not evident when it comes to the central concepts discussed. As such, 
this quasi-chronological ordering of authors does not necessarily imply that in every 
aspect of the examined realists’ thought there was a clear progression to a pre-
determined endpoint.  
Each of the four substantial chapters of the thesis is organised according to the same 
pattern. This was deemed essential in order to make parallels or differences between 
different authors more apparent. Each chapter is thus organised into four main parts. 
In the first part, I offer some information on the intellectual background and 
influences of each author in order to put their work in context. Then I proceed to 
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examine the role of power in their ontological and epistemological assumptions. The 
second part examines their conceptualisations of power, its nature and the role it is 
expected to perform in their respective theories as well as its limits. In the third part I 
examine the connection of said conceptualisation of power to the concept of the 
nation-state. Finally, in the fourth part I demonstrate how the realists under 
examination applied their theory in order to analyse past or present policies of 
specific nation-states.   
In the first chapter, I discuss the multi-faceted and flexible conceptualisation of 
power in the works of E.H. Carr and how it led to an account that views the 
development of the nation-state through the interplay between domestic and 
international factors. I examine how his historical work on the Soviet Union 
exemplified the practical application of his theory. In the second chapter, I discuss H. 
Morgenthau’s view of power as a psychological relationship and how he projected 
the animus dominandi to the collective level to account for the nation-state. The 
empirical element comprises of the application of his theory retrospectively to 
Germany during the two world wars and to American foreign policy during the 
second half of the twentieth century. In the third chapter J. Herz is examined as a 
transitional realist between classical and structural realism. I examine his 
understanding of power as a protean concept and its interplay with his account of the 
territorial state. The empirical aspect focuses on his engagement with the foreign 
policies of Germany and the United States. In the fourth chapter, I examine the role 
of power and the nation-state in J. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. His engagement 
with the foreign policy of the United States is employed in order to illustrate both the 
consistency and the limits of his theory. Finally, a fifth concluding chapter identifies 








CHAPTER I  
E.H. Carr and the resilience of flexibility: the three 
facets of power and the nation-state93 
 
Introduction 
Carr was once described as a “modern renaissance man” with an immense range of 
interests and an enduring legacy as an international relations theorist, a historian, a 
biographer and a journalist (and a controversial one for that matter).94 When it comes 
to his contribution to international relations theory, the discussion is most often 
focused on his Twenty Years’ Crisis or -in the case of more detailed studies- on his 
writings until 1951.95 After that, Carr is considered as lost for international relations, 
since he then started working on his History of Soviet Russia which occupied him for 
the next three decades of his life. The neglect of this –and other relevant- works of 
Carr on behalf of international relations scholars is understandable. For the Soviet 
Union is no more and Carr’s alleged preoccupation with its study as an agent of 
change seems now irrelevant.96 Yet when read with one eye fixed on Carr’s 
assumptions on international politics, this later work illuminates a considerable level 
of consistency with respect to his understanding of international relations and the 
cardinal factor that power is for domestic and international politics alike.97 Themes 
                                                 
93 Parts of this Chapter have been included in the following publications: D. Kenealy and K. 
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not gone entirely unnoticed. See D. F. Duke “Edward Hallett Carr: Historical Realism and the Liberal 
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that are so familiar to students of IR such as the dialectics of power and morality and 
their uneasy compromise, as well as the role of ideologies and purposeful thinking 
underpin Carr’s historical work inasmuch as they underpin his early work in 
international relations.  
In the first part, I explore the role of power in Carr’s theory of international relations. 
First, I discuss the philosophical background of his work. There the figures of Marx 
and Mannheim are of prominent importance. Carr embraced the sociology of 
knowledge developed by Mannheim and integrated it into his peculiar dialectics of 
power and morality. I claim that this move, placed power at the heart of Carr’s 
epistemological and ontological assumptions. In the second part I explore Carr’s 
conceptualisation of power and its nature and role. I claim that, rather than 
representing a weakness of his theory, his fuzzy and multi-faceted conceptualisation 
of power allows for considerable flexibility by taking into account both material and 
ideational aspects of power. I also explore the role of morality as a factor that 
mediates power but is ultimately conditioned upon it. 
In the third part I examine the way Carr employed his understanding of power in 
order to explain the rise, development and eventual decline, as he saw it, of the 
nation-state. The nation-state emerges from this analysis as a political entity which 
reflects the interplay of all facets of power both internationally and domestically. I 
claim that Carr’s historically nuanced account of the nation-state and its 
transformations is solidly based upon his conceptualisation of power and his views 
on the conditionality of thought. His views about its political and moral bankruptcy 
and the need to transcend it, are also based on that framework. In the fourth part, I 
examine the History of Soviet Russia and the other works of Carr on the Soviet 
Union under the light of the preceding analysis. I claim that the struggle between the 
formal ideology of the Soviet Union and the realities of world politics as well as the 
uneasy steps to address the question of nationalism represent for Carr a clear 
manifestation of the complexities of politics and the uneasy compromise between the 
forces of power and morality.   
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I. Carr’s theory of International Relations  
The philosophical foundations of Carr’s approach 
E. H. Carr has attained, as Molloy observed, “iconic status” in the discipline of 
international relations.98 The devastating onslaught against idealism he supposedly 
delivered with the publication of his Twenty Years’ Crisis during the first Great 
Debate of the discipline probably played some role in achieving that status. Yet, 
despite recent scholarship that questioned both the debate itself and the devastation it 
caused on Carr’s targets, his work retains its attraction to scholars of international 
relations and is the subject of renewed interest.99 As a result of the continued interest 
on Carr, the –somewhat inconspicuous- philosophical foundations of his theory of 
international relations have been uncovered to a sufficient extent.100 Carr has been an 
eclectic scholar but there are two figures that are prominent in his thought: K. 
Mannheim and K. Marx.101  
Of crucial importance for understanding Carr’s philosophy, is his indebtedness to the 
sociology of knowledge of Mannheim. In more than one instance Carr recognised the 
influence of Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia on his own work.102 For Jones Carr’s 
debt to Mannheim was great not only with respect to the rhetorical structure of the 
Twenty Years’ Crisis but also –and to a greater extent- to methodology. Thus the 
conditionality of thought which is prevalent in Carr’s critique of the utopians i.e. the 
rationalisation on behalf of the powerful of their own position is a concept borrowed 
from Mannheim.103 The critical technique of the sociology of knowledge is then -
Jones continues- twisted and displayed as the ‘realist’ extreme opposite to ‘utopia’, 
allowing Carr to create a set of dichotomies to be resolved by his own propositions, 
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artificially presented as the middle ground.104 This assessment, however, does not do 
full justice to Carr.  
Carr indeed identified the sociology of knowledge with consistent realism, as Jones 
claims, when he discussed the dead end to which the latter leads. Realism can be 
sterile, thus necessitating the uneasy compromise between reality and utopia.105 
Similarly, the sociology of thought might be irreplaceable in “unmasking” absolutes, 
but unless it proposes a “sort of middle ground” it is at risk of degrading to an 
“intolerably negative relativism”.106 If Carr identified the sociology of knowledge 
with the one extreme of his theory this does not necessarily imply that it represents 
merely part of a rhetorical devise. It rather indicates the acute awareness of Carr to 
the further implications of the consistent application of the method i.e. the 
omnipresent risk of relativism. The question is thus to find a new “standard of value” 
and as Carr examined the two possible answers that Mannheim gave i.e. “a nakedly 
pragmatical belief in power” and a “supra-temporal Reason” he ironically echoed the 
criticisms his own approach received.107 Carr thus delegated the sociology of 
knowledge to the one extreme of his dialectics because he was fully aware of the 
implications of its consistent application.  
Second, the dialectical scheme Carr used is much more than a rhetorical device 
employed to make the moderate reader sympathetic to his view. It is rather a mode of 
analysis that Carr utilised consistently regardless of whether he wrote about 
international relations, the philosophy of history or about the history of the Soviet 
Union. In historical works such as his massive History of Soviet Russia Carr was also 
interested in the interaction of reality and utopia and the possible compromises 
between them. And it is in What is History? where Carr employed a set of dialectical 
opposites in approaching historiography and once more suggested a middle 
approach.108 Perhaps unsurprisingly, as when dealing with international relations, he 
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also evoked the criticism of creating ‘false oppositions’.109 As regards international 
relations, as Molloy demonstrated, the dialectics of utopia and reality is not used as 
merely ‘camouflage’ but constitutes the basis for a “positive theory of IR”.110 Indeed 
Carr’s efforts to make sense of international relations and change in the works that 
followed the Twenty Years’ Crisis were constantly informed by his anxiety to 
suggest ways of overcoming the antithesis between the forces of morality and 
power.111  
As such, Carr’s dialectics can be better understood through his preference for an 
inductive methodology which allowed him to employ eclectically elements from 
different perspectives to tackle concrete problems without having to resort to 
deductive reasoning. A dialectical scheme such as the one he employed was an 
essential vehicle for that flexibility.112 It must be clarified that given Carr’s 
eclecticism, his dialectics is influenced by but not strictly modelled after Marx or 
Hegel. Carr might have authored a biography of Marx and he was positively inclined 
towards socialism, but was no Marxist.113 His fascination was not grounded on Marx 
the prophet of social transformation but on Marx the methodological innovator in the 
development of tools to “uncover the sources of social behaviour” and to dissect 
historical processes.114 Unlike the dialectics of Marx where thesis and antithesis give 
their place to an entirely new synthesis, this is not the case in Carr’s dialectics where 
synthesis entails a merger between the two worlds. Consequently, Carr’s dialectics 
was a curious construct, rather eclectic in nature, that drew freely on “Hegelian, 
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Marxist, and Jamesian methodologies, with a Freudian twist” and should be read in a 
more “non-progressive, Heraclitean” way.115  
At the heart thus of Carr’s theory lie on the one hand the application of the sociology 
of thought in order to unmask the conditionality of purported absolutes, and on the 
other hand a dialectical scheme which attempts to identify compromises to practical 
problems in an effort to correct the sterility of the former. Both elements are of 
crucial importance for understanding the role power plays in Carr’s ontological and 
epistemological assumptions.  
 
Power in Carr’s epistemology and ontology  
The sociology of thought Carr borrowed from Mannheim makes power central for 
his epistemology. One of the main implications of its application, is that thought 
itself is conditioned by the position of the thinker in time and space. As such the 
process of thinking is not only relative to the interests of the thinker but also 
pragmatic since it forwards his purposes. The duty of the realist when theorising, 
does not stop at unveiling the conditional thinking of the utopians. He must go 
further as to demolish the whole utopian edifice and reveal that the moral absolutes 
are not absolutes at all but instead products of a dominant group that imposes them 
on the subordinate groups as a means of perpetuating its predominance.116 In short, 
the reality of power conditions not only the process of thinking but also morality as 
the product of that process, and the duty of the realist scholar is to reveal that 
underlying reality.  
This position has important epistemological and ontological ramifications for Carr’s 
theory. As Oren demonstrated, Mannheim was worried of the potential of the 
sociology of knowledge to transform politics into “a chaotic contest in annihilating 
opponents’ utopias” and attempted to insulate its study by attributing a special role of 
apolitical detachment to intellectuals.117 Carr, however, was not persuaded since he 
believed that analytical impartiality vanishes from the very moment the political 
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theorist decides to actively participate in political debates.118  The political theorist 
thus occupies a peculiar role, which is tied to the inseparability of purpose and 
analysis. Ultimately, “political thought is itself a form of political action”.119 Given 
the inevitably purposive character of political science, the researcher is bound not 
only to understand the forces that formulate modern society but also to propose 
policies accordingly by anticipating the ideal balance between utopia and reality. 
The second implication is that the conditionality of thought and thus morality, of 
necessity grant the latter a secondary importance in Carr’s dialectics. His is a 
peculiar dialectics of power and morality or reality and utopia and their uneasy but 
necessary reconciliation that lies at the heart of sound political thought.120 This 
dialectical scheme is central in Carr’s understanding of power, since the weaker side 
of the equilibrium i.e. morality plays a mediating role at the functions of power. 
Power is for Carr constituting the ‘political’ more than any other factor. Although he 
employed a set of opposites in order to better describe the dialectics inherent in 
politics –i.e. utopia and reality; ideal and institution; morality and power- it is clear 
that power has the principal role. Politics is not solely restricted to power, yet it 
entails power nevertheless. What differentiates an administrative from a political 
issue is that the latter involves a conflict of power.121 When it comes to morality, the 
second element of politics, although it is deemed necessary for any sort of politics to 
operate its role is significantly restrained. Morality is conditioned by power but the 
equation does not work vice versa. Thus although morality might be essential for 
politics the only way for its successful operation is that it is adequately grounded on 
reality i.e. the domain of power.122 Morality thus remains the weak part of the 
equation in such an understanding of international politics, always dependant upon 
power and even more relative in international politics than it is in domestic.123    
                                                 
118 Idem 
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Power, consequently, plays a central role for both the epistemological and the 
ontological foundations of Carr’s work. The unequal relationship between power and 
morality in Carr’s dialectics, however, makes his theory vulnerable to charges of 
relativism. In the following part, after examining the nature of role and nature of 
power in Carr’s theory of international relations I will address the question of its 
connection to morality and relativism in more detail.   
 
II. Carr’s conceptualisation of power  
 
The multifaceted nature of power  
For Carr the importance of power stems from the “dual character of political society” 
which is based on two “conflicting aspects of human nature”, namely self-assertion 
and solidarity. As a result, politics is always going to be in flux and the best outcome 
one could hope for would be a precarious compromise between power and 
morality.124 This part of Carr’s work has often been interpreted as encapsulating 
assumptions about human nature that are either informing his “ambivalent realism” 
or offering evidence for his predominantly realist orientation similar to other 
classical realists like Morgenthau.125 Whilst indeed Carr grounded his approach on 
some general observations about how human societies operate, the connection with 
Morgenthau for that matter should not be overstated. 
In contrast to Morgenthau, Carr was not concerned with exploring the animus 
dominandi as an anthropological condition. He would also have been at odds with 
Morgenthau’s preference for the insulation of different spheres of human activity for 
analytical purposes. For Carr any effort to study man in isolation from society and 
the abstraction of the homo politicus as someone who pursues power alone is a 
meaningless exercise.126 His insistence to engage with all aspects of politics at the 
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same time and his tendency to favour power over morality in his dialectics certainly 
made him vulnerable to Morgenthau’s criticism that he lacked a “transcendent point 
of view from which … to appraise the phenomenon of power.127 At the same time 
however, his emphasis on the study of man as a social being allowed him to avoid 
the determinism often associated with realist visions that are grounded on 
assumptions about human nature. 
For Carr individual and society are mutually constitutive and this means that such an 
“elusive entity” as human nature can only with difficulty be understood in terms 
other than “as a historical phenomenon shaped by prevailing social conditions and 
conventions”.128 As such, it should be borne in mind that when Carr grounded his 
approach to politics on human nature, this represents the bare minimum of empirical 
observation about how societies operate diachronically. His is a notion of human 
nature that is flexible and unfixed. As such, as Charles Jones observes when 
examining his indebtedness to Mannheim, Carr differed significantly from 
“continuity realists” like Hans Morgenthau and Herbert Butterfield and their a-
historical perspectives of human nature.129  
Carr then grounded power loosely in a human nature which is malleable. His 
conceptualisation of power itself is equally flexible. He never offered an explicit 
definition of power as such and thus the closest his reader can get to his ideas about 
the essence of power is his analysis of its three facets in the Twenty Years’ Crisis. 
Drawing from and adapting Bertrand Russell, Carr presented the three facets of 
power in international politics.130 Those were military power, economic power and 
power over opinion. In the few lines preceding their analysis he offered crucial 
information of his understanding of power. First, “power is in its essence an 
indivisible whole”: the three manifestations of power are thus employed “for 
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purposes of discussion” and are “closely interdependent”.131 As he maintained when 
elaborating on each form of power, neither of them can exist without the others.  
Carr went to great pains to dispel the identification of power with military might. By 
insisting on the indivisibility of power he maintained that it is an illusion to separate 
economics from politics.132 So far Carr does not seem to be far from contemporary 
realists of the structural variant who tend to conceptualise power in terms of, 
preferably measurable, material capabilities.133 It is, however, in the third facet of 
power where Carr went beyond his successors and which merits particular attention. 
Power over opinion, he claimed, “is not less essential for political purposes” than the 
other two forms of power.134 Power over opinion is inextricably woven to the other 
two forms of power and follows them closely. An ideology of international character 
thus remains ultimately impotent unless connected to national power and therefore 
propaganda is ineffective until it establishes clear linkages with national military and 
economic power.135 
There is, however, a limitation of power over opinion that is of crucial importance. In 
contrast to military and economic power, when engaging with ideational power we 
have to “remember that we are dealing no longer with purely material factors, but 
with the thoughts and feelings of human beings”.136 What limits power over opinion 
even more significantly than the discrepancy between facts and propaganda, which 
deems any propaganda that does not correspond at least to an extent to reality futile, 
is the fact that human beings “in the long run reject the doctrine that might makes 
right”.137 The need for national propaganda to be camouflaged in the form of 
international ideologies with broader appeal is for Carr the ultimate manifestation of 
this limitation.138 In short, power over opinion is the facet of power where it meets, 
and is limited by morality. 
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It must be clarified here, that given the focus of Carr in the Twenty Years’ Crisis, he 
examined primarily the importance of power for international politics. It is not 
difficult to imagine that the three forms of power operating at the international level 
can also be applied to domestic politics with slight modifications like substituting 
military power with the coercive functions of the state. In fact prior to examining 
power in the international domain Carr focused on the nature of politics, where his 
main theme was the domestic society and the coercion exercised by the state. Even 
when dealing with the international level, he easily shifted from examples derived 
from domestic politics to similar ones in international affairs.139 As will be shown 
subsequently, despite the differences between the domestic and the international 
levels and the inapplicability of the domestic analogy, for Carr the two are closely 
interrelated and when examined historically their distinction becomes blurry.140  
In a generally well-informed review of Carr’s notion of power Hirst claims that the 
three facets of power discussed above, are limited in that they solely concentrate on a 
“capacity-outcome” conception of power. Such a conception is agent-centric, 
quantifies power, identifies capacities post hoc through outcomes and, most 
importantly, is largely outdated.141 While it is accurate that in the discussion of the 
three facets Carr emphasised the importance of them for national policies, his 
understanding of power was far broader than that. For instance his conception of 
international law as a meeting point of power and ethics and as a function of the 
community of nations, despite anchoring law to politics is not easily reducible to a 
capacity-outcome view.142 As Barnett and Duvall have shown in their taxonomy of 
power, Carr did not only see the compulsive traits of power. He was also attentive to 
the institutional, structural, and even discursive facets of power.143 As will be 
                                                 
139 Ibid. pp. 91-95; pp. 97-102 
140 For the inapplicability of the domestic analogy in Carr see G. Evans, “E. H. Carr and international 
relations” in British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1975, pp. 77-97: pp. 86-87 
141 P. Hirst, “The eighty years’ crisis, 1919-1999— power”, p. 133, pp. 138-148. Interestingly and 
tellingly for Carr’s complex views, he raised Fox’s criticism for exactly the opposite reasons i.e. that 
his notion of power implies a total disregard of agency forcing states to adapt to external 
circumstances. W. Fox, “E. H. Carr and political realism: vision and revision” in Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1985, pp. 1-16: p. 6 
142 E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 159-167 
143 While Carr’s “explicit discussion of power was largely limited to its multiple instruments… that 
could be used to overcome resistance” for Barnett and Duvall Carr was also aware of the ability of 
international institutions to “institutionalise the interests of the powerful and work against those of the 
weak”. He also, due to his indebtedness to Marx, identified the role of dominant ideologies in 
indoctrinating states who then could more easily “submit to their own domination”. Finally, due to his 
 46 
discussed in the third part, the three facets of power offered by Carr, cannot be 
reduced to an agent-centric ‘capacity-outcome’ view that artificially separates 
developments in international politics to those at the domestic level.  
 
Power, morality and change 
Power might be the most important factor in international relations but, as mentioned 
already, Carr was acutely aware of the problems associated with the consistent 
application of realism. Thus in his Twenty Years’ Crisis after demolishing the 
utopian structure, Carr turned against the realist sterility which contradicts the very 
nature of politics as the field of the struggle and uneasy reconciliation of the forces of 
realism and utopia.144 Given, however, the primacy of power in his theory, there 
remains the question of where Carr could look for the utopian element that can 
complement realism. For several of his commentators, Carr had nowhere to turn to 
because of his moral relativism. 
The unequal relation between power and morality has been debated ever since the 
Twenty Years’ Crisis was published. This was an issue that occupied several of the 
first responses to the book raised by some of the ‘utopians’ Carr offended.145 The 
main characteristics, however, of much of the discussion to follow Carr and his 
notion of power were foreshadowed by Morgenthau with his review of the former’s 
works on international politics. Morgenthau, after celebrating Carr’s efficacy in 
demolishing the utopian structure of the nineteenth century, described his effort to 
synthesise power and morality as the “Odyssey of a mind which has discovered the 
phenomenon of power and longs to transcend it”.146 For Morgenthau, Carr failed to 
offer a satisfactory synthesis due to his relativistic conception of morality, which led 
him back to power. Lacking a transcendent moral standard, Carr ultimately becomes 
a “utopian of power”.147 Much of the ensuing debate which surrounded Carr’s 
approach to power has been exhausted to examining whether Carr was a relativist. 
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Favourably disposed scholars tend to advocate that Carr never fully succumbed to 
relativism, whereas less-favourably disposed scholars tend to repeat the verdict of 
relativism.148  
According to Wilson, even in this more realistic of his works, The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, Carr compromised his relativism by accepting that on occasion the interests of 
the dominant group do coincide with those of the community as a whole and that, 
although never being too elaborate about it, he did “smuggle ethical foundations” in 
his work.149  This view is partially supported by Carr’s later works on history. When 
discussing the role of the historian Carr claimed that “his aims and purpose will 
ultimately be derived from values which have their source outside history”.150 There 
is then a set of abstract ideas that one can refer to and that may constitute 
“indispensable categories of thought”.151 They, however, not only represent the bare 
minimum but also -and perhaps more importantly- are empty shells lacking a pre-
determined meaning. Meaning is only given to them through their translation to 
concrete policies that are inevitably conditioned by space and time.152 For Carr thus, 
rather than looking in vain for extra-historical standards with which to pass 
judgement on societies or historical phenomena, it is much more meaningful to 
approach them “in their relation to one another”.153 Such views reveal, as 
Scheuerman claims, that Carr was perhaps more attentive to the complexities of 
modern morality than his critics who were fixed on traditionalist notions of ethics. At 
the same time, however, due to this attentiveness he often failed to ask “tough moral 
questions”.154  
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As such, Carr’s mere recognition of the existence of an objective morality cannot 
provide sufficient grounds to conclusively absolve him of relativism.155 When 
combined with his views about progress and change, however, it adds credence to the 
view that his relativism was at least somewhat qualified. Carr believed firmly in 
progress; not in a teleological sense that would imply an uninterrupted line towards 
an end outside history but in “the progressive development of human 
potentialities”.156 Progress rather involves the “transmission of acquired skills” 
through subsequent generations, can face setbacks, and heads “towards goals which 
can be defined only as we advance towards them” in a history with no clear end in 
sight.157 This belief, that even in times that look desperate, there are always going to 
be “new forces and movements” under the surface so that humanity still progresses 
was Carr’s own “unverifiable Utopia”.158  It is this optimistic side, as evidenced in 
his belief that humanity was gradually moving towards genuine mass democracy 
combined with his awareness of the risks of relativism, which according to Howe 
signified that far from being a relativist himself, Carr actually possessed an 
“evolutionary theory of moral progress”.159  
This emancipatory aspect of Carr’s thought has found favour amongst scholars who 
often make reference to his moral project in order to display his affinity with critical 
theory.160 Such scholars, however, as Babík correctly observed, tend to often 
overcorrect towards the direction of critical theory.161 Carr’s pragmatism should not 
be overlooked when dealing with his moral project because it is precisely the realist 
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side of his approach that can determine which moral purposes are worth pursuing at 
any given time. The ends towards which humanity strives arise within history, “not 
from some source outside it”.162 As such, the task of the politician lies not only with 
identifying which end is “morally or theoretically desirable” but also which part of 
this moral purpose is politically feasible through the direction of “the forces which 
exist in the world”.163 And, given the purposeful nature of political thought, the task 
of the political thinker is to point towards the direction where power and morality 
can be uneasily and temporarily reconciled.  
This is precisely what Carr set to do with the works that followed the publication of 
the Twenty Year’s Crisis. It is in these works, starting with Conditions of Peace that, 
as Molloy claimed, the dialectical scheme of Carr fully materialises through the 
advocacy of “systemic transformation through power to achieve a moral end”.164 
Carr’s complex views about historical development, the interplay between power and 
morality, the attempt to strike workable compromises between the two, and the 
malleability of values according to conditions of space and time are all on display in 
the way he tried to understand, and transcend, the nation-state.   
  
III. Power and the nation-state 
 
Power and the transformations of the nation-state 
In the final pages of the Twenty Years’ Crisis Carr reflected on the potential of the 
survival of nations as the main units of power in the future.165 There he dealt with 
problems such as the optimum size of the units of power, the historically conditioned 
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character of national states, and the tendency towards integration; problems which 
are clearly anticipating the arguments that followed in his subsequent work.166 In the 
preface to the Second Edition Carr suggested that the reader consults his future work 
on the subject since, according to his view, he accepted the nation-state as the main 
unit “too readily” in this early engagement.167 In the years following the publication 
of this first engagement, Carr went on to publish two other major contributions to 
international relations, Conditions of Peace and Nationalism and After. A 
characteristic of these further works is the gradual shift from a focus solely on 
international relations to an account that is also attentive to developments at the 
domestic level, or to follow Evans, the transplanting of the same core assumptions in 
a different level of analysis.168 
Carr’s periodisation of modern international relations into “three partly overlapping 
periods, marked by widely differing views of the nation as a political entity” 
provided a systematic account of the transformations of the post-medieval state.169 
This transformation was displayed in terms of the interplay between the three facets 
of power both domestically and internationally but also through the closely 
associated prevailing ideas and notions of international morality. In the first period, 
the modern nation-state gradually emerged from the ruins of the “medieval unity of 
empire and church”.170 Political power was centralised to the person of the monarch 
and economic power, in the form of mercantilism, worked alongside it to consolidate 
the nation-state through imposing uniformity domestically and expanding its markets 
through war externally. The purpose of these policies was “to augment the power of 
the state” but at the same time they were consistent national policies, for the nation 
was still identified with its rulers.171  
The second period, starting from the end of the Congress of Vienna and lasting until 
the outbreak of the Great War, was characterised by a remarkable compromise 
between political nationalism and economic internationalism. Political power passed 
to the middle classes and the tendency of the previous period “in asserting the claim 
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of the nation to statehood” was further intensified. At the same time laissez-faire 
economics, based on the expansion of the pie associated with industrial production, 
replaced mercantilism as the dominant credo. The level of economic interdependence 
achieved, however, lay for Carr not with the infallibility of liberalism but with 
British economic and political supremacy throughout the 19th century. It was the 
opening of the British market and the concentration of financial services in London 
that allowed the delicate system to operate in a relatively impartial manner which 
obscured the close interconnection between political and economic power.172 
It is with this second period that the element of ideational power became increasingly 
important. The passing of political power domestically to the middle classes signified 
a crucial transition that Carr called the “democratisation” of the nation. At the level 
of ideas, the identification of the nation with the “people”, gave nations a “popular 
connotation” and the personification of the nation replaced the person of the monarch 
in international relations as a necessary convenience. This move according to Carr 
was of profound psychological importance since henceforth human traits and 
behaviours were to be collectively attributed to nations.173 As long as the fragile 
compromise of the nineteenth century persisted, however, the implications of this 
move were not fully felt. When British economic and political supremacy crumbled, 
the system which was founded upon it started disintegrating.174 The new nationalism 
of the twentieth century would operate under an entirely new background.   
The nation-state of the second period, serving the aspirations of the middle classes, 
could comfortably be accommodated with economic interdependence through its 
limited functions and the artificial separation of political from economic 
aspirations.175 The transition from middle class democracy to mass democracy, or the 
“socialisation” of the nation brought about a radical transformation of its character. 
The newly founded political power of the masses meant that their economic 
considerations such as social welfare gained in prominence.176 As such, the third 
period was characterised by the alliance between nationalism and socialism which re-
established the unity between politics and economics. The main prerogative was now 
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the welfare of the members of the nation-state and the augmentation of its power and 
the world economy of the second period was replaced by the increasingly 
protectionist national economies of the interbellum.177 Internationally, an originally 
western European idea expanded globally through the proliferation of independent 
nation-states as a result of the application of the principle of self-determination and 
the benefits expected in terms of economic nationalism and industrialisation.178 
In Carr’s narrative of nationalism thus, the concept of the nation changed to reflect 
changing access in political power domestically, but at the same time was in close 
interplay with international power as witnessed by the elaborate system maintained 
under British supremacy. His analysis also reveals the increasing importance of 
ideational power in the form of nationalism and its impact on the international 
system and the moral edifice it supported. Any sense of international community that 
existed during the first two periods was based on a common framework shared 
between sovereigns initially and middle classes later. In the age of socialised nations 
and exclusive nationalism, however, this framework vanished. Henceforth the wars 
between nation-states were characterised by an unprecedented ferocity since the 
target was now the whole nation. The purpose of war was also transformed to a 
means of securing economic benefits for the victor and inflicting economic pressure 
to the defeated. Finally, the very way modern democratically accountable statesmen 
conducted and understood their obligations had changed, the ultimate obligation 
being towards one’s own people and not towards an international society.179  
What emerged from that ‘climax’ of nationalism then, was an ideology that gradually 
became so powerful as to undermine the foundations of international morality and 
ultimately determine the way that power itself was understood and employed. This 
final phase in the development of nationalism illustrates the implications of both the 
indivisibility of power and the continuous interaction between its different facets. 
The description of propaganda in the Twenty Years’ Crisis as a modern weapon and 
the prerequisites for its effective use bears remarkable resemblance to the social 
setting of the third period of nationalism. Although power over opinion itself is old 
enough, its impact in modern politics depends upon the increase in political 
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participation that mass democracy allowed.180 Yet this characteristic is only peculiar 
to the modern nation-state after its third period, and thus historically conditioned. At 
least one manifestation of power, then, is in fact determined in its present and 
particularly potent form by nationalism, demonstrating the power that an idea that 
becomes entrenched can convey.  
This is not to assume that a successful ideology can indeed substitute power in its 
complexity. For the particular value of Carr’s insistence on the indivisibility of 
power is precisely that the other two forms of power are imposing restraints to the 
operation of the third. This allowed him to make the claim that the burdens imposed 
on the modern nation-state by developments in the fields of military and economic 
power would eventually signal the end of the age of nationalism.  
 
Moving beyond the nation-state 
For Carr the political unit is not to be conceived as a category outside history; and 
neither are the forms of political organisation. “The structure of society at any given 
time and place”, he claimed, “as well as the prevailing theories and beliefs about it, 
are largely governed by the way in which the material needs of the society are 
met”.181 The question is whether a form of social organisation is able to meet those 
needs. In Carr’s view the nation-state was increasingly incapable of doing so. He 
believed there was a clear tendency in the fields of military and economic power that 
would eventually make the nation-state, and particularly a small one, incapable of 
performing its main functions. Matched with the moral bankruptcy of nationalism, 
these tendencies created for Carr the necessity to contemplate ways to transcend the 
nation-state.  
Mechanised warfare demanded the backing of enormous industrial capabilities, in 
which small nations could not hope to follow the great powers. Thus while even as 
late as the Great War they stood a chance for playing a role in the final outcome, by 
1940 their resistance had “no more than a nuisance value”.182 The option of 
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neutrality was also closed, since the great powers realised that it was more 
convenient to violate it rather than give their opponents a possible advantage. Small 
states in response, tended to surrender voluntarily their neutrality by relying more 
and more on the military capabilities of great powers to ensure their defence.183 With 
respect to the limitations imposed by economic power Carr claimed it played a more 
important role than military power, even though its importance was often neglected 
due to the outdated belief that the 19th century division between politics and 
economics was natural. He emphasised the point that at a time when modern 
industrial conditions in fact deemed concentrations of economic power inevitable, 
the world was becoming politically even more fragmented thus accumulating 
economic problems and insecurity. Put simply, the small nation-state could no longer 
provide the level of prosperity expected by its population.184 
Carr here observed a paradox in that the world was becoming even more politically 
fragmented while the realities of power rendered the nation-state obsolete, an issue 
also raised by other mid-century realists.185 For Carr the problem lay with the 
application of Wilsonian principles in the aftermath of the Great War. By applying 
the principle of self-determination uncritically, the peacemakers created a whole 
number of small independent nation-states at the exact moment when the 
independence of small units was becoming more nominal than real. Here the 
conditionality of thought that Carr borrowed from Mannheim is of crucial 
importance. For the identification of the principle of self-determination with that of 
nationality though corresponding to the circumstances prevailing in Western Europe 
where the two were identical, was completely irrelevant to the situation where multi-
national empires hitherto ruled. The main error thus of the peacemakers was their 
failure to realise that a moral principle becomes inapplicable when regarded as 
absolute and isolated from the political context that created it.186  
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The transplantation of nationalism to “new and unfamiliar soils”, where the 
European traditions could not limit it to the same extent, had catastrophic 
consequences. For Carr however the moral challenge facing nationalism was not 
only restrained to societies outside of its birthplace but a broader one. Insofar as 
nationalism in its climax signified the “exaltation of the nation over the individual as 
an end in itself” it was morally problematic.187 For Carr rights such as freedom and 
equality were meaningful only for individuals and could only be approached as 
metaphors, and dangerous ones for that matter, when applied to nation-states.188 As 
some commentators have noticed, Carr indeed overlapped with critical theory in his 
quest to discover a new moral framework upon which a new international society 
could be built.189 Yet to go as far as to claim, as Hobson does, that in his effort to 
transcend the nation-state Carr “ascribed a full autonomy to global moral norms” and 
that it was the “realities of global morality rather than global power” that would 
shape the new international order, is to underplay the significance of both his realism 
and the dialectics of power and morality.190  
Even in his most ambitious blueprints, Carr’s emphasis on the centrality of power 
never vanished. What partially triggered the moral attack on nationalism, he claimed, 
was precisely the failure of the nation-state to adequately provide for the security and 
welfare of its citizens.191 The forces then, which brought about the nation-state in its 
socialised form, were still active; what changed was the capacity of the nation-state 
to address their demands.192 In his quest to identify ways to address those demands, 
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Carr embraced functionalism as the way forward. But his was not the functionalism 
of the world state advocated by Mitrany.193 He cautioned against the “sentimental 
and empty universalism” implied in such a solution and gravitated in favour of 
regionalism which he deemed more “practical and workable”.194 His preference for 
regional integration stemmed from his belief that the realities of power would 
ultimately determine the form of the unit of organisation to replace the nation-state in 
the same way they previously conditioned the development of the former.195  
IV. Carr’s ‘showcase’ of realism: The Soviet Union 
Carr and the History of the Soviet Union: some preliminary 
remarks 
Russia played a cardinal role in Carr’s intellectual development even before he 
became interested in the revolution and its impact. It was his involvement with 
nineteenth century Russian literature during his career as a diplomat that made him 
sensible to the relativity of thought and the challenge towards the liberal moral 
framework that originated from those “outside the charmed circle”.196 According to 
his own account, his interest shifted to what was happening in Russia with its entry 
in the Second World War and the dramatic change from the impotence of 1917.197 
The outcome of Carr’s involvement with the Soviet Union was a massive set of 
work, not restricted to his 14 volumes of the History but including several other 
essays and books.  
In a period so polarised as the Cold War, Carr’s mode of thought and his insistence 
to avoid moral judgements when writing history gained him several criticisms. A 
notable and often repeated criticism was that his determinist view of history resulted 
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in his siding with the victors.198 Although partially right, since from very early Carr 
claimed that “what was, is right”199 this assessment is unfair. Carr was never an 
ardent determinist and this is apparent in his handling of determinism in What is 
History?.200  What he was sceptical of, was the theoretically conceivable but 
unhelpful for a historian engagement with what might have been if things took 
another, more favourable course, especially with respect to recent events.201 Haslam 
does him more justice when describing this attitude as a “deep-seated fatalism” 
closely related to Carr’s brand of realism.202  
Carr’s attitude towards the Soviet Union changed through time –naturally according 
to his own standards of historiography.203 Davies, who collaborated with him in the 
writing of the Foundations of Planned Economy, described the latter’s changing 
attitudes towards the Soviet Union until they were crystallised in the general 
assessment of “a great achievement and a historical turning-point” from 1941 on.204 
This is not to assume, as several critics have done, that Carr viewed the Soviet Union 
as offering an alternative to western capitalism. Despite his belief in planned 
economy as expressed in The New Society, Carr was aware of the peculiarity of the 
Russian case and faced the Soviet achievements rather as a challenge that the western 
world ought to answer.205 As some of his commentators already noticed, the motive 
behind his interest on the Soviet Union was not the projection of the soviet 
experiment as a successful utopia. He rather, and similarly to his previous 
endeavours, saw the Soviet Union as a showcase of the necessary blending of utopia 
and reality in politics, as demonstrated by a state that gradually abandoned its initial 
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revolutionary rhetoric and became normalised.206 In the following sections I focus on 
the traces of Carr’s peculiar realism with respect to the development of the Soviet 
Union and its attitude towards nationalism.  
Utopia and Reality: The Soviet Union and the World 
The initial impulse of the Bolsheviks with respect to foreign affairs was to treat their 
condition as the first step to world revolution. Thus their first moves were the issuing 
of the ‘peace decree’ and the publication of the secret treaties concluded by the 
previous government, both intending  to demonstrate their contempt towards 
traditional diplomacy and their self-image as a force substituting national divisions 
for class ones. Since the decree failed to evoke any reaction in western governments 
it gave its way to a foreign policy that Carr described as “dual and in some respects 
self-contradictory” i.e. the simultaneous effort to negotiate with capitalist 
governments and thus ensure the survival of the soviet state and overthrow them and 
spread the revolution.207 The tendency towards normalisation can be traced back to 
that first period when the instinct of survival forced the Bolshevik to contemplate a 
series of ideological concessions such as maintaining the authority of the state and 
behaving as one.208 Yet the adjustment to the realities of international politics was a 
very gradual process and at the first stages the Soviet Union suffered the 
consequences of its dual policy.  
The first test-case appeared within the first year of the establishment of the new 
regime. The first priority of the Bolsheviks was to conclude peace with Germany and 
although an armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk from as early as December 1917, 
the Soviets stalled while waiting for the German proletariat to rise. After some weeks 
of negotiations the German generals, unimpressed by Trotsky’s formula of “no peace 
no war”, resumed operations and advanced towards Petrograd. Facing elimination 
the new regime finally accepted terms even harsher than those initially proposed and 
peace was secured at February 1918. This failure, however, increased the feeling of 
vulnerability and helplessness of the new regime and resulted in a hasty rebuilding of 
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a tactical army that ideally ought to have been abolished.209 Relations with Germany 
represent a classical example of the dual policy followed by the Soviet Union. In the 
aftermath of Brest-Litovsk the Bolsheviks found themselves negotiating with the 
German government and at the same time inciting revolutionary activity to 
overthrow it, a contradiction only obscured by the increasing ineffectiveness of 
German authorities during the collapse of 1918. Bolsheviks saw Germany through a 
“haze of ideological preconceptions” and heavily misjudged its politics. Yet only a 
year after the failed communist rising of 1919 in Germany, Lenin could speak of a 
natural alliance between the latter and Russia.210  
A demonstration of that evolution is given by the way Carr understood the 
Comintern. In the Twenty Years’ Crisis he briefly mentioned it as an exemplification 
of the close association between national power and international propaganda.211 He 
later engaged systematically with the institution not only in the volumes of his 
History of Soviet Russia but also in two separate works: The Twilight of the 
Comintern, 1930-1935 and The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War, published 
posthumously. Through those works the reader observes the gradual fading of an 
organisation aiming at coordinating the communist parties towards the expected 
revolution. As the Soviet Union entered the 1930s with the doctrine of ‘socialism in 
one country’ already consolidated, the prospect of world revolution was becoming 
not only distant but also annoying for the Soviet leadership. As a result the 
Comintern after its seventh congress in 1935 was already simply identifying its aims 
with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.212 The way Carr examined the Spanish 
Civil War is indicative of the new tendency: a party with marginal if any role before 
the war (the Spanish Communist Party) gained gradually in importance and 
participation in government because of the increasing dependency of the Spanish 
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republican government upon soviet aid. This process according to Carr “seemed to 
have less and less to do with communism”; communism was now employed as a 
façade for the forwarding of the Soviet foreign policy.213  
This is not to assume that the Soviet regime ever quit from the aspirations for world 
revolution. Carr observed that from such an early stage as the allied intervention the 
ideological element of world revolution in soviet foreign policy was intensified, yet 
informed by “the interest of national self-preservation”214. For Carr this dual balance 
although gradually leaning towards the side of normalisation would never stop 
haunting soviet politics. He thus described the dilemma faced by the soviet 
leadership during the Sino-soviet schism as the persistent original dilemma between 
beliefs in international socialism and national interest, ultimately between the 
revolutionary principles and reality.215 Consequently, Carr viewed the Soviet Union 
as an exemplification of the constant interaction between the forces of utopia and 
reality that is the very “stuff of politics”. The balance between the ideal and the 
institution will always be an uneasy one, as the soviet case demonstrated.216  
 
Ideologies and power: communism and nationalism 
The leadership of the Soviet Union then, had from quite early to adapt to the realities 
of power in order to ensure its survival. What is also of particular interest, given 
Carr’s approach to ideational power, is the interplay between the ideologies of 
communism and nationalism in soviet policy. The doctrine officially embraced by 
the Bolsheviks upon their ascendance to power was that of Marxism whose 
programme of international socialism was incompatible with nationalism, the 
aphorism of The Communist Manifesto that “the working men have no country” 
being quite explicit. It would therefore require a great deal of ideological flexibility 
to reconcile the two doctrines. The way that the soviet doctrine of self-determination 
was developed by Lenin to reconcile the nationalism emerging from the ruins of a 
formerly multi-national empire and the socialism of the Bolshevik programme is an 
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indicative example of the necessary blending of utopia with reality in Carr’s 
thought.217  
Despite the variety of nationalities it encompassed, in pre-revolutionary Russia the 
preconditions for active national agitation were limited: the local elites -as the most 
likely bearers of nationalism- not only enjoyed a privileged position in the Russian 
administration, but Tsarist authority also protected them from the revolutionary 
potential of their respective peoples. The disintegration of this centralised system that 
followed the revolution allowed for the removal of the fabric of common interests 
that held the periphery anchored to the centre. The case of a permanent break-up like 
in Austria-Hungary was averted according to Carr due to two peculiarities of Russia. 
The first was the predominance of the Great Russian population vis à vis the other 
nationalities; the second was the summoning of nationalism as a force eventually 
reinforcing bolshevism. This paradoxical achievement is attributed to Lenin that 
“recognised the revolutionary factors in nationalism, and had foreseen that the only 
safe course would be to welcome and harness the torrent”.218 Thus by developing a 
“conditional and dynamic” doctrine of self-determination allowing for secession, the 
Bolsheviks were able to go through the civil war with considerable advantages over 
their ‘White’ opponents. Russian patriotism was easily evoked against forces 
supported by foreign powers and the connection of nationalism with social reform 
resulted in the support of the agricultural population whose nationalism was mainly 
characterised by economic grievances. The ‘Whites’ on the contrary represented the 
old Russian tradition, not only hostile to social reforms but also to concessions 
towards nationalities. Hence the Bolsheviks by way of recognising the right to secede 
in a period when no one had the power to keep the state united, proved to be more 
flexible and capable of “making a virtue of a necessity” than their opponents.219   
The description of the process of disintegration and re-integration of the Russian 
Empire is presented by Carr in a way that echoes the assumptions outlined in his 
previous works on nationalism. Thus the success of each nationalism is viewed as 
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dependent upon the roots and social base of said nationalism and, equally 
importantly, upon the regional power setting. Poland and Finland are presented as the 
only two nations that possessed from the outset a native ruling class capable of  both 
leading the national movement and to run the nation once independence was gained. 
Furthermore they both had substantial German support in their beginnings that 
precluded their forceful re-integration into the Soviet Union.220 Ukraine and White 
Russia on the contrary accounted for a quite different story. In the first, the 
nationalism of the peasantry constituting the majority of the populace maintained 
mainly anti-Jewish and anti-Polish characteristics. Furthermore, the economic 
interdependence with Russia was much closer than in the cases of Finland or Poland. 
As a result, the national movement of Ukraine, mainly evoked by a small group of 
intellectuals without broad popular support, was never consolidated. Its leaders, 
when faced with pressure from Petrograd, turned first to the French, then to the 
Germans and finally to the Poles for support. This final move was to remove any 
popular support that remained for the national movement, since it evoked the 
hostility towards the Polish landowners. Bolshevik rule was thus re-established by 
1921.221 The brief survival of the Transcaucasian Republics until 1920, suggested 
Carr, was maintained by the fact that the power vacuum left by Russian collapse was 
covered by them only with foreign support. When the latter withdrew, Russia was 
ready to recover them.222  
What one can infer from Carr’s account is the close interdependence between the 
eventual success of a nationalist endeavour and the realities of domestic and 
international power. Carr observed that the Bolshevik regimes established in several 
of the republics after their secession would not be able to succeed without the 
support of Moscow and the case was similar with their opponents. The ultimate issue 
was thus not one of independence but whether the dependence would be on Moscow 
or on a western capital.223  The underlying argument here is the same as in the 
Conditions of Peace and Nationalism and After, although clearer since illuminated 
                                                 
220 German support proved more decisive in the case of Finland -where a civil war erupted between 
Bolshevik-backed social-democrats and the government- and helped consolidate “the bourgeois 
regime in Finland”. Ibid, pp 292-295 
221 Ibid. 295-312 
222 Ibid 350 
223 Ibid. 273 
 63 
by practical examples. The principle of self-determination had a very limited 
applicability in regions east of Vienna, and was contingent upon the existence of a 
set of preconditions that were similar to those in Western Europe. Furthermore the 
realities of power and its regional distribution imposed limits to the independence of 
small units, to such an extent that they could determine their very survival qua 
independent units. Even when the Soviet Union developed its own variant of 
nationalism, Carr approached it as being qualitatively different from the exclusivist 
nationalism of the third period.224 
 
Concluding remarks 
Power then, informs crucially Carr’s assumptions about what constitutes the 
‘political’ and thus can be traced in almost all his works including those that are 
classified as historical. It is the fact that power lies at the core of Carr’s methodology 
and his epistemological and ontological assumptions which allows it to underpin 
consistently such a diverse set of works. The implicit, multi-faceted and elusive 
conceptualization of power that Carr developed in the Twenty Years’ Crisis is an 
important factor for this consistency. The three facets of power, distinct from each 
other yet inescapably woven to each other, allowed Carr to employ his 
conceptualization in order to investigate complicated social phenomena such as 
ideologies, whose analysis would not fit in a conventional understanding of power in 
terms of material capabilities. This flexibility allowed him to offer a compelling 
account of the historical development of the nation-state. 
His was an account that saw the nation-state emerging in the wake of the collapse of 
the medieval order and transforming gradually to adapt to new political and 
economic conditions. The main factor behind the transformations of the nation-state 
was the interplay between domestic and international power. The strength of Carr’s 
                                                 
224 See for instance the discussion in Nationalism and After where he claimed that none of the 
victorious powers was “nationalist in the old sense”. E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After, p. 36. Soviet 
nationalism, he claimed later, always professed to differ “on the ground that it is built up on the 
brotherhood of the many nations and races composing the Soviet Union”. Although Carr here seemed 
too willing to take the soviets’ word for it, his criticism of western nationalism as resting “on the 
unspoken assumption of the superior right of the white man” and his warning for the resonance of the 
soviet appeal with anti-colonial movements seems rather fair. E. H. Carr, Soviet Impact, pp. 100-101. 
Carr was not entirely consistent on the question of the novelty of Soviet nationalism. Indeed, his 
discussion of Stalin after the latter died, credited him with resurrecting “the Russian national 
tradition” (emphasis added). E.H. Carr, “Stalin” in Soviet Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1952, pp. 1-7: pp. 3-4    
 64 
approach was that he realised that the nation-state was not a static entity. Its character 
changed to reflect the increased access to political power of new social strata until it 
encompassed the whole of society. The same was also true of economics with the 
nation-state transforming to adapt to new economic conditions and to accommodate 
the demands of those that wielded political power. Nationalism, as the ideological 
corollary of the nation-state, also transformed to reflect changes in the field of power. 
Yet ideas have a power of their own and as long as they keep corresponding to the 
underlying social conditions this power is going to be potent. 
Carr’s views on the conditionality of thought and morality allowed him to see the 
nation-state as a historically and geographically conditioned entity. He, however, 
never saw power as the only factor that determines political life, although probably 
he saw it as the most important. He approached nationalism as an ideology that 
attempted to strike a balance between power and morality, but such a balance can 
only be precarious. When realities at the field of international power challenged the 
defensibility of the nation-state both economically and politically nationalism too, 
Carr thought, would become bankrupt. Its moral bankruptcy had already been 
demonstrated when in its third phase it eliminated any surviving notion of 
international morality. This belief led Carr, consistently with his insistence that a 
compromise between power and morality is an essential condition for sound political 
life, to contemplate ways to realistically transcend the nation-state. 
Given his belief that sound political thought lay with providing a blueprint for 
balancing, temporarily and uneasily, reality and utopia it is of no surprise that Carr 
always tried to identify possible solutions. Of course, the diagnosis is always easier 
than the prescription of a treatment and as Haslam noted Carr was often “too eager to 
prescribe”.225  It is under the lens of the balance between the irreconcilable forces of 
utopia and reality that Carr’s History of Soviet Russia remains particularly important 
for international relations theory. For it clearly displays the process of normalisation 
a revolutionary power has to undergo if it hopes to survive, while struggling to 
maintain something from the utopia that gave rise to it. The experiment that Carr 
hoped that might suggest possible ways out of the crisis or challenge the western 
world to find new ways out might have failed. Carr’s volumes however, remain as an 
                                                 
225 J. Haslam, “Carr’s Search for Meaning” in M. Cox (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, pp. 21-
35: p. 26 
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excellent demonstration of his understanding of power and its functions, the 
restraints it imposes on ideals, and the compromises reached in order to 
accommodate the ideal with reality.   
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CHAPTER II  
Hans Morgenthau and the tragedy of the nation-
state226 
Introduction 
The main focus of this chapter is the role power plays in Morgenthau’s approach to 
politics as tragedy and its connection to the nation-state. I begin by putting 
Morgenthau’s theory of international relations into the context of a critique of 
rationalism that he first launched with Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. There is a 
tendency in recent literature to uncover Morgenthau’s hidden motivations and 
intellectual roots, which the author apparently camouflaged appropriately to make his 
ideas appealing to his new audience after he settled in America.227 While mindful of 
the contribution of such approaches, in this chapter I propose to take Morgenthau on 
his own terms not the least because hidden motives are rather hard to verify. I thus 
argue that Morgenthau’s eclecticism allowed him to draw from a broad range of 
sources to create his version of realism. It is particularly the classical tradition, which 
Morgenthau himself described as encapsulating the ‘eternal truths’ of politics, which 
is of cardinal importance for understanding the core of his theory.  
The contribution of the classical tradition on Morgenthau’s theory is twofold. Firstly, 
it provides him with a clear distinction between different spheres of human activity, 
exemplified by the distinction between the transcendental and the actual that is 
central for his moral project. Secondly, that tradition offers Morgenthau the core 
assumptions he employed about the nature of man and politics, namely the awareness 
of the tragic element in human nature and the recognition that power politics is an 
inalienable element of social life.  The association of power with human nature, 
based on the anthropological assumption of an inescapable lust for power, forms the 
core of Morgenthau’s ontology and underpins his proclamation that interest defined 
as power is the ‘timeless key concept’ in politics. Power has however a role to play 
                                                 
226 Parts of this chapter are published in a modified version which focuses more on tragedy in: K. 
Kostagiannis, “Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation-State” in International History 
Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2014, pp. 513-529  
227 This applies particularly to thinkers like Nietzche and Schmitt that, is assumed, would make 
Morgenthau uncomfortable in his new environment, had he admitted his indebtedness to them.  
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in his epistemology too. It is its identification as the ‘central concept’ of politics 
which helps delineate the borders of the field and establish the autonomy of politics.  
In the second part I focus on Morgenthau’s conceptualisation of power. I argue that 
the explicit definition of power as a psychological relationship that stops short of 
violence serves the purpose of insulating the political sphere from other social 
spheres and at the same time defines the distinction between ends and means in 
politics. If, however, the assumption that power constitutes the core of politics is 
followed to its logical consequences then an unmitigated anarchy defined by 
unlimited power drives would actually materialise. This, according to Morgenthau, is 
not only prevented due to the mediating role of forces that oppose power such as 
morality but also due to power itself, and particularly the operation of balance of 
power. The latter he understood not in solely a mechanistic way but rather as a 
concept that constitutes both an element of a pluralistic international society and a 
normative prerogative. The common moral framework of the nineteenth century was 
thus essential for the effective operation of the balance of power, but for Morgenthau 
that framework was dissolved due to the rise of modernity and nationalism. 
In the third part I examine the interrelation between power and the nation-state. The 
nation-state, as the current mode of political organisation, has a twofold significance 
for Morgenthau’s theory. Firstly, it provides the framework through which the 
animus dominandi is transferred from the individual to the collective level. Secondly, 
it provides Morgenthau the concept around which to anchor the central for his theory 
notions of interest and power. The role of nationalism as the ideological corollary of 
the nation-state permeates the fields of power and morality. With respect to the 
former, nationalism is both an element of national power and the main culprit behind 
miscalculations of national power. I claim that despite his criticism of the nation-
state Morgenthau’s theory is on occasion too closely connected to it due to the 
important functions the concept is expected to play within the theory. Finally, I 
discuss the limits imposed upon the nation-state and nationalism by power in general 
and by power in the nuclear age in particular, which led Morgenthau to start 
contemplating the idea of a world state.  
In the fourth and final part of the chapter I examine the exemplification of 
Morgenthau’s approach in the cases of the foreign policies of Germany in the first 
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half of the twentieth century and that of the United States during the Cold War. 
Drawing from the themes discussed in the first three parts, I examine Germany as an 
exemplification of an actual national tragedy triggered by self-defeating nationalism. 
I approach the United States as the potential tragedy of a nation that succumbed to 
idealism, a tragedy that Morgenthau sought to avert with his advice. Finally, with the 
concluding remarks I bring the chapter in the context of the aims of the thesis and 
relate Morgenthau’s views on power with those of E.H. Carr that I covered in the 
previous chapter.  
I. Morgenthau’s theory of international relations 
 
The critique of rationalist philosophy 
With Scientific Man vs. Power Politics Morgenthau launched a fierce critique against 
the rationalist philosophy of the last three centuries and its fundamental assumptions. 
He claimed rationalism, as the backbone of modern political thought, to be 
fundamentally flawed.228 It is flawed ontologically since “rationalism has 
misunderstood the nature of man, the nature of the social world, and the nature of 
reason itself”.229 It is also flawed epistemologically since its blind belief in the 
scientific approach, modelled after the natural sciences, offers neither a full 
understanding of nor a remedy for the problems of the social world.  
The anthropological assumptions of rationalism suggest that reason can be used to 
understand both man and the world and bridge the gap between knowledge and 
action.230 This assumption has profound implications. For it presupposes a false 
identification of natural and social worlds under reason in the form of causality. The 
methodological outcome is to model social sciences after the more advanced natural 
sciences and emulate their methods. Morgenthau treated the result as one of utter 
                                                 
228 Morgenthau considered rationalism to underpin both liberalism and Marxism, and thus both camps 
of the Cold War, despite their differences, shared -and suffered from- the same flawed philosophical 
background. Hence when Morgenthau was referring to the dilemmas facing the scientific man, his 
critique did not only aim at the western world but was a universal critique of modernity. This is 
particularly apparent in H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?, New York: New American 
Library, 1972, p. 4  
229 H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1965, p. 5  
230 Ibid. pp. 122-123 
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failure not only because the social world is essentially different from the natural 
world, but also because even in natural sciences the hitherto accepted degree of 
certainty was gradually undermined.231 Morgenthau’s issue with rationalism was thus 
that its “scientific dogmatism” failed to grasp the real attributes of human nature, a 
sentiment he shared with contemporary American realists or even with some non-
American non-realists like Oakeshott.232  
Liberal international relations’ theory, as the modern embodiment of rationalism, 
suffers from the same vices. Liberalism in international relations, by combining the 
experience of its domestic success and the philosophy of rationalism sees 
international politics in terms of the domestic analogy. Thus international politics as 
a domain defined according to pre-rationalist systems of thought by the struggle for 
survival and power is essentially altered. Since states are modelled after individuals 
in domestic politics, international relations are to be governed by the same rationalist 
principles. The predominance of economics and trade over politics and the harmony 
of interests over the struggle for power lead to a system of thought that negates 
politics and replaces political conflicts with mere technical issues.233  
Yet rationalism is not only flawed philosophically. It also suffers from historical 
insensitivity. Even if rationalism’s philosophic premises are not flawed per se, they 
do not correspond to the experiences of modernity. Taken as they are out of their 
original historical context and treated as eternal truths they are utterly irrelevant to 
reality. Thus, a philosophy originating in the clash between the rising middle classes 
and the feudal state and mirroring the formers’ interests continues to inform a world 
that has long since departed from this setting.234 In the resulting question whence 
should modernity find inspiration to overcome the deficiencies of rationalism, 
                                                 
231 Ibid. pp. 122-136; In Science: servant or master? Morgenthau added to his critique of modern 
science the moral shortcoming of failing to attain a meaning by either of the two historically available 
options i.e. relation to transcendental values or immanent justification. H. Morgenthau, Science: 
servant or master?, pp. 11-24  
232 Interestingly, although Oakeshott agreed with Morgenthau’s verdict of rationalism, he considered 
the latter’s views as a mirror image of that rationalism. If rationalism saw erroneously a bright future, 
Morgenthau committed a similar error by looking nostalgically backwards: N. Rengger, “Realism, 
tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian imagination in international political thought” in M. Williams (ed.), 
Realism Reconsidered, pp. 118-136. For the common “theologico-political” and anti-rationalist 
background of several of the early American realists see N. Guilhot, “American Katechon: When 
Political Theology Became International Relations Theory” in Constellations, Vol. 17, No 2, 2010, 
pp. 225-253  
233 H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 70-121 
234 Ibid. pp. 19-40 
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Morgenthau turned to the pre-rational philosophies, which he often invoked as a 
sharp contrast to rationalist assumptions.235  
 
The return to pre-modern verities: Politics as tragedy  
According to Morgenthau’s verdict the liberals have been “forgetful of the historic 
relativity of all political thought”.236 Yet not all political thought he treated as 
historically relative.237 For political science presupposes the “existence and 
accessibility of objective general truth”; and the continued relevance of classical 
texts demonstrates their ability to transcend their historical context and express that 
truth.238 Morgenthau thus, while denying universality to liberal values, was anxious 
to dispel any notion of relativism such as the one he criticised Carr for displaying.239 
Hence in his quest to identify the eternal truths of politics, Morgenthau turned to the 
wisdom of the pre-rationalist philosophy, a philosophy he often contrasted to the 
rationalist assumptions he was challenging. His attachment to pre-rationalism is 
neither superficial nor, as Frei suggests, a mere act of camouflaging his real 
philosophical roots.240  
Pre-rationalism is on the one hand employed to demonstrate the clear distinction 
between different spheres of human activity. Liberalism identifies politics, ethics and 
science implying that a political action is ethically justified insofar as it follows a 
scientific solution. On the contrary, pre-rational philosophy treats the convergence of 
                                                 
235 Although Morgenthau often invoked the pre-rational tradition in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics 
it is in his Science: servant or master? that he employed pre-rationalism and discussed extensively the 
“shock of wonderment” which reveals the limits of human experience but can also found the basis for 
meaningful science. H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?,  pp. 24-34  
236 H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 20 
237 Philosophies representing “eternal verities” are able to guide theory and practice irrespectively of 
time and although rationalism is not one of them “there have been philosophies which were at least 
partly of this kind”. Ibid. pp. 4-5 
238 H. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 36 
239 S. Molloy, “Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil” in Journal 
of International Political Theory, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, pp. 94-112: pp. 96-98 
240 Frei, perhaps too eager to trace Morgenthau’s thought back to Nietzsche, claims that the use of pre-
rationalism merely cloaks ideas he borrowed from Nietzsche in a language acceptable for the 
American audience, given the latter’s hostility to Nietzsche. See C. Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: an 
intellectual biography, Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 2001, pp. 189. The same line of 
argument is also followed by Neacsu: M. Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International 
Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment, Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 50-56. 
Morgenthau’s eclecticism allowed him to accommodate both pre-rationalism and modern critiques to 
rationalism in his approach, as will be shown in this section. 
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politics and ethics as a goal to be reached through virtue.241 What is more important, 
the moral criticism of politics in pre-rationalism relies on a clearly conceived and 
distinct notion of ethics. Thus, it denies the moral value of power politics without 
having to deny the existence of power politics altogether as does liberalism.242 This 
very distinction between the transcendent and the actual, which can never be 
overcome due to human imperfection, is philosophically rooted to Plato and Aristotle 
as shown by Pin-Fat.243 Such notions of distinct ethics, along with the moral value of 
prudence, are explicit demonstrations of the impact of the pre-rational tradition on 
Morgenthau.244  
On the other hand, it is with respect to the very nature of both man and politics that 
this philosophy offers the eternal verities Morgenthau sought. The first truth of the 
pre-rationalist philosophy is the awareness of the tragic element in human nature. 
The understanding of the existence of irreconcilable forces like evil and good, reason 
and passion, peace and war, and the inconclusive struggle between them; the 
experience of transformation of good intentions into evil deeds; and the glaring gap 
between man’s understanding and the enigmas of the world are all experiences that 
manifest the tragic element in human nature.245 For Frei and Gismondi this 
                                                 
241 H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics pp. 35-40 
242 Ibid. pp. 42-46 
243 V. Pin-Fat, “The metaphysics of the national interest and the ‘mysticism’ of the nation-state: 
reading Hans J. Morgenthau” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 217-236 
244 Frei correctly points out that although influenced by the analytical faculties and iconoclasm of 
Nietzsche, Morgenthau refused to follow the normative connotations of his philosophy. C. Frei, Hans 
J. Morgenthau: an Intellectual biography, pp. 107-108. Morgenthau drew eclectically from a corpus 
of classical sources for his ethical projects. Lang demonstrated the Aristotelian implications of his 
notion of prudence and the aristocratic universal morality he nostalgically recalled when lamenting 
about the collapse of international morality in the age of nationalism. See A. Lang, “Morgenthau, 
agency, and Aristotle” in M. Williams (ed.) Realism Reconsidered, pp. 18-41: pp. 26-33. The 
importance of Aristotle is also prominent in Molloy’s analysis: S. Molloy, “Aristotle, Epicurus, 
Morgenthau”, passim. For the impact of the Judaeo-Christian tradition see M. B. Mollov, Power and 
Transcendence: Hans Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002, pp. 
15-75 and A. J. H. Murray, “The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau” in The Review of Politics, Vol. 
58, No 1, 1996, pp. 81-107 
245 H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 205-208. In his review of the book 
Oakeshott challenged Morgenthau’s decision to approach tragedy as a category of life rather than 
simply one of art: M. Oakeshott, “Scientific Politics” in Cambridge Journal, Vol. 1, 1948, pp. 347-
358: p. 356. In his reply, Morgenthau refused to concede this “fundamental point”. The gap between 
duty and ability is, he insisted, “a quality of existence”: H. Morgenthau, letter to Oakeshott, 22 May 
1948. This exchange has gained some attention in the relevant literature: N. Rengger, “Realism, 
tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian imagination in international political thought”, passim and R. N. 
Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, p. 308 
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understanding of politics as tragedy is to be attributed to Nietzsche.246 Nietzsche was 
by no means a stranger to tragedy, but his creative approach thereof was alien to 
Morgenthau.247 That the latter was familiar with notions of tragedy established in the 
pre-modern world, rather than a secondary loan from Nietzsche, becomes apparent 
both in terms of form and –perhaps more importantly- of ethics. 
Morgenthau’s “self-conscious” link with tragedy, to borrow Lebow’s phrasing, is 
most clearly present in the works where he explicitly dealt with the tragic quality of 
human existence.248 But the reader of most of his works cannot fail to realise that 
Morgenthau’s very language and grammar very often followed the outlook of 
tragedy. Hence the same “melancholy of wisdom that is informed by an awareness of 
the irremediable folly of mankind, evoking the memory of Thucydides” that 
Morgenthau once attributed to Louis Halle, echoes strikingly familiar to the reader of 
his own works.249 When it comes to the ethical dimension, here too Morgenthau 
differed profoundly from Nietzsche. The Nietzschean “gaiety in the face of the 
unhuman”, as aptly put by Steiner, was foreign to Morgenthau’s notion of the tragic, 
imbued as it is with a very distinct notion of ethics .250 In describing the tension 
                                                 
246 C. Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: an intellectual biography, p. 187. Gismondi’s examination of realist 
notions of tragedy relies heavily on Frei’s claims for the section on Morgenthau. M. Gismondi, 
“Tragedy, Realism and Postmodernity: Kulturpessimismus in the Theories of Max Weber, E.H. Carr, 
Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger” in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 15, No 3, 2004, pp. 435-
463 
247 As Lebow noted, Nietzsche’s interpretation of tragedy tells us more about Nietzsche than it does 
about tragedy: R. N. Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, pp. 53-54. On Nietzsche, tragedy and 
international relations see B. A. Schupmann, “A Pessimism of Strength? Tragedy and Political 
Virtue” in T. Erskine and R. N. Lebow (eds), Tragedy and International Relations, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 129-143; T. Strong, “Nietzsche and Questions of Tragedy, Tyranny 
and International Relations”, ibid. pp. 144-157 
248 R. N. Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, pp. 48-50. Also, see indicatively Morgenthau’s own works: 
H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?, pp. 24-34; H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics, pp. 205-208 
249 H. Morgenthau, “Arguing About the Cold War” (1967) in H. Morgenthau, Truth and Power: 
Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970, London: Pall Mall Press 1970, pp. 349. As an Athenian born before 
the death of Aeschylus and whose education comprised almost exclusively of reading the poets, 
Thucydides was no stranger to tragedy. On the contrary, as Cornford demonstrated, the “tragic theory 
of human nature” was deeply embedded in his work and his history balances between the quest for 
objectivity and the form and psychology of drama. Interestingly the infamous Melian dialogue with its 
hubris and tragic irony, is attributed not to Thucydides the historian but to Thucydides the dramatist. 
See F.M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus, London: Edward Arnold, 1907, pp. i-xv; pp. 174-187. 
For a more recent and detailed account of the importance of the “tragic vision of politics” in the work 
of Thucydides see: R. N. Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, pp. 40-46; pp. 126-141 
250 For the quoted passage see: G. Steiner, In Bluebeard’s Castle: Some Notes Towards the Re-
definition of Culture, London: Faber and Faber, 1971, p. 106. For a discussion of tragedy and ethics in 
Morgenthau and the gap with Nietzsche in that respect see W. E. Scheuermann, Hans Morgenthau: 
Realism and Beyond, pp. 40-69 and particularly fn 11 
 73 
between the “ethics of our minds and the ethics of our actions” as tragic, Morgenthau 
subscribed to the view that tragedy arises from an ethical clash, a moral dilemma that 
involves “inescapable wrongdoing”.251 And since in his ethical project political 
action necessarily entails doing evil, statesmen must select from a series of options 
the one that accounts for the lesser evil.252 Such an approach to political ethics, with 
a clear understanding of tragedy in ethical terms and the Aristotelian remedy of 
prudence to hubris, can more persuasively be claimed to be a direct influence from 
pre-rationalist thought, as Morgenthau himself claimed.253 
The second truth, also manifesting the tragic element of human nature and deriving 
from this very nature, regards the nature of politics. Power politics is an irreducible 
element of social life, rooted in the lust for power, inherent in all human beings. 
Therefore power is inseparable from politics, the latter being essentially always 
power politics.254 This prevalence of power and its association with human nature 
does not only derive from the tragic element of that nature but also reinforces it, 
since each human being is both “the exponent and victim of that force”.255 This final 
contribution of the pre-rationalist mode of thought is, according to Morgenthau, the 
point where the re-interpretation of politics should begin. It also forms the core 
around which Morgenhtau’s own assumptions about the nature of politics are 
crystallized.  
 
                                                 
251 H. Morgenthau, “The evil of politics and the ethics of evil” in Ethics, Vol 56, no. 1, 1945, pp. 1-18: 
p. 11; For a broad typology of tragedies in international relations which encompasses as many takes 
on tragedy as possible and the position of moral dilemmas in that typology see C. Lu, ‘Tragedies and 
International Relations’ in  T. Erskine and R. N. Lebow (eds) Tragedy and International Relations, 
158-171 
252 H. Morgenthau, “Evil of politics”, passim; S. Molloy, “Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau”, passim 
253 According to Lebow “Morgenthau was intimately familiar with the corpus of ancient and modern 
literature and philosophy”. See R. N. Lebow, “The Ancient Greeks and Modern Realism: Ethics, 
Persuasion, and Power” in D. Bell (ed.) Political Thought and International Relations, pp. 26-39. The 
claim that tragedy is all about moral lessons is met with scepticism by some authors. Euben for 
example thinks that tragedy cannot be self-evidently transferred from its original context to modern 
politics and be interpreted as representing a clash of ethical commitments. Such an interpretation is for 
him “too much the product of Aristotelian and Christian moralising” in which Morgenthau also played 
his part: P. Euben, “The Tragedy of Tragedy” in T. Erskine and  R. N. Lebow (eds), Tragedy and 
International Relations, pp. 86-96: pp. 86-92 
254 H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 9-10, 215-219 
255 H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?, p. 31 
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Ontology, epistemology and power 
Inspired thus by the pre-rational tradition Morgenthau understood power in terms of 
human nature. The central anthropological assumption that informs this 
understanding is that the lust for power or the animus dominandi is an inalienable 
element of human nature.256 The lust for power thus, is an existential condition of 
human beings, generated by their futile efforts to overcome their loneliness since 
love is unable to succeed in that goal. The tragic element of human existence is that 
power is equally impotent in accomplishing that goal.257 This inability of the urge to 
dominate to be satisfied reflects the limits of the human experience as explained in 
the “imperfectability thesis” of Pin-Fat.258 It is this imperfectability, deriving from 
what Bell calls Morgenthau’s “metaphysical” and “theological claims” about human 
nature, that dooms the power drives of men to frustration.259 As such, the lust for 
power stems from a particular vision of human nature rather than constituting a 
concept akin to Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’ which should be treated as 
“ontologically prior to any definition of human nature and self”.260 What reinforces 
this tragic element is the evilness of all politics; for every political action is rooted in 
the inherent lust for power and selfishness of human beings. Thus, the political man 
is eventually trapped in a precarious balance between the opposing but inescapable 
                                                 
256 Of course here Pichler is right to comment that “Morgenthau delivers no proof for his 
anthropological statement”. H. K. Pichler, “The godfathers of ‘truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in 
Morgenthau’s theory of power politics” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, 1998, pp. 185-
200: p 196. For a recent effort to discuss Morgenthau’s claims about human nature in terms of natural 
science see B. A. Thayer, “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International 
Politics” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2010, pp. 124-151 
257 H. Morgenthau, “Love and Power” in Commentary, Vol. 33, No 3, 1962, pp. 247-251: pp. 250-251 
258 V. Pin-Fat, “The metaphysics of the national interest”, pp. 221-224 
259 D. Bell, “Anarchy, power and death”, pp. 221-239: p. 228  
260 For an indicative view that treats Morgenthau’s ‘lust for power’ as identical to Nietzsche’s ‘Will to 
Power’ see U. E. Peterson, “Breathing Nietzsche’s air: New reflections on Morgenthau’s concepts of 
power and human nature” in Alternatives, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, pp. 83-118. Peterson’s view neglects 
the pluralistic view Morgenthau has of a human nature that incorporates different and often conflicting 
elements. Thus the lust for power might be the central aspect of his vision of ‘political man’ but the 
latter is meant to be an abstraction such as the ‘moral man’ that might be meaningful in analytical 
terms but does not imply the universality suggested by Peterson. Cozette thus remarks correctly that 
Morgenthau’s conception of human nature cannot be “reduced to this [the lust for power] impulse”. 
M. Cozette, “What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations” in 
International Studies Review, Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 667-679 
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“perennial poles” of evil and ethics.261 The inescapability of the urge to dominate 
plays in Morgenthau’s theory a significant role with respect both to his ontological 
and his epistemological assumptions.  
Firstly, he considered power and especially the concept of interest defined in terms 
of power to be the main characteristic of domestic and international politics alike.262 
The fact that interest defined as power is the timeless key concept of politics, “an 
objective category which is universally valid” does not, however, imply that its 
meaning is “fixed once and for all”. Different circumstances lead to different 
attitudes to power in various periods in history. Political science while demonstrating 
the central role of power is to adapt its emphasis accordingly.263 Given his explicit 
renunciation of the scientific approach and his agreement with Weber for that matter, 
Morgenthau’s claim to objectivity seems paradoxical. He overcame the value-
determinacy problem raised by Weber by means of modifying Schmitt’s notion of 
‘the political’ so as to incorporate his anthropological assumption. If the essence of 
politics is reduced to a simple, elemental in human nature urge, then there is at least 
one value that all statesmen share: the choice between survival or peril.264   
Secondly, power offers political science with the “central concept” that is essential to 
delineate the borders of the field and establish its independence. Morgenthau 
employed the analogy with economics and its central concept of “interest defined as 
wealth” to describe the similar functions of “interest defined as power” for political 
science.265 The autonomy of the political sphere is an important analytical tool 
Morgenthau borrowed from Weber. As such, it serves the methodological purpose of 
distinguishing different spheres of human activities as ideal types that can in turn be 
analysed in isolation.266  
This central concept has, however, profound epistemological implications beyond the 
mere independence of the political sphere. It also provides political science with “a 
                                                 
261 H. Morgenthau, “Evil of Politics”, pp. 1-18 
262 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1973, p. 35 
263 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 4-9; also in H. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, p. 
38 
264 H. K. Pichler, “The godfathers of ‘truth’”, pp. 190-192 
265 H. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, pp. 38-40 
266 M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical 
Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics” in International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 4, 
2004, pp. 633-665: p. 641 
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rational outline” of politics, having distinguished the timeless features of politics 
apart from the circumstantial. This enables not only the comprehensive 
understanding of political action irrespective of historical or geographical conditions 
but also offers a stepping stone for meaningful political action.267 Far from thus 
being just a mere analytical convenience, the identification of power with the central 
concept of an autonomous political sphere fulfils an important role in the normative 
side of Morgenthau’s theory. It is thus also a “moral and political project”.268  
Finally, power, lying at the core of Morgenthau’s political philosophy, allows for a 
better understanding of his notion of rationality. Despite the ferocity of his attack 
against rationalism Morgenthau maintained that the faculties of reason are essential 
for sound politics. Although Morgenthau’s early writings were influenced by anti-
enlightenment figures, their impact is often exaggerated and the process of his 
intellectual development neglected.269 Hence, his attack on rationalism does not 
imply an embrace of irrationality.270 For Morgenthau reason is indispensable for 
politics insofar as it ameliorates the destructiveness of power, yet this reason is not 
the scientific one of rationalism.271  It is reason in the form of political intuition 
rather than the deductive reason of positivism that has the primacy. It is this intuition 
of the platonic philosopher-king that according to Pin-Fat allows for the re-
introduction of reason into politics by reconnecting the transcendental to the actual in 
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II. Morgenthau’s conceptualisation of power 
 
Power in International Politics: its nature and role 
Morgenthau’s analysis of international politics is founded upon an explicit definition 
of power as a form of “psychological relationship”. Power can thus be defined as the 
“control over the minds and actions” of others.273 Since the concept of power is 
treated as being dependent upon the political and cultural context, it might entail any 
social relationship, insofar as it establishes or maintains that control.274 The 
spectrum, therefore, of power may cover all the range of possible relationships 
between physical violence and love.275 The fact, however, that power might 
approximate physical violence does not imply that it can be identified with it. For 
political power is essentially a psychological relationship. Armed strength may 
indeed be the most important element of political power as long as it remains a 
potentiality. When the threat of the use of force in international politics materialises, 
we are no longer in the domain of political power but in that of military power as 
naked force.276 This emphasis on the psychological character of power helps also to 
distinguish the essence of power from its elements. The latter represent merely the 
components of national power; and while ideally they should be added up in any 
power assessment of relative power such a calculation is impossible.277 
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The way Morgenthau thus approached power presupposes a clear distinction between 
political and military power. A further distinction is that between power and 
influence, the first being founded upon compulsion and the latter upon persuasion.278 
Hence both the psychological element and that of compulsion are central in 
Morgenthau’s understanding of power. In contrast to Carr, who whose understanding 
of power was implicit, Morgenthau made sure to conceptualise it. This approach is 
understandable given the role power is expected to play in his philosophy both with 
respect to its analytical and its normative sides. Williams correctly observes that in 
Morgenthau’s theory “power and interest are actually remarkably flexible and 
indeterminate concepts”.279 This conception of power allows for the establishment of 
politics as an “indeterminate sphere”, whose limitless nature encompasses both 
destructive and creative possibilities. At the very same time, the clear distinction 
between power –as defining the political- and other forms of power help insulate the 
political sphere from other social spheres and their respective notions of interest and 
power.280 Finally the exclusion of violence from his notion of power is essential for 
insulating the political sphere from its most dangerous potential i.e. the intrusion of 
physical violence.281  
Consequently the struggle for power plays a central role in Morgenthau’s political 
theory since its existence is the enabling factor for an action to be considered as 
‘political’. Power might be sought after to achieve various objectives and in this 
sense it is a “means to the nation’s ends”. Since it is selected as the appropriate 
means however, power also becomes an end in itself, at least temporarily.282 Based 
on the concept of the struggle of power as defining politics, Morgenthau claimed that 
“all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types”.283 Having 
defined the nature of political power and isolated its role in politics Morgenthau then 
proceeded to employ this role to support a three-fold typology of policies. It should 
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be noted that, despite the misleading language in Politics Among Nations, 
Morgenthau’s typology is not intended to apply to international politics alone, but 
instead encapsulates an independent logic of political power.284 
Since a ‘political policy’ that would imply an abdication from power is out of 
question, the three patterns of policies are the following. Firstly, a policy of the status 
quo is a policy that aims at maintaining power. The part that advocates such a policy 
aims at keeping the distribution of power as it is, with only minor adjustments that 
are not affecting the relative strength of the parts involved been acceptable.285 
Secondly, a policy of imperialism is a policy that aims at increasing power and thus 
altering the existing distribution of power. A significant characteristic of 
Morgenthau’s notion of imperialism is that it is a catch-all concept that aims at 
describing any policy whose purpose is to overthrow the existing balance of power. 
Thus this policy includes not only empire-building but also policies that aim at local 
preponderance.286 Finally, the policy of prestige is one that aims at displaying power, 
a policy that might be pursued in itself but most commonly its objective is to support 
either of the two previous policies.287  
 
Order and chaos: limitations of power  
The assumption that power constitutes the core of politics has far-reaching 
implications. For if it was to be followed without qualifications, it would ultimately 
imply that international relations correspond to a state of complete anarchy and 
unlimited power drives.288 The aspirations of power are thus restrained in two 
partially overlapping ways: the first lies within the domain of power and is the 
mechanism of the balance of power, and the second is the role of forces inherently 
opposed to power such as morality and law.  
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The balance of power is for Morgenthau a necessary corollary of any social order 
that comprises of a number of autonomous units.289 As such, it is bound to operate in 
an international system that comprises of independent political units. The binary 
purpose of all equilibria is “to maintain the stability of the system without destroying 
the multiplicity of the elements comprising it”.290 The international society cannot 
differ since its main elements are multiple and mutually antagonistic nations that 
struggle for power.291 The operational principle of the balance of power is that every 
time the equilibrium is threatened by a nation or group of nations, other nations 
would try to restore it. As a result the system is inherently unstable and precarious, 
since the relative power of the parts is not fixed.292 Another feature of the power of 
states that jeopardizes the normal functioning of the balance of power is its 
immeasurability.293 Statesmen should be able to calculate the power of friends and 
foes alike in order for the balance to operate effectively yet this is virtually 
impossible.294  
Although Morgenthau’s vocabulary gives an occasionally scientific guise to the 
balance of power, the concept has an equally important normative aspect.295 For its 
cardinal role in most realist approaches cannot be justified in terms of its explanatory 
force alone. As Bell argued, the concept is not essential for the “core-determining 
structure of realism” and power politics are certainly imaginable without balancing. 
He treats the concept instead as a ‘peripheral’ concept, a normative prescription to 
avert the “mortal dangers” that an unqualified quest for power would imply.296 As 
such, the function of the balance of power is dependent not only upon the capability 
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of the parties involved to exercise it but also on whether its normative aspect is 
incorporated in the dominant moral system of the given historical period.  
Bell’s assumption seemingly contradicts Morgenthau’s mechanistic vocabulary of 
the balance of power. Yet this contradiction can be overcome if Little’s interpretation 
of the balance of power is taken into account. According to that interpretation, 
Morgenthau in fact incorporated two different but interconnected dynamics of 
balance of power in his system. The first dynamic is the one which stems from 
balance of power as a universal phenomenon that is an inalienable element of a 
pluralistic society and includes the aforementioned perils. Even that dynamic cannot 
be treated as describing a principle of engineering but rather as an ideal type in the 
Weberian sense.297 The second dynamic is related to the “self-conscious attempts to 
‘regulate and restrain’ the power drives” thus minimising their potentially 
catastrophic escalation.298 It is mainly the latter thus that by embodying a normative 
prerogative can limit significantly the dangers of an unlimited quest for power.  
Indeed, the fact that the balance of power has been more successful in the previous 
centuries than in the twentieth is attributed by Morgenthau to the parallel operation 
of a universal moral code that institutionalised the former.299 The moral consensus 
between the European states of the eighteenth century and the sense that they 
belonged to the same community allowed them to develop restraints and establish 
rules in the conduct of politics that preserved “the overall stability of the European 
republic”.300 Even the mechanistic vocabulary of the period, borrowed from the 
natural sciences and intended to give to the balance of power a rationalist outlook 
became internalised. Even though only a “serviceable metaphor”, as Molloy puts it, 
the balance of power became associated with qualities it never really possessed thus 
obscuring how essential a common moral framework was for its operation.301  
Although it should not be overestimated, Morgenthau claimed that morality plays an 
important role in international politics, since the revolt of human mind against power 
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is “as universal as the aspiration for power itself”.302 Moral values thus limit the 
extremities of power politics, since they restrain statesmen from considering some 
means and ends as more ethically justifiable than others.303 The model period of 
modernity for Morgenthau was that of aristocratic rule in Europe, when the balance 
of power operated at its full effectiveness. Then, diplomats and statesmen shared a 
universal moral code that imposed rules for political action.304 The dual shift from 
aristocratic to democratic responsibility and from universal ethical standards to those 
prescribed by nationalism, would have a profound impact on the restraining role of 
morality as will be discussed in the following part.    
 
III. Power, the nation-state and nationalism 
The nation-state as the current mode of political 
organisation 
Concepts such as ‘national interest’ or ‘national power’ are central in Morgenthau’s 
understanding of international politics. As such, before engaging with the relation 
between power and the nation-state in his thought it is important to clarify how he 
approached the ‘nation’. Throughout his works Morgenthau used the terms ‘nation’ 
and ‘nation-state’ interchangeably without always drawing a clear distinction 
between the two. This is not to suggest that Morgenthau was negligent of the 
differences between a state and a nation, but rather – and similarly to Carr for that 
matter – that he conceived the two as identical only insofar as the age of nationalism 
is concerned.305 I claim that the nation-state performs two main functions in 
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Morgenthau’s theory both of which are important in order to connect power to 
international relations.  
The first important function of the nation-state in Morgenthau’s theory is the 
bridging of the central concept of the lust for power with international politics. For 
the animus dominandi is an anthropological assumption meant to describe an 
inalienable element of human nature, and thus in principle is applicable only to 
individuals.  It is essential then to identify a process by which the longing for power 
is transferred from the individual to the collectivity, in this case the nation-state. As 
politics occupy a separate sphere so does morality. Man is a moral being inasmuch as 
he is a political being and morality keeps his aspirations of power under check.306 
The deplorability of aspirations of power as immoral combined with the capabilities 
of society to limit them through institutional and disciplinary measures, result in the 
inability of most individuals to satisfy them within the community. This satisfaction 
however is to be found through the mechanism of projecting one’s aspiration to the 
collective power drive of the ‘nation’.307 The breakdown of the moral order of feudal 
and early modern Europe on the eve of modernity intensified this projection. For it 
disturbed irreversibly the internal balance of power between social spheres. With the 
belief in the power of the divine collapsing, and the modern state asserting an 
increasing level of control over its citizens, the individual power drives faced 
unprecedented frustration.308 Hence the projection of the power drives collectively is 
the only open option. An option facilitated by the ideology of nationalism that not 
only undermined the hitherto universal moral values and replaced them with 
particular ones, but also sanctified the pursuit of power as long as its aim is the 
nation itself.309  
The second function is that the nation-state, as the main form of political 
organisation, offers Morgenthau the concept to which he can anchor in a 
comprehensible way the core for his theory notions of power and interest. Yet the 
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fact that the nation-state is currently the central political conglomeration around 
which power and interest revolve, does not imply that it is either “the last word in 
politics” or an eternal category outside history. For Morgenthau interest is indeed the 
timeless essence of politics but its connection to the nation is a product of history as 
is the nation-state itself. Thus, as long as the nation-state remains the prevalent mode 
of political organisation, it is national interest that counts.310 Consequently it is the 
notion of “interest defined as power” that occupies the cardinal role in Morgenthau’s 
theory, the national character of this interest being historically conditioned.  
Notwithstanding Morgenthau’s reservations about the historical character of the 
nation-state, the way he chose to employ it as a means for bringing his core concepts 
to the foreground reveals a significant shortcoming of his approach. In her 
compelling critique of Morgenthau, Pin-Fat argues that his philosophical 
commitment to the distinction between the transcendent and the actual led him to 
allocate to the national interest the function of giving concrete meaning to 
transcendental moral principles. The result is that the nation-state is turned into a 
“mystical entity that has alchemical powers of transmuting the transcendent into the 
actual”.311 Pin-Fat is well aware of Morgenthau’s reservation about the nation-state 
and the risk it poses to international morality but believes that his grammar tragically 
leads him to either of the extremes he hoped to avoid i.e. utopianism or nationalistic 
universalism.   
 
Power, morality and nationalism  
Nationalism, as the ideological corollary of the nation-state, plays a significant role 
in modern politics for Morgenthau. Not only does it constitute one of the main 
elements of national power but also it has a disintegrating effect on international 
morality. The eternal category of politics being power however, even nationalism 
and the nation-state are ultimately in peril by modern developments in the domain of 
power as I will discuss in this section.  
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When discussing the elements of national power, Morgenthau considered the 
“national character” to be one of the qualitative elements that defies the accurate 
calculation of power.312 Nationalism is considered as responsible for one of the 
single-factor fallacies when trying to evaluate national power. Thus, under its erosive 
influence national character is ‘deified’ and the result is an overestimation of its 
impact on national power. The converse mistake of underestimating the importance 
of national character, results also in an erroneous evaluation of power.313 Nationalism 
then distorts the rational faculties of statesmen and might lead them to overestimate 
the capabilities of their respective nations while underestimating the capabilities of 
their opponents. The most important, however, role nationalism plays in international 
politics is to be found in its corruption of universal morality. 
Morgenthau’s moral critique of nationalism was concentrated against the 
“universalistic nationalism” of the twentieth century rather than the “liberal” 
nationalism of the nineteenth.314 For Morgenthau, the emergence of nationalism after 
the French Revolution was not problematic per se. Early nationalism was not only 
well-suited to address the problems of post-feudal Europe and industrialisation better 
than the order that preceded it.315 It also had a progressive quality. The old, liberal 
nationalism of the nineteenth century was synonymous with emancipation from 
oppression, and despite delegating loyalties to the nation it was limited in the sense 
that it recognised that beyond one’s own nation there were “other nationalisms with 
similar and equally justifiable goals”.316 There was the hope then, among early 
liberal champions of nationalism, that international morality would not be 
undermined but rather strengthened by its prevalence. What happened instead was a 
gradual disintegration of international morality for the most part of the nineteenth 
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century, which reached its climax when liberal nationalism was replaced by the new, 
universalistic nationalism of the twentieth century.317 
In sharp contrast to the aristocratic moral code that preceded it, the moral code of the 
age of nationalism limits significantly the ethical restraints of statesmen and thus 
imposes an important burden on morality’s role as a regulator of power politics. 
Hence democratic accountability makes the political actors ultimately responsible 
towards their own nation rather than towards a group of similarly trained individuals. 
Additionally, the universal moral code of ages past is replaced by the particular 
moral code of the nation, which in turn claims universal value triggered by the 
inherent need of human beings to obey universal moral standards.318 The culmination 
of this process is the transformation of nationalism into a political religion, whose 
purpose it is to “impose its own values and standards of action” to other nations.319 In 
such a configuration, the struggle for power is no longer limited but is given instead 
“a ferociousness and intensity not known to other ages”.320 It follows that 
nationalistic universalism is incapable of restraining the foreign policies it is 
identified with, since “it is itself in need of restraint”.321 Nationalism has a similar 
impact on another safeguard against the struggle for power i.e. public opinion. World 
public opinion can only operate under the universal moral standards that nationalism 
deprived it of, and as a result when nations appeal to the public opinion they only 
appeal to something non-existent.322 
This critique which isolates only the modern variant of nationalism as representing a 
profound threat for international morality is indicative of Morgenthau’s scepticism 
about the role of democracy in the rational formation of national interest. The fact 
that Morgenthau was at odds with democracy was spotted early by Oakeshott, but it 
was in the case of mass democracy and its close association with nationalism that he 
saw the greatest risk.323 The parallels with Carr’s association of nationalism and mass 
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democracy in the age of the “socialised nation” are clear here. Unlike Carr’s 
approach, however, for Morgenthau the rise of universalistic nationalism is not 
clearly associated with developments in economic power and the demands for 
welfare.  
Nationalism thus presented modern man with a formidable challenge since it offered 
a distorted view of power, it undermined the functions of the balance of power and it 
incapacitated the restrictive role morality had always played to power politics. 
Morgenthau’s moral critique of nationalism is compelling and appeared much earlier 
than his critique of the viability of the nation-state in terms of power. Yet at the same 
time his notion of morality is bound to the state. In a world now devoid of a universal 
moral standard the state can be the only place that can guarantee a degree of 
existential security to the individual and “thus constitutes the only moral space in an 
amoral world”.324 The only other option left for Morgenthau appeared to be nostalgia 
for an older, more orderly world. 
Indeed for a period in his intellectual life Morgenthau’s attitude, similarly to that of 
Schmitt, was one of lamentation for a bygone era and an almost uncompromised 
pessimism about its potential for recovery.325 It would appear that for Morgenthau it 
was difficult to disassociate himself from that era. As a result the only remedy he 
was initially able to produce to the “empty skies” of modern international morality 
was a “desperate plea” to re-establish the aristocratic diplomacy and balance of 
power of the early modern European system.326 Yet this conventional portrayal of 
Morgenthau as “provocative but ultimately conservative” is misleading in that it 
neglects the distinct stages of a long career.327 Hence Morgenthau’s insights in the 
1960s can hardly be described as backward-looking given his favourable treatment of 
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Mitrany’s functionalism and the “qualified optimism” that characterised his 
contemplation of a world state in the time of nuclear warfare as will be discussed in 
the following part.328  
Power as the nemesis of the nation-state 
Notwithstanding the peculiar relation between nationalism and power and the latter’s 
glorification by the former, the shifting realities of the second half of the twentieth 
century led Morgenthau to the assumption that both nationalism and the nation-state 
have had their days. As I will explain in this section, Morgenthau believed that 
power checks nationalism in any case; but it is in the nuclear age in particular that 
nation-states would become obsolete.  
The main problem with nationalism as a principle of political organisation is that 
there are no inherent limits to its application. Thus, if taken by its own terms 
nationalism is in fact “a principle of disintegration and fragmentation”. The 
disintegration of the old European empires in the aftermath of the First World War 
offers a first-rate example. If the principle of nationalism has been evoked by the 
nations that emerged from that disintegration, nothing could stop populations within 
those nations to invoke the principle in turn. The continuous fragmentation is only 
halted “not by the logic of nationalism but by the configurations of interest and 
power between the rulers and the ruled and between competing nations”.329 Power 
thus plays an important role in limiting nationalism’s potential for a chain-reaction 
that would lead to continuously shrinking in size states.  
Power, moreover, with the essential but unattainable calculation thereof is singled 
out by Morgenthau as the main factor that contributed to the decline of nations 
diachronically. Since the success or failure of a foreign policy depends upon a 
correct evaluation of power, if that evaluation is erroneous the nation that committed 
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it might well fall. The belief that power is absolute rather than relative; the failure to 
project power in time and thus treat is as permanent; or the fallacies of single-factor 
that tend to overstate a particularly advantageous element of national power, are all 
errors of evaluation that can lead to the decline of a nation.330 Nationalism itself, as 
mentioned already, not only is the main culprit of such a single-factor fallacy but by 
distorting the rational faculties of statesmen makes them more prone to 
overestimating the power of their own nation-state and thus committing hubris.331   
If power in general restrains nationalism’s inclination towards anarchy and can bring 
the collapse of certain nations, power in the nuclear age jeopardises the survival of 
the nation-state itself. The possibility of an all-out nuclear war would prevent nation-
states from performing even the most elementary of their functions i.e. defend the 
life of their citizens and their civilisation.332 The solution according to Morgenthau 
would be a political organisation that better reflects the new technological and 
economic developments. However the increase in size of the political organisations 
would not suffice. As his examination of multiethnic states or regional 
conglomerations revealed, the substitution of the nationalism of the nation-state by 
the nationalism of the regional unit would change nothing.333 What Morgenthau 
deemed appropriate was not only a political organisation of larger size, but also a 
supranational principle of order that would replace nationalism and eliminate its 
anarchic tendencies.334  
To claim that Morgenthau’s attitude with respect to the prospects of a world-state to 
replace the obsolete nation-states was consistently held would ignore not only his 
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intellectual development but also a series of well researched arguments that suggest 
otherwise. Indeed Morgenthau’s initially conservative view that looked nostalgically 
to the revival of the old diplomacy of his model period was gradually replaced by an 
embrace of the possibility of change.335 That change entailed a more favourable 
attitude towards the need for a world-state, directly related to the profound impact of 
the possibility of a nuclear war upon his thought. To spot Morgenthau’s 
inconsistencies thus with respect to that matter has indeed some merit, as has the 
attribution of those inconsistencies to the specific historical context i.e. the rapidly 
changing circumstances nuclear warfare brought about.336  
Yet to claim that the change was as profound as to “demand a renunciation of 
traditional state-centred realism and advocacy of an immediate world state”337 does 
not do Morgenthau full justice. For his variant of realism did not revolve around the 
nation-state even in its early stages. It is true that Morgenthau’s insights on the 
nation-state developed gradually, but he certainly was at odds with the modern state 
from quite an early stage in his career.338 His critique of the modern state and the 
associated nationalism identifies the former as the main culprit of the horrors of the 
twentieth century earlier than the potential of nuclear warfare was apparent. And this 
critique was, as was his future amendments to policy prescription, underpinned 
consistently by his understanding of politics as a domain inseparable from power but 
also not devoid of ethics, even if the latter are only the minimalistic ethics of 
necessity.339 It is ultimately the same ethics of necessity that led Morgenthau to 
advocate the world state as an ideal worth striving for despite his own scepticism 
about its possibilities of realisation.340  
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IV. Tragedies that were and tragedies that might be 
The tragedy of Germany and self-defeating nationalism 
The tragedy of Germany during the first half of the twentieth century is an indicative 
case of how Morgenthau applied his thoughts about the limits of enlightenment and 
the perils that nationalism and the unlimited power drive reserve to nations to a 
concrete historical case. As a German Jew Morgenthau was unfortunate enough to 
witness the early stages of the rise of Nazism in Germany, an experience that 
influenced his intellectual development profoundly.341 In a passage echoing his 
Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics Morgenthau discussed the tragedy of the German 
Jews.342 With their majority belonging to the middle classes, they embraced not only 
the philosophy and institutions of liberalism but also its fundamental flaws. 
Consequently they failed to realise –similarly to the liberals in Scientific Man- that 
their emancipation was a result of the rise of the middle classes and that the liberal 
philosophy did not represent eternal verities but was dependant upon the 
predominance of the middle classes. When thus the middle class in Germany 
collapsed in the aftermath of the First World War, they could not grasp the profound 
social implications of this collapse, namely the rise of National Socialism.343  
The rise of Nazism could only be understood according to Morgenthau as a reaction 
to the “economic, social and moral collapse of the German middle classes”.344 Yet 
the radicalisation of the former middle classes did not follow the Marxist 
assumptions that implied an embrace of communism, a political philosophy that 
shared the same rational outline with liberalism.345 Instead Nazism demonstrated not 
only a repudiation of rationalism but also an explicit embrace of irrationality bearing 
the characteristics of a political religion rather than those of a political philosophy.346 
As a counter-enlightenment movement, Nazism would demonstrate both the moral 
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bankruptcy of modernity and the extremities of an unrestrained lust for power 
revealing thus the dark side of the modern world.  
Instead of repudiating power or denying its existence Nazism glorified it, and in thus 
doing substituted its own hubris for that of rationalism. Where rationalism lacked 
restraint in its belief that science and reason can overcome power politics, Nazism 
lacked restraint in the opposite direction. The racial doctrine it embraced provided a 
way for the individual, suffocating under the limitations to his aspirations for power 
imposed by the increasingly centralised modern state, to actually realise those 
aspirations at the expense of the ‘inferior’ races. As a result “the man in the street, by 
experiencing his superiority vis-à-vis a Jew by actual deeds, could prove to 
himself… that he was actually superior”.347 As such, Nazism made an explicit albeit 
extreme point about the paramount moral significance Morgenthau’s views about the 
independence and insulation of spheres of social activity. For it demonstrated the 
destructive potential of the sphere of politics if left without limits to its own 
devices.348 This glorification of power related as it is to the emergence of 
universalistic nationalism, has also grave international implications. 
For the new nationalism of the twentieth century, in contrast to the liberal 
nationalism that preceded it, is unrestrained in its goals and has the traits of a 
political religion. It is this nationalistic universalism that gives modern international 
relations its ferocious character painted in dark colours in the “Twilight of 
International Morality”. Morgenthau considered Nazi Germany to be a distinctive 
example of that form of nationalism whereupon one nation not only stands alone 
above the rest but also has a mission to transform them into its own image.349 By 
translating all social and political conflicts to racial ones Nazism obliterated the 
distinction between domestic and international politics.350 By denying the tradition of 
Western civilisation as regards the rational pursuit of power limited by a moral code 
and substituting it with unlimited aspirations of power, Nazism’s doctrine of world 
organisation was no different, Morgenthau claimed, to that of the likes of Xerxes, 
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Alexander, and Napoleon.351 Thus the collective power drives of the nation, are not 
only unlimited domestically but also internationally.  
As mentioned already, Morgenthau was particularly concerned with the distortion of 
the rational faculties of statesmen when evaluating power. Those errors he 
considered as the most important factor for the demise of nations and it is with 
respect to those that the tragedy of Germany unfolds. Morgenthau’s verdict of 
Germany after Bismarck was that her foreign policy was determined by “three fatal 
propensities”.352 Both Imperial and Nazi Germany lacked a sense of proportion when 
assessing their relative power towards that of their opponents. They also 
overemphasised the importance of military strength and through a distorted sense of 
mission they identified might with right.353 A typical example of this attitude was the 
disregard on behalf of German leadership during the First World War of the impact 
an American entry would have for the course of the war.354 For Morgenthau then, 
always willing to attribute specific gifts or vices to ‘national character’, Germany had 
the sad privilege of possessing “the one fatal weakness” that is most likely to 
provoke hubris: lack of moderation.355 Such was his approach when he examined 
“The Political Philosophy of Prussianism” and he attributed the last disasters that 
befell upon Germany to this tradition.356  These characteristics made Germany a 
special case only inasmuch as they accentuated the pre-existing problems of 
nationalism.  
As happens often in the sequence of tragic cycles, this so characteristic of hubris lack 
of moderation was followed by hamartia. The scope of German imperialism 
expanded from its localised variant under Bismarck to the continental imperialism of 
William II and finally exploded out of proportion with the unlimited imperialism of 
Hitler.357 And like any other country that failed both in its appreciation of its own 
power as well as that of others and set unattainable goals, Germany undid her own 
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power.358 The lesson to be drawn for other states is for Morgenthau crystal clear: 
overconfidence and the ensuing miscalculation or hubris and hamartia will lead to 
nemesis, a lesson Germany learned the hard way twice in a century. Morgenthau’s 
examination of the German tragedy incorporates all the main elements of his political 
philosophy. Most of all, however, it demonstrates the importance of his moral project 
and the paramount moral value of prudence. For to understand the centrality of 
power in politics is one thing, to ‘surrender to its immanence’ is quite another, as his 
old criticism of Carr demonstrated. The fall of Germany is but another reminder to 
the self-destructing possibilities of an unconditional surrender to that immanence.  
 
A tragedy in the waiting room: American foreign policy and 
the hubris of idealism 
The tragedy of Germany was employed by Morgenthau for ‘pedagogical’ reasons. 
His main objective was not to advise German foreign policy makers, for it was 
already too late for that, but to make the fall of Germany an example that the United 
States ought to avoid. He made sure to make the connection between German 
delusions of the past and contemporary American policy explicit as early as 1950 in 
an essay tellingly titled “The Conquest of the United States by Germany”.359 Unlike 
Carr, Morgenthau never attempted to stay detached from the two opposing camps of 
the Cold War or to find a medium ground between them. Even though not a “simple-
minded cold warrior”, Morgenthau’s loyalties lay clearly with his adopted country.360 
His intellectual career was thus underpinned by an effort to influence American 
foreign policy. He understood realism as a compass that would help that policy 
navigate through the perils of idealism and avert a potential tragedy from 
materialising.  
If in the German case it was mainly the Jewish middle classes that failed to realise 
the insufficiency of rationalism to understand the nature of politics, in the American 
case, due to its own exceptionality, the danger was equally grave. As Williams 
demonstrated, Morgenthau was attentive to the exceptionality of American politics 
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and saw it at least to some extent in a positive light.361 Not only did he appreciate the 
greatness of the “national purpose” of America, but he also considered her social 
setting to have some redeeming qualities –such as the predominance of the middle 
classes- that resembled of the old, benevolent nationalism of the nineteenth century 
and made it harder to the nation to succumb to nationalistic universalism.362 At the 
same time, however, he demonstrated an acute awareness of the risks inherent in 
such exceptionality such as the potential of patriotism to degenerate to 
nationalism.363 Furthermore, the fact that the rise of the middle classes was almost 
unchallenged in America led to the identification of power politics with aristocracy 
and the fallacy of treating power politics as a “historical accident”. For Morgenthau 
there was no other country in the western world that held the conviction of the 
feasibility of a foreign policy devoid of the struggle for power more than the United 
States.364  
There was indeed a “historical accident” at play for Morgenthau but that was hardly 
the identification of politics with power. That accident was the historical context that 
brought about American exceptionalism, namely the geographical isolation from the 
European struggles for power and the unopposed continental expansion of the United 
States due to the lack of adversaries that could pose a serious threat. The danger thus 
for American foreign policy stemmed from the fact that this particular historical 
accident was taken out of context and understood as an “endowment of nature”.365 
Combined with a “sense of mission”, rooted in American uniqueness, it created the 
preconditions for what Morgenthau called the “intellectual errors” of American 
foreign policy, namely utopianism, legalism, sentimentalism, or isolationism.366 As a 
result, even when the United States actually pursued their national interests, that was 
done with the wrong reasoning and thus success was almost accidental.367  
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Such a foreign policy was particularly dangerous in the context of the Cold War 
where the United States was faced with a potent opponent. Morgenthau’s critique of 
the Soviet Union on philosophical grounds resembles the one he directed against the 
United States. Not only its underlying philosophy of Marxism shared the same 
flawed foundations as western liberalism but in its bolshevist –and utterly unrelated 
to Marxism368- incarnation it attained the traits of a ‘political religion’. As such 
Bolshevism, at least in principle, shared the characteristics of nationalistic 
universalism and embarked upon a quest to impose its own political philosophy on 
the world. In the new international context, however, where the conflict for power 
was erroneously identified with that of “ways of life” Bolshevism was met “by 
Western democracy at least halfway”.369 Morgenthau dreaded the consequences of 
the potential clash between two superpowers that supported mutually incompatible 
ideologies. In his effort thus to influence American foreign policy towards a rational 
calculation of the national interest, he portrayed the Soviet Union as possessing this 
quality to a greater extent than the United States and being able to “coldly calculate” 
the issues at stake.370 Indeed Morgenthau for most of his career viewed Soviet 
foreign policy as being essentially realist.371 
As such the major problem of the United States was to understand the type of 
challenge presented by the Soviet Union. For Morgenthau that challenge was clearly 
Russian imperialism, using the ideology of communism and world revolution as an 
instrument of and as a rationalisation for its policies. The confusion of communism 
with Russian imperialism, married with the American peculiarity of viewing politics 
in moral terms, not only obscured the real nature of the antagonism but also created 
the preconditions for embarking upon a moral crusade.372 What made the situation 
really desperate for Morgenthau was that in contrast to most nations that lacked the 
power to embark upon such a project, a superpower armed with nuclear weapons 
actually had the power to start a moral crusade, provided it succumbed – and indeed 
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it seemed to be doing so - to nationalistic universalism.373 In its unqualified anti-
communism thus American foreign policy was negligent of the national interest and 
overstretched in its aims. For Morgenthau this ultimately paralysed American power 
because “our moral, intellectual and political judgment has gone astray”.374 
In addition to the risk of moral crusading, American foreign policy faced a challenge 
from the impact of nationalism to the rational faculties of policy makers; a danger 
that was aggravated due to American exceptionality. The fact that throughout its 
history the United States faced many victories but only a few defeats was according 
to Morgenthau misinterpreted as American omnipotence.375 This fallacy did not only 
affect perceptions about American power leading to an overestimation thereof, but 
also informed a tendency to underestimate the power of the Soviet Union.376 
American foreign policy and public discourse during the Cold War was, for 
Morgenthau, riddled with examples of such a fallacy. It is in this spirit that he 
approached official reactions to the first nuclear explosion of a Soviet device in 
1949. What was at stake for Morgenthau was the realisation of the importance of the 
development, and the readjustment of a foreign policy hitherto based on a monopoly 
of atomic weapons. The fact that not only such a development was not expected but 
also that when it happened its significance was underplayed, meant for Morgenthau 
that American officials continued to underestimate the Soviet Union by falling 
victims to the “fatal propensity” of nationalism.377 Almost two decades later he 
similarly criticised Brzezinski’s doctrine of “American paramountcy”. This doctrine 
attributed erroneously Soviet restraint to American conventional superiority, 
something that for Morgenthau was “an illusion, born of nationalistic blindness”.378 
What really restrained the Soviets, he claimed, was fear of escalation to nuclear war. 
Instead of being equally afraid -as they ought to have been- the United States were 
about to embark on a reckless new doctrine. By assuming the non-usability of 
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nuclear weapons, the new doctrine denied the risk of escalation altogether and as 
such exposed American foreign policy to a fatal danger.379 
A combination thus of the negation to recognise power politics as such; the 
understanding of politics in moral terms; the ensuing tendency for moral crusading; 
and a belief in American omnipotence, constituted what Morgenthau understood as 
the hubris of American idealism. This understanding in terms of imminent tragedy 
was apparent in Morgenthau’s much discussed opposition towards the war in 
Vietnam.380  For Morgenthau the point was not containing communism as such, 
especially in cases when it was blurred with nationalism and anti-colonialism like in 
the case of Vietnam. Containment should not represent a moral crusade but should 
target communism insofar as it was the ideological cloak of Soviet imperialism, 
whose balancing was in the American national interest. Morgenthau often invoked 
the tragic vision of politics and the par excellence case of hubris i.e. the Athenian 
expedition in Sicily to warn the American government about the danger of ‘self-
delusion’.381 A passage from his 1966 “Truth and Power”, reflecting upon the 
relations between the Johnson administration and the intellectuals is quite telling: 
What the President needs, then, is an intellectual father-confessor, who dares 
to remind him of the brittleness of power, of its arrogance and blindness, of 
its limits and pitfalls; who tells him how empires rise, decline, and fall, how 
power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He ought to listen to that voice and 
tremble.382 
 
Here Morgenthau was trying to talk ‘truth to power’ and in so doing he was 
reminding the powers that be of the perils arising from the hubris of perceived 
omnipotence. Morgenthau’s shift in language after 1965, from a discussion in terms 
of national interest to one in terms of morality hardly indicates an abandonment of 
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his realism as Rafshoon suggests.383 For as discussed above, the moral value of 
prudence was a persistent element in his engagement with politics and the only 
antidote that could help policy makers to avoid the pitfalls of nationalism.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The main objective of this chapter was to uncover the importance of power in 
Morgenthau’s theory of international relations. The centrality of power in his work is 
inseparable from an understanding of politics as tragedy which follows from a 
critique of rationalism as being unable to trace the essence of the nature of human 
beings or politics. Based on the anthropological assumption of a lust for power and 
the tragedy of its inescapability, Morgenthau placed power at the core of his theory. 
Drawing thus eclectically from a wide range of both ‘pre-rational’ and anti-
enlightenment sources, Morgenthau developed a conceptualisation of power that is 
explicit and narrow and therefore constitutes and insulates the political sphere. As 
such, power permeates his theory both ontologically and epistemologically. 
Morgenthau formed a strict analytical framework within which he placed power as 
the core of politics which is separated by other spheres of human activity like 
morality. This approach is in sharp contrast to that of Carr with his different 
theoretical background and dialectical understanding of politics. 
The different backgrounds of Carr and Morgenthau account largely for their 
significant differences in approaching the nation-state as the main ‘unit’ of power in 
modernity and nationalism as its ideological corollary. Carr’s wide range of interests 
paired with his flexible conceptualisation of power allowed him to offer a nuanced 
understanding of the nation-state and its development in terms of shifts in the 
domestic and international distribution of power. Morgenthau’s account on the other 
hand is less elaborate and mainly intuitive since he never focused on the historical 
development of the nation-state or paid attention to its careful conceptualisation for 
that matter. Furthermore, the nation-state plays a central role in Morgenthau’s effort 
to translate his animus dominandi to international politics meaningfully and in 
overcoming the division between the transcendental and the actual. Carr’s flexible 
understanding of a power that is disassociated from human nature and his dialectical 
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view of politics as opposed to Morgenthau’s distinct spheres of human activity 
allowed him to avoid such shortcomings. Yet despite their profound differences there 
are also striking similarities to be found in the two realists’ approaches of the nation-
state. 
First and foremost, neither of them treated the nation-state as an objective category 
outside history. Nor did they see the nation-state as an ossified, eternal ‘power unit’. 
Morgenthau’s tragedy was that his intuitive understanding of the nation and his 
restrictive methodology did not allow him to elaborate adequately on its historical 
development and thus effectively disassociate a historically conditioned notion from 
a theory that purported to capture timeless elements of politics. This, however, does 
not imply that Morgenthau was not mindful of the limitations power imposed to the 
nation-state and nationalism as its ideological corollary. In fact both realists 
examined thus far identified the nation-state as an unfixed manifestation of power 
conditioned upon the latter, since it is power that lies at the heart of their ontological 
assumptions. A further similarity is that, despite their very different assumptions 
about morality, both were acutely aware of the risk posed by any notion of 
international society anchored morally in the premises of nationalism.  
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CHAPTER III  
John Herz and realism’s moment of transition 
 
Introduction 
The chapter begins with an examination of the main characteristics of John Herz’s 
approach to international politics. I claim that, mindful of the limits of both 
traditional and positivist approaches, he favoured the median way of the study of 
structures and systems. At the same time, however, his analysis differed significantly 
from that of neorealists especially with regard to the most static aspects of their 
approach. As such, Herz can be approached as a realist that cannot be placed 
comfortably within either classical or structural realism.384 His efforts to make sense 
of international politics revolved around the concept for which he is –rightly- most 
known, the security dilemma. I then examine the centrality of the security dilemma 
for both his ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
Ontologically, I claim that the primacy he attributed to the security dilemma allowed 
Herz to approach power as rooted to it. By grounding power on a social condition 
Herz avoided some of the pitfalls usually associated with a conceptualisation of 
power deriving from human nature. This move in turn allowed him to better account 
for variations in the centrality of the role of power in different historical periods. 
After establishing the centrality of the security dilemma in Herz’s ontology, I 
examine the implications of such an approach for his epistemology. Herz’s efforts to 
engage with the two ideo-typical reactions of the human mind to the realisation of 
the dilemma, namely realism and idealism, led to an attempt to synthesise them 
through the advancement of ‘realist liberalism’. The latter, being Herz’s particular 
brand of realism, comprises of an effort to utilise the knowledge attained by realism 
                                                 
384 I discuss differences and similarities between Herz and both forms of realism throughout the 
chapter. In most of the secondary literature Herz is approached as a classical realist. A point similar to 
the one I develop in this chapter is raised by Schuett. He claims that, despite being closer to classical 
realism, Herz’s contribution of the concept of the security dilemma which became the “foundational 
conceptual framework for subsequent generations of realists” makes him the “perfect entrée into post-
classical realism”. R. Schuett, Political realism, Freud, and human nature, p. 53 
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about the centrality of the security and power dilemma, while avoiding the fatalism  
implied in such a realisation.  
In the second part, I examine the nature and role of power in his theory. I claim that 
Herz, by connecting power to security and by conceiving it broadly as the possession 
of means of security or the perception of such a possession, offered an account of 
power that is flexible and can accommodate the different needs resulting from 
different historical settings. The importance he attributed to the impact of 
technological developments is indicative of this malleability since what counted as 
strength in the pre-atomic age could become a liability by the development of nuclear 
weapons. As such, for Herz power while maintaining its essence is in need of 
constant re-evaluation and re-definition.  When it comes to the role of power, Herz’s 
account is indicative of his effort to forward realist liberalism. He dismissed both the 
naivety of idealism’s belief that one can get rid of the struggle for power once and 
for all but he equally castigated the extreme realism that degenerates to an apology of 
power politics. Herz refused to subscribe to the most pessimistic reading of the 
security dilemma as implying an eternal struggle for power and focused on the 
importance of the fact that realisation of its existence is the first step for a conscious 
effort to mitigate the struggle for power. It is under this light that he examined the 
importance of the balance of power in the classical international system as mitigating 
power politics.  
In the third part I examine the connection between this conceptualisation of power 
and the nation-state. The common ground here is the security dilemma and the 
efforts to mitigate it. For Herz the form a political unit takes in any given 
international system depends on its capacity to perform its protective functions. By 
examining the rise of territoriality as the underlying structure of the modern 
international system, Herz exposed the relationship between power and the form of 
the political unit as a dialogical one. On the one hand, technological developments 
make available new weapons that increase the vulnerability of the existing political 
units. Herz traced the emergence of the territorial state to the gunpowder revolution 
that had such an effect. By their ability to employ their newly-acquired power, 
territorial lords managed to establish the new unit of impermeability. On the other 
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hand however, the very way power is understood and employed in international 
relations is bound to change as soon as the new structure is established.  
Given the importance he attributed to military technology and the nation-state as a 
unit of protection it is no surprise that Herz was particularly alarmed by the 
development of nuclear weapons. In the second section of the third part I examine 
the impact this development had on Herz’s thought and its culmination in his account 
of the ‘demise’ of the territorial state. The new developments seemed to be signalling 
a radical departure that for the first time in history made the accumulation of power 
meaningless and the existing political units vulnerable. For Herz, believing that mere 
territorial expansion of the units of defence was useless against the destructiveness of 
such weapons the only solution would be first a ‘holding operation’ and secondly, a 
universalist approach. His worst fears however had not materialised and the 
territorial states seemed to be retrenched despite the unfavourable conditions. In the 
concluding sections of this part I thus examine Herz’s revisiting of the nation-state. I 
claim that his modified account, by somewhat de-emphasising military power and 
integrating more elements in the functions performed by the nation-state, offered a 
more accurate image of the condition of the nation-state and was more faithful to his 
broad conceptualisation of power.    
In the fourth part I examine how the main tenets of Herz’s theory are displayed in his 
analysis of Nazi Germany and the United States. I claim that Herz approached 
Nazism as the exemplification of the extreme, power-glorifying realism that sound 
politics must try to avoid. While such realism is insatiable to efforts of 
accommodation, Herz genuinely believed that in the case of the Cold War this was 
not the case and that mutual fear could be mitigated by common effort. His approach 
to American foreign policy was characterised by an effort to raise awareness of the 
security dilemma on the other side so that conscious efforts could be made for it to 
be mitigated. The concluding section summarises the main findings of the chapter 
and connects them to the thought of the realists examined so far.  
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I. Herz’s theory of International Relations 
Herz and international relations: intellectual curiosity and 
methodological pluralism 
One of the most recognisable characteristics of Herz was what Karis described as an 
extraordinary breadth and depth of academic interests, indicative of which was his 
early habit of attending classes in a variety of faculties thanks to the free tuition of 
universities in Germany.385 This example was but an early demonstration of an 
intellectual curiosity that was to stay with Herz for the better part of almost half a 
century that he remained intellectually active. Most accounts of Herz’s career in the 
relevant literature offer vivid illustrations of his intellectual odyssey right from its 
beginnings when he studied international law with Kelsen, through his engagement 
with international relations and comparative politics, to his plea for establishing an 
interdisciplinary field of ‘survival research’ in his final years.386  
As a result, in his works on international politics Herz was always willing to take 
seriously and engage with fields as diverse as -to name but a few- zoology, 
psychology, social anthropology, international law, criminology, and Lorenz’s 
studies on aggression. Such a breadth of interests however, was not without its risks. 
While reviewing the Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics Thompson 
claimed that one of the main reasons that prevented Herz from being considered a 
first-rank scholar in international relations was precisely the fact that he did not 
“devote himself unreservedly” to the field.387 Yet this diversity is responsible for 
both the richness of his insights but also his characteristic methodological pluralism. 
                                                 
385 T. Karis, “A Life of Passionate Scholarship” in International Relations,  Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, 
pp.405-409: p. 407 
386 All following articles contain longer or shorter intellectual biographies of J. Herz: T. Karis “A Life 
of Passionate Scholarship”; J. Puglierin “Towards being a ‘Traveler between All Worlds’” in 
International Relations,  Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp.419-425; P. Stirk, “John H. Herz: realism and the 
fragility of the international order” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 285-306; C. 
Hacke and J. Puglierin, “John H. Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality” in International Relations,  
Vol. 21, No. 3, 2007, pp 367-382. For the early Herz, Kelsen and international law see P. Stirk, “John 
H. Herz and the International Law of the Third Reich” in International Relations,  Vol. 22, No. 4, 
2008, pp. 427-440. For the plea to establish a new field of ‘survival research’ see J. Herz ,“On Human 
Survival: reflections on survival research and survival policies” in World Futures, Vol. 59, 2003, pp. 
135-143 and K. Graham, “‘Survival Research’ and the ‘Planetary Interest’: Carrying Forward the 
Thoughts of John Herz” in International Relations,  Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 457-472 
387 K. Thompson, “Review: The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics” in The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 3, 1979, pp. 941-942 
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Given this immense diversity of interests then, it is no wonder that Herz 
demonstrated a remarkable openness in his approach to international politics, of 
which his methodological pluralism is indicative. A peculiar trait of this pluralism 
was Herz’s attempt to synthesise his German intellectual heritage of a theoretical and 
historical tradition with the empirical and pragmatic political science that he 
encountered in America.388 In formulating his own approach Herz actively sought to 
take the best elements from both worlds.389  As such Lebow is right to observe that 
although Herz never wrote about the Greeks, he had the mindset of one, at least as 
regards his preference for the ‘middle way’.390 Although Lebow here has in mind the 
median way in terms of realism and idealism, his comment is also applicable to 
Herz’s methodology. His position in the debate between traditionalism and 
positivism is indicative of this approach.  
In International Politics in the Atomic Age Herz briefly contrasted two opposite 
extreme approaches on methodology, clarifying he was dealing with them as ideal-
types that do not appear frequently in their pure form, and found them both 
wanting.391 The “abstract” approach, in its effort to generalise and deduce patterns is 
at risk of reducing international relations to “typology or phenomenology”.392 Further 
risks are associated with its ‘scientific’ incarnation that Herz examined in his later 
work. Thus he was also sceptical of the ‘scientific’ approach to international 
relations, which in neglecting that political science is problem-oriented expends itself 
in accumulating and analysing data for the sake of it. The results of such an approach 
are often trivial or irrelevant and often do not add more to our understanding of a 
concrete situation than the intuition offered by the traditionalists.393 The recognition 
that traditionalists are more appreciative of the special historical, cultural and other 
particular characteristics of each concrete case, however, implies that they tend to err 
in the opposite direction. In the universe of the “overconcrete” or “historical” 
                                                 
388 J. Puglierin, “Towards being a ‘Traveler between All Worlds’”, pp. 419-423 
389 Ibid. p. 422 
390 R. N. Lebow, “Identity and International Relations” in International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 
2008, pp. 473-492: p. 473. Lebow is not entirely right to claim that Herz never wrote about the 
Greeks. See indicatively J. Herz ,“Prologue as Epilogue: Aristotle’s dream” (1973) in J. Herz, The 
Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, New York: David McKay, 1976, pp. 303-307 
391 J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, New York & London: Columbia University 
Press, 1962, pp. 5-12 
392 Ibid. p. 6 
393 J. Herz, “Relevancies and Irrelevancies in the Study of International Relations” in Polity, Vol. 4, 
No. 1, 1971, pp. 25-47: pp. 26-37  
 106 
approach, generalisation is impossible since international politics are conceived as a 
continuous “flux of changing concrete situations” whereupon “everything... is always 
new and incomparable, and nothing whatsoever repeats itself”.394 For Herz this 
position is unsatisfying since any meaningful study of international politics must be 
able to attain at least some level of generalisation.  
What for Herz constitutes the ‘middle way’ of engaging theoretically with situations 
that might be in flux but are stable enough so as not to represent merely “fleeting 
events” is the study of structures and systems.395 He was thus much closer to Waltz’s 
structural realism than other classical realists, a point he also made when he claimed 
that their approaches are not incompatible in response to Ashley’s interpretation of 
his work.396 Yet he was not willing to accept the structural approach unconditionally. 
For Herz, theoretical model-building is valid insofar as its models are “distillates 
from life” rather than “products of abstract speculation”, an assertion that would 
place him at odds with Waltz’s heavily deductive approach.397 A further caveat is the 
risk of ossification of the approach, whereupon the student of international relations 
views structures and systems as static when they are constantly changing. Apart from 
the obvious danger in terms of a theory’s validity, when parallels are drawn between 
dissimilar situations and are used to infer standards of action the results can be 
“deadly”. Constant re-evaluation of the framework is therefore essential if a 
structural approach is to be workable.398  
Herz’s methodological pluralism, his openness to interdisciplinary approaches and 
his preference for the middle way between different epistemological positions 
                                                 
394 J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 6 
395 Ibid. p. 7 
396 See R. Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests”, pp. 204-236; J. Herz, “[Political Realism 
and Human Interests]: Comment” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, pp. 237-
241: pp. 239-240. The contrast between this attitude and Morgenthau’s dismissive comments about 
similar approaches and their emphasis on methodology is glaring. H. Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations, pp. ix-x 
397 J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 8; although induction is not discarded 
completely by Waltz, he thinks that it is more suitable for testing hypotheses and laws rather than 
theories. In fact he thinks that although both induction and deduction are indispensable for theory 
formation, realism was too close to induction whereas neorealism was leaning more towards 
deduction. K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 7-11; K. Waltz “Realist Thought and 
Neorealist Theory”, p 33  
398 Ibid. p. 9. For an illustration of how wrong parallels can be drawn from superficially similar but 
essentially different cases see Herz’s own contribution on the discussion about détente in the 1970s: J. 
Herz, “Détente and Appeasement from a Political Scientist’s Vantage Point” (1974) in J. Herz The 
Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, pp. 279-289 
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informed consistently his efforts to make sense of international relations. More than 
every other classical realist perhaps, Herz concentrated his efforts around a 
reoccurring problem that he struggled with from early on and was to form the core of 
his political philosophy. This problem is, as Karis reminds us, his “obsession” with 
survival: “His most influential concept, the ‘security dilemma’, was defined in 
answer to the question, ‘why have we been slaughtering each other on end?’” he 
notes by quoting Herz’s autobiography, which tellingly is titled Vom Überleben i.e. 
“of survival”.399     
Survival in an irrational world: the ontology of the ‘security 
and power dilemma’ 
Herz believed we inhabit an irrational world that is home to a fundamental 
antagonism between the need of cooperation and the inescapability of conflict.400 
Both elements are central to Herz’s ontological assumptions about social life. On the 
one hand human beings are fully aware that their survival depends upon fellow 
human beings. On the other hand, awareness of their vulnerability vis-à-vis the very 
same persons they rely upon for their survival gives rise to mistrust and hostility.401 
This paradox of cooperation and conflict, both equally necessary for survival, gives 
rise to the security dilemma.  
Faced then with a constant threat to their survival, human beings – or groups for that 
matter - are locked in a perpetual struggle to attain more power as a means of 
security. Where the ‘dilemmatic’ element of the concept enters, is that this effort 
creates insecurity to others who in turn embark upon a similar effort to accumulate 
power.402 What makes the security dilemma such a core concept for Herz’s ontology 
is the perpetual character and the inescapability implied in it once the process is 
initiated. For as long as human competition for security begins, a vicious circle is 
                                                 
399 T. Karis, “A Life of Passionate Scholarship” p. 408; Stirk mentions the connection between Herz’s 
academic interest and the title of his autobiography and points to a biographical connection too: the 
fact that Herz’s own survival as a German Jew was threatened during the Nazi regime. See P. Stirk, 
“John H. Herz: realism and the fragility of the international order”, p. 287.   
400 J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A study in theories and realities, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 16 
401 Ibid. pp. 3-5 
402 J. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” in World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
1950, pp. 157-180: pp. 157-158 
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entered whereupon full security, while never fully attainable, increases the necessity 
for further accumulation of power.403 The centrality then of power in Herz’s ontology 
depends upon its role as a means of overcoming the security dilemma.  
By competing for and securing power individuals or groups are merely trying to 
address this perennial problem.  Although representing one of the possible reactions 
to the security dilemma, power plays so important a role in Herz’s theory of 
international politics, that he often did not distinguish them and instead referred to 
them collectively as the “security and power dilemma”. That said, Herz was not 
willing to ascribe to power properties of a pass-partout which could unlock all 
secrets of social life. Indeed, he was very cautious not to base his theory of 
international politics upon such ‘unproved’ and ‘metaphysical’ foundations as 
assumptions about human nature.404 Here the contrast with Morgenthau is glaring, 
and Herz identified the animus dominandi as one of the main weaknesses of the 
former’s theory.405 He for one made sure to clarify his own position time and again: 
“The condition that concerns us” he maintained, “is not an anthropological or 
biological, but a social one”.406 Consequently there can be no “innate power instinct” 
as such: the quest for power simply stems from the instinct of self-preservation that 
is activated by the ‘security dilemma’.407   
By removing the power drive from the rather flimsy and unverifiable foundations of 
human nature and founding it upon a social condition, Herz did not only succeed in 
covering his ‘ontological flanks’ so to speak, but also in disassociating realism from 
a fatalistic worldview.408 As Sylvest correctly points out, social structures might be 
solid but they are not as unchangeable as human nature.409 Such a move then implies 
                                                 
403 J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 24  
404 J. Herz, “[Political Realism and Human Interests]: Comment”, p. 239.  
405 J. Herz, “Reflections on Hans Morgenthau’s Political Realism” in American Foreign Policy 
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vicious”: R. Schuett, Political realism, Freud, and human nature, p. 57 
409 C. Sylvest, “John H. Herz and the Resurrection of Classical Realism” in International Relations, 
Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 441-455: p. 448. Indeed, as will be discussed in subsequent parts, Herz often 
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far more increased possibilities of accommodation and understanding between 
competing powers.410 It also allows for the occasional prevalence of power-alien 
elements such as economic interests or moral and religious circumstances, which 
Herz interestingly calls “a-political”, in the formulation and execution of policies 
“from time to time”.411 It does not however, imply a complete marginalisation of 
power in his theory of international relations.  
After the qualification that power does not a priori define international relations for 
Herz is taken into account, one must still arrive at the conclusion that its implications 
remain paramount for his realism. Thus the fact that “power, in modern international 
relations, has been the ultimate means of deciding issues”, becomes an inevitable 
outcome from the moment power “has entered the field at all”.412 The account here is 
evolutionary: power competition among states marginalises power-alien 
considerations in the same way economic motivations marginalised non-economic 
ones domestically.413 Herz implied a historical transition whereupon power gained 
significantly in importance for international politics. The importance he ascribed to 
the specific notion of power that arises from the territorial character of the modern 
state i.e. national power, gives a clear indication about when that transition should be 
placed. It is national power that enabled nations to assert themselves against the 
world and “became the chief instrument of so-called power politics”.414  
Hence the centrality of power in Herz’s ontology is conditional upon an 
understanding that firstly it stems from the main theme which is the ‘security 
dilemma’ and secondly its character and role is shifting according to the historical 
                                                                                                                                          
contemplated the possibility of either mitigating or overcoming the security dilemma. He was also 
well aware about what an approach founded upon a social condition implied when displaying 
skepticism about grounding territoriality to a biological instinct. If competition for resources is 
conscious –as opposed to instinctive- then political units will not be eternally bound to fight each 
other. J. Herz, “The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State” in 
Polity, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1968, pp. 11-34: pp. 30-32 
410 J. Herz, “Reflections on Hans Morgenthau’s Political Realism”: p. 7 
411 J. Herz, “Power Politics and World Organization” in The American Political Science Review”, Vol. 
36, No. 6, 1942, pp. 1039-1052: p. 1040 
412 Ibid. pp. 1939-1940 
413 Ibid. p. 1040. 
414 J. Herz, “International Politics and the Nuclear Dilemma” (1962) in J. Herz The Nation-State and 
the Crisis of World Politics, pp. 124-147: p. 128 (emphasis is added). Of course that does not imply 
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relationships of whatever units constituted the basic units”. J. Herz, Political Realism and Political 
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context. This conditionality by no means reduces its importance however, since for 
Herz as long as the international system is based upon territorial units, the 
compulsion it exerts upon them means no-one of them can abandon power politics in 
favour of other considerations without increasing its vulnerability and thus reducing 
its chances of survival.415  
On epistemology: The ‘security dilemma’ and political 
thought 
If power, through its close connection to the security dilemma plays an important 
role in Herz’s ontology, through the very same connection it plays an equally 
important role in his epistemology. For Herz, it is the very irrationality of the world 
and its apparent conflict with human reason that gives rise to all political thought.416  
Thus he anchored the two ideo-typical theories of political realism and political 
idealism to the reaction of human mind to the realisation of the ‘security and power 
dilemma’.  
For Herz the conventional distinction between political idealism and political realism 
as representative systems of “what ought to be” versus “what is” respectively, is 
unsatisfactory.417 Instead, he understands both approaches as two extreme attitudes 
towards the security and power dilemma. On the one hand, political realism 
recognises the implications of this basic condition and understands politics as 
“fundamentally determined by the struggle for power”.418 Although this is an 
ontological statement it has important epistemological implications. Having 
identified the centrality of power, political realism then often falls prey to a single-
factor fallacy and disregards all other factors that might be at work alongside or 
against power.419  
Political idealism on the other hand, is ultimately unsatisfied by the mere 
examination of the political phenomena that derive from the security and power 
dilemma.420 It seeks to transcend them and connect the ideal with reality either by 
                                                 
415 J. Herz, “Power Politics and World Organization”, p. 1040 
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claiming the potential of future realisation of the ideal or by claiming that the ideal is 
actually being realised at the present.421 In the first case, political idealism fulfils a 
revolutionary function whereupon it rationalises the interests of the oppressed 
groups. In the latter, it idealises the status-quo and justifies the predominance of the 
powers that be.422 Here the similarities with the conditionality of thought discussed 
by Carr are striking, and certainly Herz was aware of the work of Mannheim.423  
Another commonality with Carr is Herz’s preferred type of political thought which 
he called “Realist Liberalism”. Very much like the dialectics of utopia and reality in 
Carr, Herz’s own approach is trying to synthesise the best elements of the two 
worlds.424 Sound political thought should aim to avoid both the naivety of idealism 
and the fatalism of realism. As such, the epistemology of “Realist Liberalism” should 
be firmly based on the “utilisation, without compromise or euphemism, of any and 
all knowledge of political realism”.425  Realist observations of the security and power 
element in human societies constitute the “facts”, the hard ground upon which 
political thought can be built. They also delineate the limits of the attainable by 
highlighting the restraints imposed by those facts upon human action.426 At the same 
time, ethical guidance can only be given by accepting the main advantage of political 
idealism, namely the “realisation... that man can act”.427  
Realist Liberalism then does not represent a mere combination of elements from 
political idealism and political realism. More importantly, it represents the dialectical 
synthesis that follows from the ‘thesis’ of the first and its contradiction by the 
‘antithesis’ of the second.428 This synthesis lies also at the basis of Herz’s notion of 
rationality in a world that is, as already noted, far from rational. Herz understood 
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idealist rationalism not merely as a belief in “reason” but rather as a blind belief in 
the possibility of the opposing instincts of pity and survival to be reconciled. Since 
however for Herz rationality is not inherent in the world, sound political thought 
should begin with the assumption that “rationality is morality to be aimed at”.429 The 
recognition of rationalism as a normative rather than epistemological position should 
be matched by the acceptance of the ‘realist facts’ as the raw material which creates 
the preconditions for whatever rationality can be attainable.430  
 
II. Herz’s conceptualisation of power 
 
Power and international relations: its protean nature  
Given the primacy of the security dilemma in Herz’s theory of international relations, 
it follows that whatever importance power holds in such a theory can only be 
derivative. As such, his conceptualisation of power is anchored to the security 
dilemma. Having rejected the assumptions about an innate power drive in human 
nature, Herz treated the struggle for power as a means to satisfy the need for security, 
paving thus the way for contemporary realism. Power then to begin with, is to be 
understood as the possession of means of living and of weapons that can be used to 
safeguard one’s own life and secure the possession of said means.431 This intimate 
connection between power and security is echoed in his later assessment of the 
“power of protection” as the main source of legitimacy for any given political unit.432 
The closest then he offered to a notion of the essence of power is its broad 
understanding as the possession of means of protection or the perception of such a 
possession. 
The latter relates to the importance he attributed to the subjective element of power 
in line with what Sylvest calls Herz’s “perspectivism” or –anachronistically- 
constructivism.433 Writing three decades after the publication of Political Realism 
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and Political Idealism Herz described power as “the most fundamental but also most 
elusive of realist concepts”.434 One element of this elusiveness that concerned Herz 
right from the beginning was the importance of non-material forms of power, namely 
prestige. He made sure to include the subjective element of prestige alongside the 
otherwise brief and basic formulation of power he offered in his earlier work. There, 
he described prestige as an equally important to military and economic power 
element, since its possession “confers power upon its possessor”, irrespectively of 
the fact that it might not reflect actual power.435 Morgenthau too paid attention to the 
same element, while cautioning to the perils of not only downplaying but also 
overplaying one’s own power through prestige policy.436  
Herz’s conceptualisation of power, however, is not exhausted in its understanding as 
material capabilities or even in the perception of the existence or lack thereof. For 
him the importance of the subjective element goes beyond its role in the calculation -
or miscalculation as the case might be- of power. It affects the very core of our 
understanding of power itself. Unlike geography, population or the armed forces of a 
nation-state that are verifiable “givens”, its power cannot be treated as such because 
its estimation is totally dependent upon the actor’s interpretation of the former. That 
power and power relations thus are understood as givens is a result of actors’ or 
observers’ perceptions of reality.437 In fact, Herz claimed, power is a metaphor and 
as such it is “in the eyes of the beholder”.438 And the vision of the beholder differs 
“according to historical memories or cultural or social traditions”.439   
This final statement is revealing of one of the main characteristics of Herz’s notion 
of power: the components of power cannot be conceived to be independent of 
conditions of space and time. This, as stated already, applies to the subjective 
element of power. Herz indeed claimed that prestige or image-making gained so 
much in importance during the Cold War compared to the past that it came to 
account for “half of ‘power politics’”.440 It also applies to the material or objective 
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element of power. For Herz the traditional notion of power could be used as a 
standard of comparison between different units because it was “measurable, to some 
extent, graded, and calculable”.441 The elements of national power in this traditional 
understanding could be ‘added up’ to allow for an estimate of the cumulative power 
of a nation-state. They do not differ much from those presented by Morgenthau for 
the same purpose and include “size, location, configuration of territory, quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of population, economic and above all industrial 
development, and... military strength, actual as well as potential”.442  
This measurability of power however, resulted from the particular historical setting 
that gave birth to the classical international system. Power, in its current 
understanding as capabilities, is but a derivative concept that takes its meaning from 
the underlying structure of territoriality. It is only through this structure which 
established the modern state as the main impenetrable unit that “these capabilities 
can be made use of in international politics”.443 Once this structure withered away, as 
Herz believed to be the case with the rise of bipolarity and the development of 
thermonuclear weapons, the very concept of power would be bound to lose its 
traditional meaning.444 While before the development of the new weapons it still 
seemed reasonable to understand power as “something radiating from one centre… 
until it finds an equilibrium with that of similar geographically anchored units” as per 
Russell, in the atomic age power could bypass the hard shell of the territorial unit and 
destroy power “from centre to centre”.445 As such, the development of the new 
weapons represented a far more radical change than the emergence of bipolarity 
because at its heart lay a paradoxical condition: power, both traditional and atomic, 
would become at the same time both an asset and a liability. Possession of traditional 
factors of power such as the level of industrialisation or location, as well as nuclear 
weapons themselves, would render their holder more vulnerable than with their 
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absence, and power would become synonymous with impotence.446 The implication 
for the concept of power itself, as traditionally understood, would be an urgent need 
for its re-definition since it would now be rendered meaningless.    
Similarly to Morgenthau, Herz displayed scepticism about the prospects of 
humanity’s survival in the face of developments in nuclear warfare. To be fair to 
him, however, writing in the late 1950s he was merely trying to capture the 
uncertainty of a transitional age and outline prospects for the future. As such, his 
assessment that with the development of nuclear weapons power equals impotence 
belongs to the sphere not of prediction but of mere identification of tendencies that 
might or might not materialise. After reviewing extensively the risks involved in 
conceptions of deterrence at the time he concluded that the main characteristic of the 
transitional period was an unprecedented uncertainty that rendered any redefinition 
of concepts almost impossible. For him the only meaningful way to approach 
international structure and politics would be to accept the precarious coexistence of 
two contradictory realities: on the one hand the traditional or “preatomic” power 
relations whereupon old concepts retain partially their validity and on the other hand 
the “constellation in which permeability… is the underlying condition”.447 The 
paradoxical outcome is a situation in which power is “’measurable’ and 
‘comparable’, and no longer measurable and absolute, all at the same time”.448 
Despite being merely the outline of a tendency, Herz’s approach to power in this case 
provides with a good indication about his view of the concept as essentially protean 
in its character. Nuclear weapons aside, the emergence of bipolarity offered for Herz 
a clear example of how historical development calls for a constant re-evaluation of 
the central concepts. Paraphrasing Marx, Herz emphasised time and again that 
developments at the level of international relations “constitute a superstructure over 
the developments of the means of destruction”.449 Herz had always been concerned 
with the impact of technological developments on international politics and human 
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survival generally, as recent works by Sylvest and Scheuerman demonstrated.450 He 
emphasised particularly the role of military technology when accounting for changes 
in the international system.451 His analysis on the emergence of the territorial state in 
place of the medieval unit thus was centred on the role of gunpowder, and his 
assertion that the prospects were bleak for the nation-state was equally based on the 
developments that rendered the hard shell of nation-states permeable.452 As a 
consequence –and notwithstanding the nuclear weapons that render the measurability 
of power “doubtful as such”- the increased complexity and sheer number of power 
factors to be taken into account when calculating power has increased so much and 
so rapidly during modernity that any effort to calculate power is even more complex 
than it used to be. This increasing uncertainty which followed rapid technological 
developments, with the addition of the subjective element of power made the 
measurability of power in the bipolar world precarious.453   
Here Herz’s realism lies somewhere between classical realism and neorealism. For 
even though the essence of power as the bare minimum of means of security remains 
unchanged in Herz’s theory, the same does not apply to the form of power. The latter 
is in constant flux throughout history and reflects changes in the international system. 
This fluidity of both power and the international system distinguishes Herz’s 
approach from later incarnations of structural realism despite their similarities. For 
Herz power cannot be fungible because it does not possess the same external traits at 
any given time. Yet for neorealism, trying to model a theory of international relations 
after microeconomics, power is expected to play the role of money and thus be 
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fungible, at least to some extent.454  The important difference is not one of degree: 
despite the differences between various neorealists they would agree with Herz that 
to measure power accurately is a daunting endeavour.455 The main difference is 
rather a qualitative one: Herz’s power is in flux and in need of constant re-evaluation, 
in line with his warning of the risk of ossification associated with structural 
approaches. Hence, whereas for neorealism power is something static, for Herz’s 
variant of realism this is not the case.  
The role of power in politics and its limits  
For Herz then, so long as the security dilemma is not resolved, power is going to lie 
at the core of politics. The fatal problem with political idealism is, as mentioned 
already, the belief that the struggle for power can be abandoned in favour of a new, 
ideal order. The identification of power as a means of overcoming the security 
dilemma meant for Herz that those who attempt to abandon the struggle for power 
unilaterally increase their vulnerability vis-à-vis others.456 Whenever thus an idealist 
project manages to overcome a pre-existing order, its success is going to be short-
lived. For in conditions of insecurity and struggle for power, the only way it can 
survive is on a power basis.457 As a result, once new rules and institutions are in 
place, they are doomed do be corrupted by those very phenomena they sought to 
overcome. This is the tragedy of idealism and Herz noted that history is riddled with 
abortive efforts to create a better world, the examples of the French and Russian 
revolutions being typical of how an internationalist movement degenerates to self-
serving national policies.458 
Realist cynicism is born out of disillusionment for the fate of such efforts, but it does 
not fare any better in addressing the problems of social life. While political realism 
can understand the constraints the security and power dilemma imposes on human 
action better than idealism, it “fails to gain the minds of men for any length of 
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time”.459 At best, realism simply neglects everything apart from power 
considerations and becomes fatalistic; at worst it glorifies power and its 
paraphernalia such as war, aggressive nationalism and imperialism.460 Herz realised 
that in the field of international relations the observations of realism carry more 
weight than in domestic politics because of the prevailing conditions of international 
anarchy. Here, the refuge of an overarching authority that might control the power of 
the dominant members of the group is absent as are the various institutionalised 
checks and balances of domestic politics.461 The logical conclusion of such a 
realisation would be that the struggle for power in international relations is endless 
and unchecked, a conclusion often followed by structural realists of the offensive 
variant.462 For Herz however, this view is not justified by historical experience. 
Despite differences with domestic politics, international anarchy has not always been 
unconditional, the struggle for power has often been limited and the security 
dilemma mitigated.463 
In his early formulation of realist liberalism Herz opted for the minimalist mediating 
factor of the balance of power and its modified variant of collective security. He 
recognised the existence of other mitigating factors such as international law or 
ideologies of unity but was very sceptical about their potential to inform realist 
liberalism in the context of modern international relations.464 A self-conscious 
system of balance of power like the one that flourished in Europe until the nineteenth 
century, was based on the belief of those participating in it that they shared an 
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interest in maintaining a system comprised by a plurality of political units. Such a 
system represented for Herz a middle-way between “individualism” and the “general 
interest” of preventing a single power from dominating the system.465 With the 
development of bipolarity Herz came to believe this system could no longer perform 
its limiting functions as will be discussed in the following section. Yet one particular 
aspect of his analysis remained crucial for his understanding of efforts to mitigate 
power competition: his treatment of the balance of power as a conscious effort, 
informed by an understanding of a general interest.  
In periods of history when the balance of power was almost an accidental outcome of 
the existence of a system comprising of multiple units like that of the ancient Greek 
city-states or of the Hellenistic kingdoms, units succumbed to an “undiluted ‘power 
and security dilemma’” and thus failed to “break the vicious circle and to pursue any 
policy of mitigation and restraint, relying instead on the pure principles of power 
politics in the narrower sense”.466 The lack of realisation that the maintenance of a 
pluralist system guaranteed the continued survival of its units eventually led to the 
inability to check Rome and avert its hegemony.467 Awareness of the fact that there is 
a common interest in sustaining a system that allows for the co-existence of 
independent units meant that the security dilemma can at least be alleviated through 
conscious effort.  
It is this aspect of Herz’s thought that for Wheeler distinguishes his notion of the 
security dilemma from the more pessimistic one forwarded by Butterfield, namely 
the belief that by comprehending its dynamics, actors “can act upon this knowledge 
to promote mutual security”.468 In an era when the two superpowers faced each other 
with unprecedented suspicion and with the survival of humanity at risk, his plea to 
policy makers to approach the nature of the conflict in a detached way, realise the 
true nature of the conflict and the common interests in avoiding nuclear war, and to 
“put oneself into the other’s place” aimed at offering a way to mediate the security 
dilemma.469 As mentioned in the previous section, the centrality of power for Herz 
lay with its importance as a means to addressing the security dilemma. As such, the 
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limitation of the struggle for power ultimately relies on how successful efforts to 
mitigate the security dilemma are going to be. Herz often displayed a “guarded 
optimism”, to borrow Stirk’s expression, towards the possibility of somewhat 
mitigating the security dilemma through a combination of conscious effort and 
technological developments.470  
 
III. Power and the nation-state 
The nation-state as the unit of power 
In his quasi-autobiographical introduction to the Nation-state and the Crisis of World 
politics, Herz reflected on his main objectives in his early engagement with 
international politics. One of the issues that troubled him was why the security and 
power dilemma played such a prominent role in the relations between units that were 
“in their respective historical setting… the highest ones, that is, not subordinate to 
any higher authority”.471 The second issue was related to the character of those units: 
“What accounts in history for the emergence of the great variety of units which are, 
in different periods, the highest ones?”.472 From the very way the questions are 
framed some first conclusions about the way he tried to tackle the problem can be 
inferred. Herz was going to approach the nation-state as a ‘unit’ of security, and he 
was going to approach it as a historical unit.473  
For Herz the formation of political units results from the effort to strike a 
compromise between the two opposing forces of cooperation and insecurity in 
human societies. Human beings, he noted, feel more secure in groups, and 
particularly so in groups that appear as ‘natural’. Competition within the group does 
not disappear totally but there is at least a degree of solidarity especially when the 
security of the group is threatened by other groups. As such, the tendency of human 
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beings to organise themselves in social groups cannot eradicate the struggle for 
survival which is now projected at the level of the group.474 Here, despite their 
differences in what constitutes the roots of the struggle for power, Herz employed a 
similar mechanism of projection to Morgenthau.475 The same condition applies to all 
groups but in the particular case of the state it becomes much more acute due to fact 
that being the highest unit, it “cannot rely on any higher authority” for purposes of 
security.476 
The form of the political unit is determined primarily by its capacity to offer 
protection to its members, both internally and externally.477 What allowed nation-
states to perform this function, and what thus for Herz constituted the main 
underlying structure of the modern international system, was “territoriality”. It is the 
organisation of the state on a territorial basis with “impermeable”, defensible 
boundaries that turned it into the basic political unit.478 Herz’s account of the 
evolution of the territorial unit is a historical one. As when examining power, his 
main focus was on technological development and in particular the development of 
military technology. In his account, the territorial state emerged at the aftermath of 
the “gunpowder revolution” and from the rumbles of the previous “unit of 
impermeability”, the medieval castle, which had become vulnerable and unable to 
fulfil its protective function any longer.479 Technological progress, then, determines 
what sort of political unit will emerge next by rendering previous forms of 
organisation indefensible and thus obsolete. This can be illustrated clearly by the 
factors that Herz considered more important for explaining the transition to the 
modern international system.  
In the medieval setting, a combination of a common set of values and the lack of 
destructive weapons provided for the minimum of internal and external security 
essential for the survival of the system.480 The medieval system however was 
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challenged by the collapse of the previous moral order and the emergence of new 
weapons. In Herz’s variant of “strategic determinism” major revolutions in military 
technology can challenge the whole “’superstructure’ of economic, social, and 
political relationships” by undermining the foundations of the “units of protection”, 
and certainly the gunpowder revolution was one of them.481 The collapse of medieval 
order was followed by a period of insecurity and turmoil which was characterised by 
internal and external conflict amongst the various units. The character of the new 
units to emerge was not predetermined but would depend on the outcome of this 
conflict.  
It was thus a question of which of the rulers engaged in the conflict could most 
effectively exploit this newly-acquired military power and how far could they extend 
their control through the use of such power.482 Here the ability to employ the new 
technological means for the dual purpose of internal pacification and external 
protection proved crucial. The rulers of the emerging territorial states were able to 
accomplish the first task by employing power in order to remove the last remnants of 
feudal power and dissolve the obsolete units of impermeability such as castles and 
fortified cities domestically.483 At the same time, lining the borders with 
fortifications, controlled and manned by the centralised government, formed the new 
‘hard shell’ of the territorial unit which afforded it increased protection from external 
interference.484 The two processes developed in parallel and reinforced each other: 
external forces that would otherwise aid some of the pockets of resistance 
increasingly found it hard to do so due to the newly-formed hard shell.485 By the end 
of the seventeenth century the territorial unit had been consolidated as the main 
political unit. Power then, mostly military but also economic -through the increased 
ability of the territorial rulers to fund their efforts through the newly-emerged money 
economy instead of relying on their vassals486- played a major role in forging the 
territorial unit. 
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The relation between power and the nature of the political unit, however, is not one-
directional. In Herz’s approach they exist in a dialogical relationship that is 
determined by their close connection to the question of security and how it is best 
addressed at a given historical setting. Where the dialogical element becomes 
apparent is in the changing conception of power after the territorial unit is 
established as the main form of political organisation. Herz observed that the use of 
concepts such as “power” or “sovereignty” often obscures the fact that they are 
intimately related to territoriality and are in fact derivative of it.487 As mentioned in 
the previous part, for his variant of structuralism territoriality is the underlying 
structure and once it is consolidated, the form of power and the very way its 
functions for international politics are understood is bound to change. The main 
change the emergence of the territorial state brought to power was through the 
process of centralisation. 
In contrast to the pre-modern system where power was “diffused among various 
power-holders with jurisdiction over the one and same group of people” power was 
now centrally organised and has become measurable.488 This particular 
understanding of power could not be employed in international relations without 
reference to “something pre-existing, namely, the territorial state itself”.489  In an 
international system where international anarchy “has not always been complete” the 
establishment of the territorial unit, largely immune from external interference, is the 
factor which granted power an increased role.490 For it is only through the purposeful 
use of power after the collapse of medieval unity that international anarchy can be 
mitigated to some extent. The balance of power as a conscious attempt to prevent 
hegemony from materialising, as it was exemplified in the classical modern system, 
was significantly different to the coincidental balance of power of bygone ages. What 
differentiated it was a combination of material conditions, such as an adequate 
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number of great powers of similar capabilities and the existence of an insular holder 
of the balance, and dynastic diplomacy.491 The latter, free from “’power-alien’ 
influences, could devote itself to balancing policies as to a cool and detached game 
of chess”.492  
This close interaction between territoriality and the newly-found power of the 
territorial state is on display in Herz’s account of the institutions associated with the 
modern international system. His account of the development of the concept of 
sovereignty is one of conflict between empire and territorial rulers resolved in favour 
of the latter due to their ability to employ power to pacify and defend their 
domains.493 Similarly, the substitution of modern international law for “natural law” 
is examined as an attempt to regulate relations between sovereign nations which 
reflected the underlying structure of territoriality.494 The principle of legitimacy and 
nationalism that followed it, which further contributed in stabilising the system, both 
required the defensible units established by territoriality to flourish.495  
Even the community character of the European system with its principles of limited 
war and non-conquest was tied to the territorial character of the units. Despite the 
fact that this community was restricted to the continent of Europe itself while 
allowing European powers to pursue imperialistic goals overseas, its essence was not 
merely ideological for Herz. He noticed that the impermissibility of conquest was 
extended beyond Europe as soon as territoriality expanded and similar, impermeable 
units were formed elsewhere.496  
Consequently, in Herz’s theory it is not only power that is in flux due to changing 
conditions, as mentioned in the previous part, but also the international system itself 
as well as its underlying structure and its units. In the case of the modern 
international system, it is the very structure of territoriality that for Herz gave it its 
peculiar characteristics. The success of the territorial state lay in its ability to offer a 
satisfactory answer to the question of security. Political units however, are always 
historical units, replaced by other forms of organisation when they can no longer 
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perform their basic functions. Herz, often by drawing parallels to how previous 
political units gradually disappeared, was sceptical about the potential of the modern 
state in the twentieth century.  
The ‘demise’ of the territorial state? 
When discussing Herz’s account of the challenges facing the nation-state and its 
foundation of territoriality it should be borne in mind that Herz returned to the 
question of the nation-state several times in the course of his career, often 
reconsidering or reframing earlier assertions. As such, a degree of inconsistency is to 
be expected, especially given the fact that his area of interests expanded significantly 
in the decades that followed to encompass a notion of security that incorporated 
environmental factors, welfare, demographics and development. What remained 
constant in his analysis of the nation-state however, was its binary conceptualisation 
as a unit of protection and cooperation. It is with respect to those closely 
interconnected themes that the core of his examination of the limits of the nation-
state can be exposed. 
Given the emphasis Herz placed on developments in –mainly military- technology 
for the emergence of the territorial state as the unit of protection, it is of no surprise 
that in his early engagement with the nation-state it was this particular field that 
concentrated his attention. His account of the “demise” of the territorial state was 
mainly focused on developments that were undermining its foundations of 
territoriality and the impermeability associated with it.497 Similarly to Carr, he 
examined a series of factors that from the 19th century on increasingly allowed for 
the impermeability of the territorial states to be bypassed. The development of 
economic warfare and the increased effectiveness of blockades, ideological 
penetration and air warfare were all factors that although not being decisive in the 
two world wars, enabled competing units to penetrate each others’ hard-shell in a 
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“the impending disappearance of the nation-state” whereas he did not. J. Herz, “Introduction”, pp. 16-
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way that was impossible under the classical system.498 By the First World War it was 
becoming apparent that small nation-states were increasingly incapable of defending 
themselves and in the aftermath of the Second World War even some of the great 
powers “qua territorial states, were on the way to becoming obsolete”.499   
Despite the importance of those challenges however, territoriality could still be 
salvaged. Surprisingly for a realist, Herz saw collective security in a positive light 
despite the abortive effort of the League of Nations. In an era when the balance of 
power was disrupted and territorial states were becoming increasingly vulnerable, a 
system of collective security appeared to him a plausible solution and Herz oriented 
some of his early efforts in proposing ways to make it workable.500 The organisation 
of the post-war world on the basis of bipolarity, characterised by an ideological split 
between the two sides and the existence of nuclear weapons signified for Herz the 
loss of whatever hopes there might have been for a genuine collective security 
system.501 The very rise of bipolarity however, could also be interpreted as an effort 
to safeguard territoriality by extending the hard-shell of defensibility to the level of 
the bloc. Bipolarity was seen by Herz as representing the culmination of tendencies 
of extending the territorial state to ameliorate the effects of economic 
interdependence and the increased vulnerability to military technology.502 The most 
radical challenge to the territorial system thus lay not with the rise of bipolarity but 
with the development of nuclear warfare which happened to coincide with it. 
Although initially not too alarmist about the role of nuclear weapons, Herz came by 
the late 1950s to believe that their development signified a revolution with 
potentially similar consequences for the nation-state that the gunpowder revolution 
had for the medieval unit of protection.503 Whereas under bipolarity old concepts of 
power and sovereignty needed to be readjusted to be maintained, the nuclear 
                                                 
498 J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 96-108 
499 Ibid. pp. 98-99; p. 107 
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501 Collective security’s effectiveness was determined by the existence of a plurality of territorial units 
without any commitments towards other powers in the form of alliances. It was thus to be a 
refinement of the balance of power, albeit organised on a legalistic basis. For Herz this system was 
still workable in the interwar period, but states came to realise its necessity only “when the 
preconditions for a genuine collective security system had vanished”. J. Herz, International Politics in 
the Atomic Age, p. 93; pp. 76-95 
502 Ibid. pp. 111-166  
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revolution signalled the need for their radical re-invention since it undermined their 
very foundation of territoriality. The problem was not only that the hard-shell of the 
states could now be penetrated vertically with much more destructive means than 
previously. A much graver implication was that nuclear weapons could potentially 
signal the obliteration of the dialogical relationship between power and territoriality 
and its replacement by a paradox. Instead from conferring security to its holder, 
power in this arrangement created vulnerability.504 The outcome is the transition 
from the mitigated security dilemma of the classical system to the unmitigated and 
absolute security dilemma of the bipolar world.505  
Considering the fact that power, and nuclear power in particular, could no longer 
play its protective function, Herz proposed a short-term “holding operation” plan 
based on mutual accommodation of the superpowers and advocated a “realistic 
universalist” approach as a long-term goal based on the common interest of all 
humanity on survival.506 The latter would for the first time override national interests 
and power competition which could serve the territorial states well but proved unable 
to provide any protection at the face of nuclear annihilation.507 Such an approach 
would involve nation-states realising the primacy of their common interest to 
survival and either delegating their nuclear weapons to a supranational authority or 
dismantling them. This in turn would allow them to regain part of their protective 
functions and continue to exist as territorial units, albeit no longer as “ultimate units 
of control”.508  
For this universalism to stand any chance however, nation-states ought to abandon 
particularistic values that traditionally worked against it, namely what Herz called 
                                                 
504 J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 167-223  
505 Ibid. pp. 231-243 
506 Ibid. pp. 244-357 
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“exclusivist nationalism”.509 The necessity of such a move despite the resistance to 
be expected was, at least for Herz, clear and it relied on the way he understood the 
connection between allegiance to a political unit and the protective functions this unit 
could accomplish.510 Since the nation-state could no longer offer the minimum of 
protection required, continued attachment to nationalism was merely an exercise in 
futility. Paradoxically, for the nation-state to survive it ought to abandon its 
ideological corollary. A decade later, Herz had to return to the question of the nation-
state in an effort to address its apparent resilience and a series of trends that were 
moving exactly to the opposite direction of universalism, towards a “new 
territoriality”.511  
The first factor that contributed to this outcome lay with the “unavailability of force” 
in the bipolar world. The superpowers proved to be more interested in maintaining 
their spheres of influence and the status quo and, despite not abolishing their nuclear 
weapons, they kept them only as a final resort. The result was not only that nuclear 
power became “unavailable” but also conventional power due to the risk of 
escalation.512 Ironically, this stabilisation was in part due to the fact that some of the 
ideas Herz discussed in his earlier plan for a “holding operation” actually 
materialised.513 The shortcoming of his long-term outline lay with the fact that 
“holding operation” was a necessary but not sufficient condition for universalism. In 
reality, when the risk of a nuclear holocaust moved to the background, nation-states 
did not feel particularly compelled to contemplate more radical solutions.   
Operating parallel to the developments in the field of power were other forces that 
contributed to the retrenchment of nation-states. Old-style empires, founded upon 
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imperialistic policies that aimed at securing self-sufficiency and established on the 
basis of military superiority and the absence of nationalism among the colonised 
people were by then crumbling. This development was brought about by a 
combination of technological developments, which rendered reliance on raw 
materials less important for survival, and the rise of nationalism in the former 
colonies.514  Through the close association of legitimacy with the fulfilment of the 
main functions of the state and the impact of technological development, Herz 
managed to provide an interesting account of the qualitative difference between 
defensive nationalism and the aggressive one that preceded it. Nationalism proved 
very effective in marshalling the power of the nation when faced with an existential 
threat. The cases of Israel and Vietnam demonstrated its potency even when faced 
with superior power. At the same time however, it could not be employed for 
purposes of conquest because it would firstly meet fierce resistance from a hostile 
and equally nationalistic population, and secondly because through modernisation 
and economic development the protective functions of a unit could be more easily 
fulfilled without the need of territorial expansion.515   
For Herz then, the nation-state has secured its existence and retained its position as 
the main political unit “providing group identity, protection and welfare”.516 Herz of 
course was mindful that not all new nation-states were well-placed to fulfil their 
main functions.517 He was also mindful of the fact that despite its survival, the 
nation-state could not return to the territoriality of old. The reason he talked about a 
“new territoriality” was the perpetuation of what he initially conceived as a 
transitional stage i.e. the coexistence of permeability and impenetrability.518 This 
permeability was not only referring to nuclear weapons or air power but also to the 
newly available means of indirect penetration that technology facilitated. 
Additionally, states had to “assert themselves in an environment of vastly and rapidly 
increasing technological, economic, and general interrelationships of a shrinking 
                                                 
514 J. Herz, “Territorial state revisited”, pp. 15-18 
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517 He often raised doubts about the viability of the ‘artificial’ states that followed the dismantling of 
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reconsideration of the importance of modernisation in decreasing dependency see: J. Herz, 
“Introduction”, pp. 18-19 
518 See J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 221-223; also Part II in this chapter 
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world”.519 This reformulation of his position on the nation-state may appear as 
inconsistent to his classical work on territoriality. By de-emphasising the role of 
military power however, Herz managed to offer a more nuanced account of the 
nation-state and the challenges it faced, that still remained close to his broad 
conceptualisation of power outlined in the previous part.  
 
IV. Realist Liberalism and foreign affairs: Nazi Germany and 
the United States 
 
Herz never produced a monograph on the history of a single nation in the way Carr 
did, or an extensive commentary like Morgenthau’s engagement with American 
foreign policy. Having been uprooted from Germany due to the rise Nazism and 
never fully assimilated in the American intellectual tradition, he remained at odds 
with both worlds. Yet, as Pluglierin notes, this distance allowed him to approach 
both his native homeland and his adopted one in a detached and critical way.520 In his 
engagement with German and American politics the main threads of his thought are 
on display: the need to balance between and avoid the excesses of extreme realism 
and idealism, and the necessity of conscious effort to mitigate the security dilemma.    
From the beginning of his career Herz tried to make sense of Nazism and its 
implications for domestic and international politics. On the one hand, his study of 
Nazi doctrines of international law alerted Herz to the limitations of Kelsen’s theory 
of pure law and contributed to his shift towards a more politically-oriented 
interpretation of international law.521 On the other hand, however, the gradual 
evolution of those doctrines from the initial ‘natural law’ theory when Germany was 
in need to reassert legal parity with the rest of European powers to the ‘racial law’ 
corresponding to the era of assimilation of territories with German population 
signified for Herz something more than the mere manipulation of law as a 
justification for German foreign policy. The tendency in the development of German 
international law was for him clear, and nodded to the eventual prevalence of a view 
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521 P. Stirk “John H. Herz and the International Law of the Third Reich”, pp. 427-440; C. Sylvest, 
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which would maintain only the “realistic parts of the theory” and achieve consistency 
with Nazi worldviews in the embracement of a dogma which accounts for the very 
negation of international law and its replacement by continuous conflict.522 Here 
Herz, similarly to Morgenthau for that matter, had in mind the extreme realism that 
goes beyond the realisation of the role of power to its glorification, a realism that was 
exemplified by Nazi Germany.523  
Herz later confirmed these insights and broadened them to cover every aspect of life 
in Nazi Germany. Faced with similar economic and social problems as other Western 
Societies, Nazism opted for the “easy solution” of “always cutting the Gordian knot”: 
in essence solution amounted to non-solution but mere evasion of the problem by 
relapsing to pre-civilisational means of resolution through force.524 From the series 
of contradictions that Herz examined alongside their resolution on behalf of Nazi in 
terms of naked power, perhaps the most relevant to the question of the nation-state is 
that of international order. At a time when the territorial state was faced with 
increasing interdependence the main problem was the reconciliation of the need for 
integration with the maintenance of cultural autonomy. The two opposite answers in 
post-war Germany were either extreme nationalism or pacifist internationalism, and 
Nazism by initially posing as a champion of anti-imperialism and equality among 
nations seemingly accommodated both. In reality however, as its racial doctrine had 
implied from early on, Nazism demonstrated contempt for all traditional aspects of 
international politics that used to limit the struggle for power. In a world comprising 
according to Nazism of ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ races the only option with which 
other powers were left was either continuous struggle or acceptance of Nazi 
domination.525 
For Herz, the quest had always been to avoid precisely this extreme realism and the 
ensuing unlimited struggle for power. In the conditions of the Cold War with its two 
superpowers “armed with conflicting ideologies and annihilating weapons”, this 
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quest had become imperative.526  His efforts to propose ways to mitigate the security 
dilemma in such a setting, such as the plan for ‘holding operation’ discussed in the 
previous section, so as to ensure human survival informed constantly his engagement 
with American foreign policy for the duration of the Cold War (and beyond). The 
main problem with détente, that Herz advocated as a means to limit the insecurity on 
both sides of the conflict, was that it superficially resembled the very appeasement 
that failed to prevent the Second World War. Herz’s answer to the problem is 
particularly interesting since, contrary to Carr and due to the closer attention he paid 
to Nazism, he fully realised the risk posed by Hitler and was in no need to learn the 
“lessons of Munich”.527 
After outlining his plan for ‘holding operation’ Herz had to defend it by means of 
dispelling the parallels between appeasement and détente. The world of the Cold 
War, he maintained, was essentially different than Europe in the 1930s; and the 
Soviet Union, unlike Nazi Germany was a power more interested in maintaining the 
status quo. For Herz, the charges of appeasement by extremists on both sides posed a 
greater risk to international security than the actual steps taken by the two 
superpowers for mutual accommodation.528 The situation was aggravated by the 
increased importance of the security dilemma in conditions of ideological 
polarisation. Writing in the early 1970s he observed that the almost symmetrical 
views of the other side as expansionist advocated by extremists were misleading and 
that it was actually more possible that both sides were “defensive-minded”. The way 
he chose to illustrate this statement was crucial. By presenting the Soviet viewpoint 
he asked whether by expanding to Eastern Europe, a “much invaded country” was 
seeing this expansion as merely the establishment of a defensive zone “particularly 
when the Americans engaged to what looked to them as encirclement”.529 Here Herz 
was actively trying to raise awareness of the security dilemma and its implications 
and to persuade his audience to pause and ‘put themselves in the other fellow’s 
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shoes’ or more precisely “in Moscow’s shoes”.530 Having realised the implications of 
the security dilemma the two superpowers could actively try to mitigate it through 
détente.  
It is with this mitigation of the security dilemma through conscious effort in mind 
that Herz was particularly critical of the disregard for international law often to be 
found in American policies. In a series of letters to the editor of New York Times, he 
made the case that “more or less clandestine operations” like those orchestrated by 
American intelligence services in order to undermine or remove unfriendly 
governments were in violation of the most basic rules of modern international law.531 
The rules Herz had in mind were those creating the framework for a minimum of co-
existence between territorial states, namely the “inviolability of their territories in 
peacetime and of non-interference”.532 Of course during the Cold War this attitude 
still entailed the risk of escalation in a crisis and eventually nuclear annihilation, as 
Herz claimed when discussing the invasion of Grenada.533 For him however the 
problem was more fundamental. In a time when international cooperation and mutual 
understanding was increasingly essential for survival given the global problems now 
facing humanity, the United States seemed to be moving closer to unilateral policies. 
Herz thus maintained his criticism of post-Cold War American policy in terms of 
disregarding international law and institutions and abstaining from cooperation in 
facing environmental challenges.534 He moreover saw American policy as 
unenlightened in terms of traditional security concerns. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the United States as the only remaining superpower no longer faced 
any credible threat to her security. This new environment allowed in principle for the 
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possibility of taking steps to alleviate the security dilemma of other powers but this 
never materialised. On the contrary, American foreign policy was characterised by a 
series of decisions that intensified the security dilemma in others. This attitude 
culminated in the ‘war on terror’ during Bush administration which turned several 
countries into potential targets for pre-emptive strikes. Herz, however, observed that 
the tendency was clear from earlier decisions such as the maintenance of NATO 
despite its apparent uselessness in the new environment and the choice to expand it 
eastwards which further intensified the security dilemma of Russia.535 Such an 
orientation for Herz, signified a return to the same extreme realism he was so 
desperately trying to avert by devising Realist Liberalism in the first place.    
 
Concluding remarks 
Herz’s attempt to appraise power and the nation-state is founded upon the central 
role the security dilemma plays in his theory. It is the security dilemma that lies at 
the root of the struggle for power. Herz here differs from both Carr and Morgenthau. 
In contrast to Carr who merely observed that power is there, he tried to ground his 
account of power somewhere. In contrast to Morgenthau, he picked a social 
condition instead of an anthropological one as the main cause for the struggle for 
power. When it comes to his conceptualisation of power, his identification of 
elements of power is reminiscent of that offered by Morgenthau. His understanding 
of power and its role however as being in flux and his emphasis on the need to 
constantly re-define is much more radical not only from Morgenthau’s but also from 
Carr’s flexible conceptualisation. 
Herz, like Carr and Morgenthau, saw the nation-state as a historically-conditioned 
political unit whose existence is closely connected to power. His account of 
revolutions in military technology and their impact on the defensive functions of the 
state is far more detailed than those offered by the other two realists examined so far. 
It represents, however, one of the main weaknesses of his approach in that he tended 
to over-emphasise this single-factor. By taking into account factors such as the 
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potency of nationalism as a force and the need of the nation-state to provide for the 
welfare of its citizens Herz’s revisiting of the nation-state is more nuanced than his 
initial account. He also moved closer to Carr’s interpretation that incorporated all the 
aforementioned aspects, albeit with a more basic discussion of military power. One 
significant difference is that since Herz’s reformulation aimed at accounting for the 
survival of the nation-state the discussion of the elements that contributed to its 
resilience are better framed than in Carr who believed it to be on its way out. The 
two accounts can be largely seen as complementary.  
Herz, while conventionally classified as a classical realist, could more accurately be 
described as a transitional figure that belonged to both the classical and the structural 
realist world. His adamant removal of power from human nature, the emphasis on the 
security dilemma as a social condition and his appreciation of structural approaches 
are all elements that connect him to structural realism, and in particular the defensive 
realism of Waltz. At the same time however, his insistence for the constant re-
evaluation of concepts, and the perception that systems and structures are in constant 
flux does not allow for his classification as a structural realist either. Perhaps the 
most telling characteristic of his approach that distinguishes him from structural 
realists and offensive realists in particular is his refusal to subscribe to the most 
pessimistic implications of the security dilemma. His insistence on what constitutes 
sound political thought and the need to balance reality and utopia, whose similarity 
with Carr has been promptly been noted in the relevant literature, allowed him to 
contemplate and actively promote ways to mitigate the security dilemma. 
Mearsheimer, as will be discussed in the following section, followed the security 
dilemma to its most pessimistic implications, as would have done the ideo-typical 
realism that Herz tried to avoid.  
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CHAPTER IV  
John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism 
 
Introduction 
If Herz represented a transitional version of realism that displayed elements of both 
traditional and structural approaches, with the emergence of Waltz’s neorealism the 
transition to a purely structural theory of international relations was completed. In his 
effort to create a parsimonious and elegant structural theory, however, Waltz had to 
“retreat from the real”, as Molloy put it, and he disassociated his theory from foreign 
policy which would need a separate theory.536 John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism 
represents an attempt to overcome the gap between international structure and 
foreign policy by providing a unifying framework that while preserving the main 
features of Waltz’s structural approach also claims to be able to account for state 
behaviour.  
In the first part of the chapter, I examine the foundations of Mearsheimer’s approach. 
He remains generally faithful to the structural framework developed by Waltz but he 
draws different conclusions from it. Where Waltz sees security maximisers, 
Mearsheimer sees power maximisers. He further modifies the framework to include a 
rational actor assumption which he claims is enabling him to transcend the gap 
between foreign policy and international structure. As regards Mearsheimer’s 
faithfulness to structural realism, it has profound implications on the role power 
plays in his epistemological and ontological assumptions. Epistemologically, his 
theory is neatly separated from power in a way alien to the reflexivity displayed by 
realists examined thus far. Ontologically, power remains of paramount importance 
but since it is expected to play a role analogous to money its conceptualisation must 
of necessity be narrow.  
As regards Mearsheimer’s claim that his modification of structural realism can help 
to account for state behaviour and can be employed to both predict and prescribe, I 
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claim -drawing on Oren’s and Barkin’s criticisms- that this creates a significant 
tension to his theory. This tension is underlying Mearsheimer’s efforts to engage 
with the foreign policy of the United States.  
In the second part I explore Mearsheimer’s conceptualisation of power. This is 
particularly narrow, as one would expect from the function power is expected to 
perform in his theory. More specifically, his notion of power is reduced strictly to 
material capabilities of which military power and land power in particular are 
deemed to be the most important. When it comes to the limits of power, offensive 
realism’s image of states striving to achieve hegemony becomes significantly 
watered down. Apart from structural constraints and nuclear weapons Mearsheimer 
introduces the first important qualifier of offensive realism, the stopping power of 
water. The result is a moderated version of offensive realism whence great powers 
become satisfied when attaining regional hegemony. 
Mearsheimer’s engagement with the nation-state is examined in the third part. 
Despite treating the modern state as a billiard ball, he is attentive to the historical 
developments that brought about its emergence. The primary focus is, consistently 
with his theory, the role of military power. Mearsheimer, however, also attributes to 
nationalism an important role in the establishment and expansion of the nation-state. 
In this part thus, I also examine how his approach to nationalism tries to balance 
between a structural theory on the one hand and a phenomenon that, being 
ideological in nature and belonging to the domestic domain, should lie outwith its 
scope on the other. The third part ends with an examination of Mearsheimer’s 
thought on the future prospects of the nation-state and the possibility of taming 
nationalism.  
In the final part, I focus on Mearsheimer’s approach as illustrated by his analysis of 
American foreign policy. Both his analysis of that policy until the end of Cold War 
and his efforts to project its trajectory to the future, as well as his engagement in the 
debates about its formulation as a public intellectual after his predictions failed to 
materialise, are examined. In this part, Mearsheimer’s engagement with American 
foreign policy is examined as illustrative not only of how he translates his theory into 
prescriptions but also of the tension between prediction and prescription outlined in 
the beginning of the chapter.  
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I. Mearsheimer’s theory of international relations 
 
Foundations of Offensive Realism 
There is a marked difference between John Mearsheimer’s philosophical background 
and that of the classical realists and Herz examined in the previous chapters. While 
the aforementioned realists occasionally commented on each other’s works and 
exchanged views, the formulation of their respective variants of realism was by and 
large independent from each other. Mearsheimer, belonging to a later – the third 
according to Vasquez - generation of realists, is both aware of and has engaged with 
the work of classical realists as well as that of the founding father of neorealism, 
Kenneth Waltz.537 As such, his variant of realism is primarily founded upon earlier 
realists in contrast to the variety of intellectual backgrounds that influenced the 
realists examined so far. 
Before turning his attention to international relations’ theory Mearsheimer published 
works on strategy with a particular emphasis on deterrence.538 Although he initially 
did not self-identify as a realist, Mearsheimer soon became one and he unreservedly 
lists K. Waltz as the most important realist to having influenced him.539 Mearsheimer 
developed his own variant of realism, offensive realism, gradually with its definitive 
statement being the Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Elements of his theory, 
however, were already visible in earlier works.540 Mearsheimer’s offensive realism 
                                                 
537 For Vasquez early realists include Carr and Morgenthau and the second generation neorealists such 
as Waltz and Gilpin. J. Vasquez, Power of power politics, p. 2; Mearsheimer offers accounts of his 
early engagement with international relations and the authors that influenced him in J. Mearsheimer, 
“Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John. J. Mearsheimer (Part I)” in 
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2006, pp. 105-123: pp. 107-109 and in J. Mearsheimer, 
“Power as the Currency of International Relations, Disciplining US Foreign Policy, and Being an 
Independent Variable”, interview with Theory Talks, 2012, accessed from http://www.theory-
talks.org/2012/06/theory-talk-49.html  p. 3.  
538 His first monographs were a book about conventional deterrence and a critical biography of the 
British strategist Liddell Hart. J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983; J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, London: Brassey’s, 1988 
539 J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)” p. 109 
540 According to Toft, they are traceable back to the late 1980s and in particular his critical biography 
of Lidell Hart. P. Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power” in 
Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 381-408: p. 382. Mearsheimer 
confirms this when he states that the decision to write the Tragedy of Great Power Politics and 
present his own realist theory dated back to the late 1980s. J, Mearsheimer, “Power as the Currency”, 
p. 3   
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superficially appears as a synthesis of the theoretical framework developed by Waltz 
and the logical conclusions of ‘classical’ realism.541 He agrees with the starting 
assumptions of Waltz and as such he is clear that his theory is a structural one, very 
much like Waltz’s neorealism.542 
Where he disagrees with Waltz, however, is in the conclusions he draws from said 
assumptions and most importantly the answer to the question whether states act as 
power or as security maximisers. He believes contra Waltz that states seek to 
increase their power and traces his claim back to Morgenthau’s variant of classical 
realism. More precisely, Mearsheimer’s reading of classical realism is one according 
to which states are inherently aggressive, since they are “naturally endowed with 
Type A personalities”.543 Consistent with such a reading, Morgenthau is classified as 
an offensive realist since the animus dominandi is interpreted to be automatically 
applicable to states.544 Despite being in agreement, however, with what he considers 
to be the logical conclusions of classical realism, Mearsheimer does not subscribe to 
an explanation that is founded upon assumptions about human nature.545 
Mearsheimer then, while disagreeing with the “benign world” of Waltz’s defensive 
realism remains attached to the latter’s theoretical framework.546 He makes, however, 
a significant modification to this framework in that he is willing to engage with the 
historical record in an effort to validate his theory. The structural theory of K. Waltz 
was intended as a highly abstract theory that shied away from accounting for foreign 
policy, which needed a separate theory. As a result, those defensive realists drawing 
on Waltz and aiming at offering comprehensive accounts of state behaviour, like 
Snyder and Van Evera, had to develop a “unit-level component” to supplement their 
                                                 
541 It should be noted here that when speaking of ‘classical realism’ or ‘human nature realism’ 
Mearsheimer has in mind mainly Morgenthau. Other realists such as Carr and Kennan, who are often 
classified under the same grouping, are not included in his account since “they do not offer their own 
theory of international politics”. J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: 
Norton, 2001, pp. 18-19 
542 J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)” p. 110; J. Mearsheimer, 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 21  
543 Ibid. pp. 17-22; p. 21 
544 For the claim that for Morgenthau the lust for power is hardwired in states see Ibid. p. 19. For 
Morgenthau as an offensive realist see J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International 
Institutions” in International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1995, pp. 5-49: p. 12 fn 27  
545J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)” p. 110 
546As Molloy points out, Mearsheimer’s reformulation of realism “possesses the language of classical 
Realism but is still dependent upon Neorealist categories for ‘theoretical’ validation”. S. Molloy, 
Hidden History of Realism, p. 132 
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theories of international relations.547 Mearsheimer, however, despite also drawing 
heavily on Waltz’s neorealism is willing to apply his theory to real-world problems 
without feeling obligated to develop a separate theory which explains unit-level 
factors. He sets to achieve the unity between systemic and unit-level analysis by 
introducing an assumption of rationality to his theoretical framework.  
The major differentiation then of Mearsheimer’s framework from that of Waltz and 
his followers is the inclusion of state rationality as the fifth and final of his “bedrock 
assumptions”.548 Such an addition, he claims, allows realist theories to account not 
only for outcomes but also for state behaviour. By delegating misguided calculations 
to the level of the exceptional, such a realist theory would not need a separate theory 
of foreign policy to account for state behaviour. Instead, domestic considerations 
would have little if any role in influencing the making of foreign policy. The 
remaining few cases where “domestic pathologies lead states to act in suboptimal 
ways” can be explained away as anomalies to the theory.549  
Of course a side effect of such a choice that Mearsheimer is fully aware of and critics 
have been quick to exploit, is the fact that his theory becomes vulnerable to 
criticisms both in its own terms and for its verifiability vis-à-vis the historical record, 
a problem that Waltz never had to face.550 Hence Mearsheimer’s realism is 
                                                 
547 J. Mearsheimer, “Realists as Idealists” in Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2011, pp. 424-430: p. 
426 
548 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 31 
549 J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism”, in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2009, 
pp. 241-256: pp. 244-246 
550 See for instance his comment that “In effect, Waltz has created an escape hatch in his theory that 
mine does not have” in J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)” p. 112. 
Theoretical challenges to Mearsheimer are discussed throughout the present and the following section. 
As regards his engagement with the historical record, Snyder suggested that Mearsheimer’s selection 
of case studies that comprised of “as aggressive a collection of states as could be imagined” leave his 
theory vulnerable to “a suspicion of selection bias”. G. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World – Offensive 
Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay” in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, 
2002, pp. 149-173: p. 161. An edited volume on history and neorealism has sought to engage with the 
historical record in order to challenge realists’ claims that their theories are vindicated by history. 
Despite some of the contributors’ tendency to engage with a catch-all realism that is often reduced to 
the power maxims of the Melian dialogue, the volume includes some insightful engagement with the 
cases that Mearsheimer covered in the Tragedy of Great Powers Politics as well as cases that he 
omitted. Schroeder examined the 17th and 18th centuries in an effort to demonstrate that both struggle 
for power and a quest for order stemmed out of the structure of anarchy and that it would be fallacious 
to concentrate only on the former: P. Schroeder, “Not even in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries: power and order in the early modern era” in E. May, R. Rosecrance, and Z. Steiner (eds), 
History and Neorealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 78-102. As regards the 
cases that Mearsheimer omitted, Williamson examined the case of Austria-Hungary before the Great 
War and claimed that without taking into account the domestic situation, the steps taken towards the 
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influenced profoundly by this core theoretical commitment to structural realism and 
its modification to include the rational actor assumption. The way this framework 
affects the conceptualisation of power in Mearsheimer’s realism will be examined 
first through the examination of his epistemology and then through the ensuing 
ontological assumptions. 
 
Power vacuum: Mearsheimer’s epistemology 
Mearsheimer has indicated that he has a preference for elegant and simple theories 
and he believes realism to be such a theory.551 Theories, he maintains, are essential 
tools for simplifying complex realities. In fact the more complex the reality one tries 
to comprehend is, the greater the need for a “mental map” which helps to simplify it 
by isolating the most important forces at play.552 As such theories are of necessity 
simplifications of reality whose explanatory power is restricted by the fact that some 
of the omitted factors can occasionally influence state behaviour. A few such 
‘anomalies’, however, constitute part of the “price to pay for simplifying reality” and 
should not pose a significant problem to a theory’s overall credibility. Of course, 
when a theory faces too many anomalies then its foundations are undermined since it 
cannot adequately explain reality.553  
                                                                                                                                          
war could not be fully accounted for, and even if it were so then defensive realism seemed to offer 
more plausible an explanation for Austro-Hungarian foreign policy than Mearsheimer’s theory: S. 
Williamson, “Austria-Hungary and the coming of the First World War”, in E. May et al (eds), History 
and Neorealism, pp. 103-128. Apart from the essays that discussed US foreign policy and which will 
be covered under Part IV, contributions by Steiner, Ferguson, Welch Larson and Shevchenko, and 
Haslam in the same volume engage with great powers that Mearsheimer discussed like Nazi Germany, 
the UK and the Soviet Union. The policy of Japan in particular seems to be particularly troubling for 
Mearsheimer since as an insular state it should be expected to act as an offshore balancer. Its case is 
discussed in M. Barnhart, “Domestic politics, interservice impasse, and Japan’s decisions for war” in 
E. May et al (eds), History and Neorealism, pp. 185-200; J. Haslam, “John Mearsheimer’s 
‘elementary geometry of power’: Euclidean moment or an intellectual blind alley?” in E. May et al 
(eds), History and Neorealism, pp. 322-340: pp. 324-325; P. Toft, “Offensive realist between 
geopolitics and power”, pp. 395.   
551 J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)”, p. 107 
552 J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for 
International Relations” in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No 3, 2013, pp. 427-
457: p. 435   
553 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, pp. 10-11. The role of anomalies, or ‘error 
terms’ as Oren describes them, becomes problematic for Mearsheimer according to critics, because 
they occur that often as to undermine the theory’s soundness. See I. Oren, “Unrealism of 
Contemporary Realism”, pp. 288-289. For a collection of such anomalies and a very good, albeit 
somewhat combative, overall criticism of Mearsheimer’s theory that parallels Oren’s in some respects 
see also: J. Haslam, “John Mearsheimer’s ‘elementary geometry of power’”, passim   
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This interpretation of theory as a mental map of reality which should then be verified 
in the ‘laboratory’ of the real world represents an epistemological commitment to 
positivism that resonates little with the approaches discussed so far.554 The notion of 
power has been central for those realists’ epistemological assumptions, whether 
through the importance of the sociology of knowledge in Carr, the separation of 
spheres for analytical purposes in Morgenthau, or the fundamental motivation behind 
political thought in Herz. Mearsheimer, despite his scepticism towards a particular 
brand of positivism that he calls “simplistic hypothesis testing”, remains committed 
to a positivist methodology according to which a theory should comprise of clearly 
defined variables and the examination of the causal connection between them, and 
should be ultimately falsifiable.555 Such a theory is epistemologically impenetrable to 
power and as a result is missing not only part of the complexity of the phenomenon 
of power, but also the self-awareness that previous realists carried.  
This disassociation of power from realist epistemology means that it is no longer 
possible for the observer to be mindful, and as a result also guarded, of the ways in 
which different aspects of power influence the process of theorising itself. By 
claiming objectivity, as Barkin points out, the contemporary realist analyst is 
deviating from the classical realist call for reflexivity and succumbs to exactly the 
same fallacy that Morgenthau attributed to idealism in Scientific Man.556 He is 
correct in that sense to conclude that classical realism, “to the extent that it explicitly 
won the first debate, implicitly lost the second”.557 In Mearsheimer’s positivist 
epistemology power does not enter the field of theory-formation at all. The theorist 
has to develop a set of clear and sound assumptions, define their key concepts and 
identify causal mechanisms. The theory can then be tested against the facts and 
“yield unambiguous predictions”.558  
A sound theory then is one that at the same time is able to describe, predict and 
prescribe.559 There is however, an important problem with this purported unity 
                                                 
554 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics p. 8 
555 On the variant of positivism to which Mearsheimer subscribes as well as the main characteristics of 
theory and theory-testing see: J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Leaving theory behind”, pp. 431-435.  
556 S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and Foreign Policy” in Foreign Policy analysis, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
2009, pp. 233-246 
557 Ibid. p. 237 
558 J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Leaving theory behind”, p. 432 
559 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, pp. 8-12 
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between prediction and prescription. As several authors noted, contemporary realists, 
including Mearsheimer, are often at odds with the policies followed by American 
administrations and do not hesitate to express their opposition to them in an effort to 
influence the public discourse.560 Yet their effort to influence policy is fundamentally 
opposed to their positivistic epistemology which presupposes a neat separation 
between object and subject of analysis.561 The problem with Mearsheimer’s theory 
then is that it cannot overcome the incompatibility between predictive and 
prescriptive approaches. The former, being pattern-focused and based on self-
replicating systems, leave no space for agency and “serve to obviate politics” while 
the latter, being problem-focused emphasise contingency and the resulting necessity 
to be prudent both when making policy recommendations and when analysing 
power.562 This reflexivity, so characteristic of classical realism, cannot be reconciled 
with an approach that claims to be predictive.563 In such a theory of international 
relations, power is of necessity restricted to the sphere of ontology, where it is 
expected to play the role of currency.  
 
On power and ontology: a currency for international 
relations? 
For Mearsheimer, as for all other realists examined, power “lies at the heart of 
international politics”.564 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is structured around 
questions regarding this key concept and deriving from the epistemological 
commitments mentioned above. More specifically, for Mearsheimer a theory that has 
isolated power as its central concept must be able to explain why states seek power in 
the first place and how much power they want. Furthermore, it must be able to define 
clearly power and to offer a list of indicators that can be measured to rank individual 
states and estimate the distribution of power between them. Finally, a clear definition 
                                                 
560 I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, pp. 283-290; S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and 
Foreign Policy”, pp. 233-246; R. A. Payne “Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign 
Policy Debate” in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2007, pp. 503-514   
561 This separation would mean not only that prediction alone would make prescription unnecessary 
but also that prescription is meaningless since the observer’s wishes cannot influence the object of 
their analysis. See I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, pp. 286-290 
562 S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and Foreign Policy”, pp. 237-242 
563 Ibid. pp. 242-245 
564 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 55 
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of power is required for the patterns of state-behaviour to be more easily 
identified.565   
Consistent with his epistemological commitments to structural realism, Mearsheimer 
founds his theory on a set of bedrock assumptions. Despite being formed 
deductively, those assumptions differ from Waltz’s efforts in one important aspect. 
Whereas for Waltz the bedrock assumptions of a theory are of necessity radical 
simplifications which convey “a false impression of the world”, Mearsheimer rejects 
this approach.566 For him theories should be based on sound assumptions that offer 
“reasonably accurate representations” of important factors for international 
politics.567 Apart from the assumption of state rationality that has already been 
mentioned, Mearsheimer’s set of assumptions is comprised by the following: 
international anarchy, possession of offensive capabilities by states, uncertainty of 
intentions, and survival as the main motivation of states.568  
Although if treated in isolation they do not explain why states seek to maximise 
power, their combination, Mearsheimer maintains, makes a persuasive case for why 
great powers will struggle for power and aim for hegemony.569 As regards the first 
part of the argument, that is, the reasons why states seek power in the first place, 
Mearsheimer’s logic does not seem to differ significantly from that of other 
structural realists. The possession of offensive capabilities by states, combined with 
uncertainty about other states intentions and the existence of international anarchy 
means that states fear each other and try to accumulate power to ensure their 
survival.570 The identification of fear as the main factor behind states’ motivation to 
strive for power is a plausible conclusion that can be logically drawn by the 
combination of Mearsheimer’s bedrock assumptions. To claim, as Pashakhanlou 
does, that the centrality of fear amounts to the introduction of a “psychological unit-
level variable” which undermines his theory, would be to put too fine a point to a 
                                                 
565 Ibid. pp. 12-14 
566 K. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, p. 27 
567 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 30. Mearsheimer further clarifies his position 
on why theories should be based on realistic assumptions when favouring the epistemology of 
scientific realism over that of instrumentalism: J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Leaving theory behind”, 
pp. 432-434 
568 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics,  pp. 30-32 
569 Ibid. p. 29-30 
570 Ibid. p. 32, 42-43 
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narrow understanding of fear which Mearsheimer does not seem to share.571 The 
answer, however, that Mearsheimer gives to the second part of the question i.e. how 
much power states want, is more controversial. 
Despite beginning from a set of assumptions that are very similar to those entertained 
by defensive realists, Mearsheimer reaches the exactly opposite conclusion.572 For 
him, given the extremely high stakes in competition between states, the uncertainty 
over other states’ intentions, and the unpredictability of future developments in the 
distribution of power, states can only behave as relative power maximisers.573 The 
discrepancy thus between offensive and defensive realism, as Snyder correctly 
observes, is not attributable to disagreements about the constraints imposed by the 
international system as one would expect from structural theories, but on different 
interpretations of a “unit-level factor” i.e. the amount of security states seek.574 
Snyder is further correct to point out that Mearsheimer’s marshalling of Herz’s 
formulation of the security dilemma as reflecting “the basic logic of offensive 
realism” and as implying that “the best defence is a good offence” is misplaced.575 
The problem with Mearsheimer’s reading of the security dilemma is not only that 
Herz understood its implications differently.576 It is also that since in Mearsheimer’s 
theory all states are “revisionist and believe (correctly) that others are too”, there is 
no room left for any effort to address hypothetical threats and thus the ‘dilemmatic’ 
element of the security dilemma is eliminated.577  
                                                 
571 Pashakhanlou understands fear as an emotion and claims that its use would be incompatible with a 
“materialist and systemic theory” such as offensive realism. A. H. Pashakhanlou “Back to the 
Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive Realism” in International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2013, 
pp. 202-225: p. 207. Given, however, the fact that Mearsheimer assumes state rationality and often 
uses the term ‘fear’ to signify ‘worry’ it would be fallacious to assume that he understands fear so 
narrowly. Besides, a scared state would still have to rationally evaluate the situation and formulate its 
policy accordingly without having to respond in the instinctive manner implied by Pashakhanlou’s 
psychological reading of fear. For a more nuanced discussion of fear in realism see N. Crawford, 
“Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking ‘Man’” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
2009, pp. 271-288 
572 G. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World”, p. 154; P. Toft, “Offensive realist between geopolitics and 
power”, p. 390 
573 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 32-35 
574 G. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World”, pp. 154-155 
575 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p.p. 35, 36 
576 See relevant discussion in Chapter III: supra p. 115: fn 462 
577 G. Snyder “Mearsheimer’s World”, pp. 155-156. Booth and Wheeler raise a similar point when 
they claim that “Mearsheimer replaced any dilemma of interpretation with a rule of fatalism, and 
abolished any dilemma of response by a rule of offensive potential”: K. Booth and N. Wheeler, The 
Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008, p. 35 
 146 
The final role that power plays in Mearsheimer’s ontology is related to the 
importance he attributes to its accurate definition and measurement. Building on the 
analogy with economics he claims that power is the equivalent of money in the realm 
of international politics: “power is the currency of great-power politics and states 
compete for it among themselves”.578 The analogy to money implies that in the same 
way that utility maximisation is “expressed and measured in terms of money” so is 
“the national interest (security)... in terms of (relative) power”.579 The necessity to 
treat power like money stems from the expectation that power can be used as an 
indicator which can be measured and that allows states to be ranked.580 
Mearsheimer’s notion of power resonates well with such a view. The development of 
“good indicators of power” is important for the accurate appreciation of “the power 
levels of individual states”, which can be employed by the observer to rank them and 
determine whether they qualify as great powers or not. The identification of the 
number of great powers can in turn be utilised for the distribution of power and 
polarity of the system to be determined.581  
  
II. Mearsheimer’s conceptualisation of power 
The nature of power 
Since power is expected to play the role of currency in Mearsheimer’s theory, it has 
to be measurable and as such a narrow definition of the concept is warranted. He thus 
proceeds to approach power in terms of material capabilities, or “tangible assets... 
that each great power controls”.582 Mearsheimer is echoing – albeit distantly- Carr’s 
facets of power when he distinguishes between two forms of power that are 
interconnected but cannot be equated.583 He differs, however, from Carr in some 
important aspects the first of which is that he establishes a clear hierarchy between 
the two forms of power. It is military power that counts most in Mearsheimer’s 
theory, and from its various ingredients it is land power that is of paramount 
                                                 
578 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 12 
579 S. Guzzini, “The enduring dilemmas of realism in International Relations”, p. 539 
580 Ibid. pp. 537-540 
581 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 12 
582 Ibid. p. 55, p. 57 
583 Ibid. p. 55 
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importance.584 The reason why naval, aerial or even nuclear power can only play a 
supplementary role is that land forces are indispensable for “conquering and 
controlling land, which is the supreme political objective in a world of territorial 
states”.585 This overemphasis on military might and particularly land power, despite 
being logically solid offers little if any flexibility when dealing with other forms of 
exercising power or power maximisation outwith the scope of territorial conquest, as 
Toft correctly observes.586  
The second form of power, latent power, “refers to the socio-economic ingredients 
that go into building military power”.587 From the various elements of latent power 
Mearsheimer distinguishes population size and wealth as being the most important. 
And since a large population is a necessary but not sufficient condition for generating 
significant amounts of wealth, Mearsheimer opts for using “wealth alone to measure 
potential power”.588 Given that whatever importance latent power holds is 
conditional upon its ability to be translated to military power, Mearsheimer rejects 
indicators of wealth such as the GNP which might be misleading.589 Instead, he 
emphasises the importance of identifying indicators that can capture “a state’s 
mobilisable wealth and its level of technological development”.590 Here Mearsheimer 
makes a similar to Herz point regarding the dependency of measuring power on 
historical conditions.591  
A second important difference with Carr’s facets of power is that Mearsheimer does 
not allow for ideational power in his formula. For him any realist conceptualisation 
                                                 
584 Ibid. pp. 55-56 
585 Ibid. p. 86; pp. 83-114, 128-133. This view is hardly surprising given that Mearsheimer claims that 
conquest actually pays and helps augment the aggressor’s power: Ibid. pp. 148-151. Also in G. Snyder 
“Mearsheimer’s world”, p. 153. It should be noted, however, that in later works Mearsheimer 
although maintaining that conquest generally pays, adds a qualifier as regards the age of nationalism: 
infra under Part III.  
586 Toft traces Mearsheimer’s “preoccupation with military power and especially with land power” to 
his earlier engagement with strategy and deterrence. P. Toft, “Offensive realist between geopolitics 
and power”, p. 384 
587 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 55 
588 Ibid. pp. 60-62 
589 For Mearsheimer wealth forms the foundations of military power but it cannot always be translated 
to the latter neatly. The reasons for what he calls the “gap between latent and military power” are 
diminishing returns, differences in efficiency and differences in the type of military forces that each 
great power chooses to develop with the wealth available. Ibid. pp. 67-82. 
590 Ibid. p. 62 
591 It must be noted, however, that Mearsheimer’s preposition is anchored on the assumption that 
power is ultimately measurable and that the observer should modify their indicators according to the 
historical context. Herz’s views, as mentioned already, are more radical in that he believes the very 
measurability of power to be historically conditioned.  
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of power must of necessity emphasise material aspects of power. Ideologies are 
indeed included in the list of non-security goals that states can pursue insofar as they 
do not require the state to act against its national interest i.e. the pursuit of relative 
power.592 Mearsheimer clarified that non-material aspects of power are of no 
consequence for his version of realism when challenged by K. Booth on grounds that 
several of his ‘idealists’ were actually attentive to the role of power.593 In his 
response to Booth’s commentary, Mearsheimer maintained that authors who focus 
primarily on the power of ideas differ “fundamentally… from how realists 
understand this concept. Realists focus mainly on material power, be it economic or 
military...”.594 This position is unsurprising given the function that power is expected 
to play in his theory of international relations and the necessity for it to be 
measurable.  
The function of power as currency also explains Mearsheimer’s inclination to favour 
a ‘traditional’ power-as-capabilities approach to more recent developments in the 
discussion about power such as Dahl’s notion of power as being relational.595 This is 
not to suggest that he neglects such discussions. When appraising power and its role, 
Mearsheimer begins with a discussion of the distinction between power-as-outcomes 
and power-as-capabilities approaches. He disagrees with approaches that conflate 
assets with outcomes since the two are qualitatively different: the former only cover 
material capabilities and the latter add to the equation non-material factors that often 
affect outcomes.596 For Mearsheimer power cannot be equated with outcomes. 
Firstly, an outcome-centred approach would deem any effort “to assess the balance 
of power before a conflict” futile because the assessment could be performed only 
after the conflict was resolved in one way or another. If this were the case, it would 
                                                 
592 According to Mearsheimer, states do occasionally pursue such goals but “offensive realism has 
little to say about them” unless of course their pursuit conflicts with “balance-of-power logic” in 
which case they are trumped by security considerations. J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, p. 46 
593 Booth’s comment was part of his contribution to the discussion about Merasheimer’s 2004 Carr 
Memorial Lecture. K. Booth, “Offensive realists, tolerant realists and real realists” in International 
Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 350- 354 
594 J. Mearsheimer, “The more isms the better”, p. 356 
595 According to Baldwin, who strongly supports Dahl’s view of power, the shift from traditional 
“elements of national power” approaches that understood power as a “property concept” to 
approaches understanding it as a relational one, as advocated by Dahl, “constituted a revolution in 
power analysis”. D. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, pp. 274-275  
596 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 58 
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pose significant problems for any theory of international relations based on the 
assumption of the state as a rational actor such as Mearsheimer’s. Secondly, he raises 
the point that a conceptualisation of power based on outcomes would imply that the 
side that prevails in any given conflict is always the most powerful one. This is, 
however, not always the case as the examples of United States’ defeat in Vietnam 
and Napoleonic France’s in Russia demonstrated. Finally, since power represents 
means and outcomes ends, their identification would deem any distinction between 
means and ends meaningless.597 
Limits of power 
Given that Mearsheimer’s states can only be secure only when they have attained 
hegemony, his vision of international politics seems superficially to be one of 
continuous and unlimited competition between states. Yet, as Snyder correctly points 
out, the implications of his theory are watered down if one takes into account the 
various qualifiers that he integrates into it.598 What limits the quest for power in 
offensive realism however, is not morality as in the case of classical realists. 
Morality does not play a prominent role in Mearsheimer’s theory.599 It can -and 
should- only be taken into consideration when a state has the luxury to do so, namely 
when it does not conflict with “balance-of-power logic”.600 The fact that it is often 
employed to justify a selected foreign policy is considered by Mearsheimer as 
convenient masking of realistically formed policies.601 With morality taken out of the 
equation, what remains to moderate the quest for power are mainly structural and 
geopolitical forces.  
                                                 
597 Ibid. pp. 57-60 
598 G. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World”, p. 153 
599 Realism is a “fundamentally amoral theory” as he claimed in his Theory Talks interview in 2012: J. 
Mearsheimer, “Power as the Currency”, p. 8 
600 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, p. 47. Mearsheimer offered a further 
elaboration on this idea in his Carr Memorial Lecture. There, in a rather simplistic reading of Carr’s 
dialectics, he claims that Carr might have been exaggerating the conflict between morality and power 
given the fact that states sometimes can pursue both goals simultaneously. Additionally moral goals 
might be pursued when they are not seriously affecting the logic of realism. But when the two are in 
conflict, power considerations will trump everything else. J. Mearsheimer, “E.H Carr vs Idealism” in 
International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2005, pp. 139-152: pp. 142-143.  
601 Ibid: 143; J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 25-27. Such lies, employed when 
there is a contrast between liberal values and realist policies, or “liberal lies”, are considered by 
Mearsheimer relatively harmless compared to fearmongering and strategic cover-ups that can 
seriously misfire. J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics, 
London: Duckworth Overlook, 2011, pp. 81-86, p. 101    
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Although in Mearsheimer’s theory states have, in principle, no motivation to limit 
their quest for power they are not “mindless aggressors” striving endlessly to 
dominate the system.602 The states in his theory in addition to being power 
maximisers are also rational calculators and as such they soon figure out that their 
behaviour should match their capabilities lest they find themselves in a position 
worse than the one they began in. As a result states calculate carefully the perceived 
costs and benefits of every action and pursue it only if the former outweigh the 
latter.603 Their moderation is therefore a result of an, as humanely as possible, 
accurate evaluation of the external constraints imposed to their quest for power. 
The first such constraint comes from the international system itself and more 
specifically from the distribution of power. Its importance lies with the way it 
influences the levels of fear and balancing behaviour. The more asymmetries in the 
distribution of power, the more unstable a system is, and the more great powers fear 
each other. Mearsheimer ranks the possible systems from the more stable bipolar one 
to the most unstable unbalanced multipolar, with balanced multipolarity somewhere 
in between.604 The reading of the distribution of power can help states to modify their 
behaviour accordingly and anticipate whether other states are more likely to balance 
or pass the buck. An accurate reading thus should be enough in most cases to 
persuade a potential hegemon that the costs of attempting to dominate the system are 
far greater than the slim chances of success.  
The expected counterbalancing that a potential hegemon will face from worried great 
powers is further aggravated by an important geopolitical factor. The predominance 
of land power in Mearsheimer’s theory means that in order for such power to be 
employed effectively, a state should be able to project it when it so needs. For 
Mearsheimer, this prospect is severely limited by the stopping power of large bodies 
of water that hinder the capacity of great powers to attack each other with land 
forces.605 The inclusion of a geopolitical variable helps Mearsheimer to better 
account for cases of insular powers as well as the operation of regional systems that 
                                                 
602 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 37 
603 Ibid. pp. 37-40 
604 Ibid. pp. 337-347 
605 Ibid. pp. 114-128 
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could otherwise be treated as anomalies to his theory, but at the cost of making his 
overall theoretical framework somewhat more blurry.606  
The final limitation to a power achieving hegemony is nuclear weapons. 
Mearsheimer sets a high threshold for hegemony: a power that attains this position 
must in essence be “the only great power in the system” with any other powers being 
unable to seriously challenge it.607 In the age of nuclear weapons, because of their 
immense destructive capability, attaining hegemony would require the dominant 
state in the system to establish a clear advantage either by monopolising the 
possession of nuclear weapons or by establishing a refined defence system that 
would neutralise an opponent’s arsenal. Given, however, that such a development is 
unlikely, Mearsheimer believes that effectively no global hegemony is attainable.608  
Consequently, the best result one state can hope to achieve is regional hegemony and 
maintenance of this position by preventing other regional hegemons from 
emerging.609 The latter point is however, as Layne noted, logically problematic. If 
regional hegemony is the best possible position attainable and the stopping power of 
water prevents global hegemony from materialising, then a regional hegemon should 
not be seriously worried about a peer emerging in another region of the world since 
the stopping power of water would also apply to them.610 
 
                                                 
606 Toft claims that with the introduction of location Mearsheimer is creating an ambiguity with the 
levels of analysis and thus makes his theory very hard to challenge on his own terms: “Only if the 
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deals with the stopping power of water as being important only when facing a defending great power, 
and one that is not distracted for that matter. J. Mearsheimer,  Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 
114-119 
607 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 40 
608 Ibid. pp. 128-133 and pp. 224-232 where he claims that despite the unlikelihood of attaining 
nuclear superiority, great powers will still try to attain it.  
609 Ibid. pp. 41-42 
610 C. Layne, “The ‘Poster Child for offensive realism’: America as a global hegemon” in Security 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2002, pp. 120-164: pp. 126-127 
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III. Power and the nation-state 
The nation-state in offensive realism 
Mearsheimer’s view of the state comes very close to the one offered by Legro and 
Moravcsik in their paradigmatic reading of realism.611 Since his theory is a structural 
one, the domestic setting of each particular state is of no significant consequence for 
its behaviour. As such, states cannot be meaningfully differentiated by anything other 
than their relative power, at least for the purposes of a theory of international 
relations. “In essence”, maintains Mearsheimer, “great powers are like billiard balls 
that vary only in size”.612  As happens often with billiard balls, their direction and 
their collisions are determined by factors other than themselves. In the case of 
Mearsheimer’s billiard balls the external factor that compels states to act in a specific 
way is international anarchy. It follows that in his version of realism it is not the state 
that is the central element. What realism requires, he maintains, is not the state itself 
but the existence of international anarchy. As long as the structure of the international 
system is anarchic it will impose constraints upon whichever political unit happens to 
be the prevalent form of political organisation in any given period.613  
It is clear then that when Mearsheimer approaches the states as the main actors in 
international relations he does not engage with the notion of the state as 
encompassing an eternal category outside history. Although the idea that the main 
political units change throughout history is present in earlier works, Mearsheimer 
started placing particular attention on the emergence of the modern state in recent, 
and largely still ongoing, research.614 In his recent work he pays attention to the 
transition from a ‘stateless’ Europe in the fifteenth century, to the emergence of the 
                                                 
611 J. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, pp. 12-13  
612 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 18 
613 Ibid. p. 365 
614 Apart from the Tragedy of Great Power Politics mentioned already, Mearsheimer examined in his 
earlier “False Promise” article how feudal political units behaved vis-à-vis realist assumptions. Even 
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Mearsheimer, “False Promise of International Institutions”, pp. 44-46. More recently, Mearsheimer 
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and nationalism. The paper represents his “preliminary thinking on the subject” and is cited here with 
the author’s permission: J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins: Nationalism and Realism”, Prepared for 
Yale Workshop of International Relations, 5 May 2011. Accessed, 21 December 2013. Available from 
mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/recent.html 
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dynastic state and its eventual replacement by the nation-state.615 Mearsheimer cites 
C. Tilly approvingly and he attributes the prevalence of the state as a form of 
political organisation to its superiority over the other political units of the time. 
Consistently with the core assumptions of offensive realism about power, the crucial 
advantage for the emerging state was provided by its efficiency in translating latent 
to military power vis-à-vis the various alternatives to it such as the city-states of 
Italy.616 As a result the prevalence of the state in Europe was largely determined by 
its competence “on the battlefield”.617 Here, Mearsheimer’s narrative does not differ 
significantly from that of other realists examined as regards the interplay between 
power and the emergence of the modern state and bears a particular resemblance to 
Herz’s emphasis on military power and the rise of the territorial state. 
Power politics thus is the first of the “two main driving forces” which led to the 
establishment of the modern state system. The second one, surprisingly for a 
structural theory, is nationalism.618 For Mearsheimer, the dynastic state might well 
have been more effective than its competitors in marshalling power, but it did not 
enjoy the loyalty of its population. When nationalism came to the forefront however, 
in the aftermath of the French revolution, the allegiance of the population to the state 
could be marshalled and employed as a “huge force multiplier”. The success of 
France’s national armies quickly led its neighbours to adopt nationalism themselves 
and by “the early twentieth century, every state in Europe was effectively a nation-
state”.619 Mearsheimer’s narrative here is based solidly on the predominance of 
military power and the idea of state socialisation. States adapt to new circumstances 
                                                 
615J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, pp. 15-16 
616Ibid. pp. 17-18 
617Ibid. p. 17 
618Ibid. p. 16 
619Here, Mearsheimer’s account of the transition from dynastic to popular sovereignty parallels Carr’s 
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and adopt successful behaviour in order to improve their odds of survival.620 This 
view of nationalism is common amongst neorealist theorists that provided accounts 
of the phenomenon and on whose works Mearsheimer draws, such as Posen and Van 
Evera.621 As Kadercan correctly observes, however, such a linear interpretation fails 
to explain why states instead of happily embracing such a handy power multiplier 
they actually tried to strangle nationalism in its cradle.622 
There is however a further problem or, more accurately, two interconnected problems 
with the importance Mearsheimer attributes to nationalism. Nationalism is a 
phenomenon of ideological nature, and Mearsheimer recognises it as such.623 The 
fact then that he singles it out as one of the crucial factors that led to the prevalence 
of the nation-state might prove problematic for his theory. First, the importance 
attributed to nationalism would imply the introduction of an ideational element of 
power in a theory whose understanding of power is claimed to be materialistic. 
Second, an ideology is of necessity a factor that influences states at the domestic 
level and as such it should not be able to alter state behaviour significantly. In the 
following section, I evaluate the way that Mearsheimer addresses those challenges. 
Nationalism and power politics  
Since Mearsheimer has repeatedly treated nationalism as an ideology and he claims 
that the “nation-state system is largely the product of the inter-play between 
nationalism and power politics”624, the first problem that needs to be addressed is 
whether by granting such an important role to nationalism he undermines his 
explicitly materialistic theory by re-introducing an element of ideational power.  
After all, not only has he excluded the power of ideas from his framework but he 
approaches ideologies in general as non-security goals that are lower in the hierarchy 
of state goals than survival. This point has been picked by critics of Mearsheimer 
                                                 
620Mearsheimer is generally in agreement with Waltz’s views on state socialisation to successful 
practices, but he extends such practices beyond balancing to include successful offensive behaviour 
and innovation. J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 166-167 
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401-428: pp. 402-406 
622 Ibid. p. 406 
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Power Politics, p. 365; J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, pp. 100-101 
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who claim that he is not faithful to the model he developed by maintaining the 
importance of nationalism i.e. of an ideology.625  
Yet for Mearsheimer, nationalism is not any ideology. When he discusses the 
hierarchy of state goals he makes special reference to goals that are complementary 
to the pursuit of power and tellingly lists national unification amongst them.626 As 
long as an ideology is compatible with the premises of offensive realism, there is no 
problem with a state pursuing it. And in Mearsheimer’s view, as his later engagement 
with the topic demonstrated, nationalism is the par excellence compatible to realism 
ideology. This compatibility is attributed by Mearsheimer to the fact that nationalism 
and realism share core assumptions at the foundational level, namely that they are 
both particularistic and both focused on the state and survival.627 The marriage of the 
state to the nation in the late eighteenth century had profound implications for both. 
Those nations that were associated with a state by the time of the transition to 
popular sovereignty, had to worry about the survival of their respective state since 
the fates of the two were now interwoven. And, those that did not posses their own 
state acquired a powerful incentive to aspire for one to ensure their survival.628  
The reason for nations’ preference for their own state is explained by the impact of 
nationalism in the functioning of a state. Drawing from relevant literature in the field 
of nationalism studies, Mearsheimer observes that the nation-state is much more 
intrusive than its predecessor as regards the lives of its members. The process of 
cultural homogenisation, while making sense for the nation-state for both economic 
and military reasons poses a fatal threat to minority nations. The ensuing risk of 
assimilation or even annihilation is what triggered nations to have a strong 
preference for their own state and also led to the expansion of the nation-state 
globally through the process of decolonisation.629   
Mearsheimer seems to approach in a similar fashion the second potential problem 
with the importance he attributes to nationalism as a domestic force in an otherwise 
structural theory. The problem is aptly summarised by Oren who, when discussing 
                                                 
625See for instance R. Little, “Turning back the clock: Mearsheimer resurrects the first great debate” in 
International Relations, Vol. 19, No 3, 2005, pp. 341-344: p. 343; A. H. Pashakhanlou, “Back to the 
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the conflict between prediction and prescription in Mearsheimer’s approach, claims 
that the latter introduces an “error term” in his theory. The error term, is a factor 
excluded from the theory, such as domestic politics, that occasionally accounts for 
foreign policy. The realist scholar can then try to “expose the error and try to 
minimise it”630. What is problematic about this approach empirically is for Oren the 
fact that the “error term” seems to be accounting for the rule rather than the 
anomalies in American foreign policy.631 Mearsheimer for his part certainly 
approached nationalism as a domestic factor in one of his early engagements with 
international relations theory, right at the wake of the Cold War. There he claimed 
that domestic factors are not of equal importance to structural constraints in 
explaining the stability of post-1945 Europe. And the most important of such factors, 
‘hyper-nationalism’ was by and large a consequence of security competition rather 
than its cause.632 Writing a decade later, despite adding the qualifier that domestic 
factors are limiting the ability of offensive realism -or any structural theory for that 
matter- to accurately predict in detail when and how often conflict occurs, he 
maintained their secondary importance. Focusing on structural factors alone, he 
claimed, “should tell us a lot about the origins of great-power war”.633  
His treatment of nationalism as a domestic factor notwithstanding, Mearsheimer’s 
approach of nationalism can get him beyond the “error term” as a result of the close 
interconnectedness he identifies between it and realism. There is certainly a degree of 
compatibility between nationalism, as Mearsheimer approaches it, and his variant of 
realism. After all, his treatment of nationalism as a power multiplier can easily be, at 
least in theory, accommodated with his approach of power as material capabilities. 
The employment of nationalism allows states not only to build mass armies but also 
to mobilise their citizens to maintain such armies and provide them with resources. 
Even the non-material aspect of the increased motivation and thus reliability 
displayed by national armies can be accommodated in Mearsheimer’s existing notion 
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632J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”, p. 12; pp. 20-21 
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of power since he allows for a qualitative element in assessing military forces.634 The 
main problem with his approach to nationalism is therefore not one of logical 
consistency in terms of his theory, at least insofar as the incorporation of nationalism 
does not undermine the main logic of such a theory. 
Mearsheimer, however, goes beyond this interpretation of nationalism and attributes 
to it even more importance, and in so doing he seems to be dealing with nationalism 
as an ad hoc qualifier of offensive realism. After discussing the interplay between 
power-politics and nationalism in his most recent engagement with the topic, 
Mearsheimer moves on to discuss the ways in which nationalism has impacted upon 
“aspects of international politics that are of central importance to realism’s 
intellectual agenda”.635 In so doing, however, he is awarding to nationalism a 
transformative role which is inconsistent with the function it could possibly perform 
in a structural theory. When discussing the impact of nationalism to the character of 
war, Mearsheimer observes that conflicts between states in the age of nationalism 
tend to escalate quickly to the absolute form described by Clausewitz in contrast to 
the limited war that dominated the early modern European system. With a limited 
war to attain limited aims being out of the question, states have less of an incentive to 
start one. Furthermore, nationalism makes it now very difficult “for the victor to 
occupy the vanquished state”.636 Ironically here, despite his disregard for ideational 
power, Mearsheimer seems to be more attentive than Carr to the potency of 
nationalism as an ideology when faced with opponents who posses superior power.637 
This conclusion, however, would mean that conquest, does not after all pay as much 
as Mearsheimer originally assumed, or at least not in the age of nationalism.638  
                                                 
634J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, pp. 23-24; J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, pp. 69-80; for the 
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Of course offensive realism is a general theory that cannot be expected to illuminate 
everything and Mearsheimer is clear that often non-structural factors influence state 
behaviour. For the theory to operate smoothly, however, these anomalies should be 
rare exceptions. Yet there is hardly an instance in which Mearsheimer, when 
engaging with foreign affairs, has not cautioned against -and most likely rightly so- 
attempts to engage in social engineering abroad or conquest on grounds of the 
resistance one is to expect by nationalism.639 Furthermore, when discussing the 
possibility of transcending the state, Mearsheimer is connecting its survival in the 
foreseeable future to the appeal of nationalism and its glorification of the state.640 In 
claiming that nationalism not only influences the likelihood of war alongside 
structural factors, but also that it is connected to the resilience of the state as a form 
of political organisation Mearsheimer does, eventually, allow a non-structural factor 
to further qualify the main premises of offensive realism.  
Taming the nation-state?  
From the preceding discussion it is clear that Mearsheimer does not display the same 
deep-rooted scepticism towards nationalism as his mid-twentieth century 
predecessors. Neither does he share the same anxiety so indicative of Herz and 
Morgenthau about the future survival of not only the nation-state but also humanity 
itself in the face of nuclear weapons. The nation-state seems to have weathered some 
of the challenges that earlier generations of realists anticipated and, for Mearsheimer, 
it does not seem to be going anywhere in the foreseeable future. As a result, he does 
not try to devise a blueprint for transcending the nation-state as earlier realists did. 
For Mearsheimer, the key question is not how to go beyond the nation-state but how 
to tame it for the period that it is going to remain the dominant form of political 
organisation.  
In evaluating generally nationalism, Mearsheimer approaches the phenomenon 
                                                                                                                                          
Great Power Politics, pp. 148-152, p. 488. Rosecrance, however, in his review of the book anticipated 
the potential implications of such a position when he claimed that “the ‘stopping power’ of modern 
nationalism... may be greater than the water barrier”. R. N. Rosecrance, “War and Peace” in World 
Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2002, pp. 137-166:  p. 148 
639 He summarised his views on the subject when commenting on American efforts to attempt social 
engineering in the 21st century: “Washington seems to have an uncanny ability to take a bad situation 
and make it worse” in J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged” in The National Interest, No. 129, 2014, 
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macro-historically. He claims that, although in the short term nationalism with the 
dissolution of multinational states and irredentism that come with it is increasing 
instability and the likelihood of war, in the long term it can increase the prospects of 
peace. Since nationalism makes the success of conquest less likely the more “pure 
nation-states” there are, the less likely they are to fight over minorities or attempt to 
conquer each other.641 His commentary during the conflicts in the Balkans, where 
Mearsheimer suggested redrawing of borders and transferring populations so that 
homogeneous entities are created, makes clear that this idea has been with him long 
before it was crystallised theoretically.642 What Carr once deplored as the “mass 
sacrifice of human beings to the idol of nationalism” is for Mearsheimer a necessary 
evil in order to avoid further conflict.643 
This rather benign view of nationalism bears a superficial resemblance to the liberal 
nationalism of the 19th century discussed by Carr, Morgenthau and Herz. 
Mearsheimer, however, unlike liberal nationalists is aware of the darker side of 
nationalism or “ugly hyper-nationalism” as he prefers to call it. This form of 
nationalism, similarly to Morgenthau’s nationalistic universalism, is borne out of the 
belief that other nations “are both inferior and threatening”.644 For him, however, 
hyper-nationalism does not represent a distinct phase in the development of 
nationalism but rather a possible transformation of benign nationalism. Mearsheimer 
identifies security concerns and the resulting sense of vulnerability as one of the 
main reasons behind the emergence of hyper-nationalism. An additional reason is the 
tendency of governments to cultivate nationalism in an effort to marshal support for 
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their security policies.645 The risks of hyper-nationalism, however, are not sufficient 
reason for Mearsheimer to contemplate ways to go beyond nationalism and the 
nation-state.  
As regards the state, he does not believe that the present or foreseeable developments 
at the field of power are threatening its existence. Even if the state is replaced by 
another entity in the future, there will be no significant difference in their behaviour 
for as long as the international system remains anarchic. The only development in the 
international system that could possibly challenge the explanatory power of realism 
is, for Mearsheimer, the establishment of a hierarchical system.646 When it comes to 
nationalism, despite his generally positive view of the phenomenon, Mearsheimer 
believes that some moderation is required in order to limit the possibility of its 
degeneration to hyper-nationalism and suggested two ways to achieve that end back 
in 1990. His first suggestion on the moderation of nationalism is one that resonates 
well with his theory. The development of small professional armies and reliance on 
“high-technology military organisations” such as the one normally accompanied by 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons, should be able to reduce the need for mass 
armies and the cultivation of nationalist sentiments associated with them.647  
The second proposal was somewhat more ambitious since it involved nothing less 
than the “teaching of honest national history” on behalf of the elites.648 What 
remained unaddressed in this proposal was why, given the emphasis Mearsheimer 
places on nationalism as a power multiplier, governing elites would voluntarily 
dispense with such a useful tool. In his later work Mearsheimer seems to be 
retreating from this suggestion when he claims that although nationalism is a potent 
force and “a major cause of war”, its myths are of only secondary if not tertiary 
importance. It is foreign policy behaviour that causes nationalist myths and not the 
other way around.649 As such, elites can still safely engage in nationalist myth-
making without risking too much. This rebuttal, however, appears strange given the 
emphasis that Mearsheimer places even in his recent work on how nationalist myths 
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help nation-states forge identities and motivate their citizens to make sacrifices.650  
IV. Mearsheimer and American Foreign Policy 
 
US Foreign policy until 1989: a poster child for offensive 
realism? 
According to the premises of offensive realism outlined in the previous sections, the 
ideal American policy should be one of establishing regional hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere and then, since global hegemony is unattainable, make sure that 
no other regional hegemon emerges by acting as an offshore balancer. For 
Mearsheimer, this is the course that the United States actually followed up to the end 
of the Cold War. His engagement with this period demonstrates clearly not only how 
he approaches the workings of the international system but also how he understands 
the interplay between domestic factors and nationalism.  
For Mearsheimer, after its establishment and for the duration of the 19th century the 
United States acted according to the theory of offensive realism and attempted to 
establish regional hegemony. It pursued this aim by following consistently two 
interconnected policies: on the one hand it sought to expand territorially and on the 
other it tried to limit the influence of European powers in the Western Hemisphere.651 
For Mearsheimer, there was no need for the United States to occupy the whole of 
North America for security reasons since Canada and Mexico were not powerful 
enough to pose a serious threat. The fact that the United States restrained from 
attempting to assimilate those states is explained by Mearsheimer by the difficulties 
posed to conquest by nationalism.652 After the United States achieved hegemony in 
the Western Hemisphere its main purpose according to offensive realism should be to 
                                                 
650In Why Leaders Lie, Mearsheimer seems to be suggesting that nationalist myth-making is 
intensified after wars or violent state formation and mostly for white-washing. Ibid. p. 69-80. As such, 
the “rhetoric of nationalism is tailored to suit the behaviour of states, which is driven largely by other 
calculations”. Ibid. p. 100. This of course is in clear contradiction to his statement in “kissing cousins” 
where he claims that in trying to motivate their public, elites will “portray the adversary as the 
epitome of evil” which n turn “makes it almost impossible to negotiate an end to a war short of total 
victory”. J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, p. 28. Here Mearsheimer is attributing to myth-making 
the ability to change the character of wars between nation-states and approaches it is as an inalienable 
part of nationalism rather than one of its insignificant paraphernalia.  
651 J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, pp. 238-249 
652 Ibid. p. 244 and in particular fn 18, p. 488 
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ensure that no local state forms an alliance with an overseas great power and to 
prevent any other regional hegemons from emerging in other regions of the world.  
Although in its initial decades the United States had no power to implement the 
Monroe doctrine, the European colonial empires were dissolved due to the 
disintegrating influence of nationalism. Further efforts on behalf of European powers 
to intervene in America such as French and German involvement in Mexico or the 
Soviet alliance with Cuba were met with hostility by the United States and every 
effort was made to contain them.653 As regards the role of the United States as an 
offshore balancer, Mearsheimer believes that in that case too its practice vindicates 
his theory. Although inclined to pass the buck to local powers to balance against a 
potential hegemon, the United States did not hesitate to actively intervene when the 
former failed. As such, the United States intervened in Europe when the entente 
powers failed to check Germany in World War I, again in World War II for the same 
reasons, and once more during the Cold War since no European power was able to 
check the Soviet Union. Similarly, in Asia the United States tried to prevent first 
Japan from gaining hegemony when the Soviet Union faced defeat at the hands of 
Germany, and subsequently to contain the Soviet Union after no significant power 
was left to check it.654 
Mearsheimer’s overview of the foreign policy of the United States for the better part 
of the past two centuries as being essentially realistic, however, comes as a contrast 
to the views of mid-twentieth century realists. Realists such as Morgenthau and 
Kennan were often critical of what they considered to be the surrender of American 
foreign policy to idealism.655 Mearsheimer accepts that the society of the United 
States is characterised by a “deep-seated sense of optimism and moralism”.656 He 
thinks, however, that the real influence liberal principles had on American foreign 
policy rarely went beyond rhetoric. He thus disagrees with Kennan’s criticism and 
claims that there is a marked gap between liberal rhetoric and realist practices in 
American foreign policy. What might occasionally obscure the gap is that realist 
policies do not always conflict with liberal values and as such can easily be 
                                                 
653 Ibid. p. 249 
654 Ibid. pp. 252-261 
655 For Morgenthau see Chapter II, Part IV. Mearsheimer discusses extensively Kennan’s views in J. 
Mearsheimer, “Introduction”, pp. xxiii-xxxiii 
656J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 22-25 
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explained away by reference to moral principles alone. And when there is conflict 
between the pursued policies and liberal values, “spin doctors” can be trusted to 
invent a story that rationalises the policy.657 
Of course, Mearsheimer’s engagement with the historical record and his claim that it 
vindicates his theory can -and has been- challenged on various grounds. One of the 
most common challenges to Mearsheimer’s engagement with American foreign 
policy, and one raised quite early, relates to his insistence that the United States had 
not in the past and would not in the future try to reach for global hegemony. Layne 
raised the issue in his review of the Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Although he 
agrees with Mearsheimer that the United States should try to be an offshore balancer 
he claims that it actually entertained hegemonic aspirations even before the end of 
World War II and that the foundations for American primacy were laid already from 
the 1950s before it was actually achieved in 1990.658 As will be discussed in the 
following section, Mearsheimer in his later engagements with the topic came closer 
to Layne’s position that the United States are enjoying primacy in the current 
international system. The reverse point, that the United States has actually underused 
their power for the better part of the twentieth century was raised by May.659 
Competing interpretations of historical periods, however, are unlikely to pose a 
serious threat to any engagement with history that does not seriously distort the 
historical record. When it comes to his commentary on ongoing debates about 
American foreign policy, however, Mearsheimer’s approach faces more challenges. 
It is one thing to claim retrospectively that a theory can account for state behaviour in 
the past and it is quite another to claim that it can accurately predict future behaviour. 
Mearsheimer claimed both for offensive realism and as a result his engagement with 
post-cold war American foreign policy found his predictions to be at odds with the 
policies actually followed. In his effort to offer advice on such issues Mearsheimer 
found himself much closer to the classical realists’ arguments about the perils of 
moral crusading and the influence of domestic factors than his structural approach 
would allow.  
                                                 
657Ibid. pp. 25-27; Mearsheimer, “Introduction”, pp. xxvii-xli  
658 C. Layne, “The Poster Child of offensive realism”, pp.135-158 
659 E. May, “The United States’ underuse of military power” in E. May et al (eds), History and 
Neorealism, pp. 228-245 
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After the Cold War: The conflict between prediction and 
prescription 
In the decade following the end of the Cold War, Mearsheimer examined the likely 
courses of American foreign policy for the years to come. He concluded that the most 
likely scenario would be for the United States to replicate the approach they followed 
in the past i.e. that of an offshore balancer. Given that the threat of the Soviet Union 
was now gone, Mearsheimer expected the United States to gradually withdraw from 
both Europe and Asia, and pass the buck to the great powers of those regions in the 
hope that they will balance each other.660 If regional powers fail to catch the buck 
and a potential regional hegemon emerges amongst them, then the United States 
would be expected to intervene to prevent them from dominating the regional 
system. As such, the more significant worry for the United States seemed to be 
China’s economic rise, which -if continued unchecked- would lead to the 
accumulation of unprecedented latent power.661 The alternative of pursuing global 
hegemony seemed to Mearsheimer to be out of the question: there was “hardly any 
evidence”, he claimed in the final pages of Tragedy of Great Power Politics, “that the 
United States is about to take a stab at establishing global hegemony”.662 In the years 
that followed the publication of the book, Mearsheimer found himself claiming that 
this is precisely what the United States ended up doing.   
One year after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Mearsheimer wrote an article about 
the Bush administration’s response to them and noted some disturbing developments. 
In its anxiety to make the United States secure again, he claimed, the administration 
seemed to be contemplating a quest for global hegemony. He warned that an effort to 
                                                 
660This point was repeated in several publications in the 1990s and early 2000s. See indicatively: J. 
Mearsheimer, “The Future of America’s Continental Commitment” in G. Lundestad (ed.), No End To 
Alliance: The United States and Western Europe, New York: St. Martin’s, 1998, pp. 221-242; J. 
Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, 2001, pp. 46-
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661For an early discussion of China as a potential regional hegemon in Asia see: J. Mearsheimer, 
“Future of American Pacifier”, pp. 53-56. Mearsheimer returned to the theme with J. Mearsheimer, 
“China’s Unpeaceful Rise” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690, 2006, pp. 160-162 and J. 
Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia” in The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2010, pp. 381-396 
662J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 382. For Mearsheimer, despite being by far the 
most powerful state in the system after the Cold War, the United States was not a global hegemon and 
was unlikely to become one even if it wanted, because it did not have the capacity to project power 
across the oceans. Ibid. p. 381; also in J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of America’s Continental 
Commitment”, passim  
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use American military might to forge an empire, even if a benign one, would not only 
be unrealistic but also more likely to aggravate the risk of terrorism.  He was 
particularly critical of any attempt to remove unfriendly governments abroad and 
promote democracy and warned that nationalism and the difficulties of social 
engineering are huge impediments for such efforts.663 This line of argument was 
repeated consistently by Mearsheimer as the United States was preparing to invade 
Iraq. He insisted time and again that the war was unnecessary since Iraq lacked the 
capability to pursue regional aspirations and even if it so attempted, that it could be 
easily contained.664 He also tried to expose what he considered the militant 
Wilsonianism of neoconservatives, a mixture of idealism and a blind belief in power, 
which neglected the difficulties imposed by nationalism on efforts to impose friendly 
political systems on other countries.665 In his criticism of the pursued policy was not 
alone. Indeed most prominent realists opposed the war in Iraq too.666 
Mearsheimer’s persistent opposition to the war in Iraq, as well as his analysis 
thereof, however is revealing of the tension between prediction and prescription 
outlined in the first part. His advice is consistent with what his theory would require 
the United States to do, but the foreign policy the latter actually followed is at 
                                                 
663J. Mearsheimer, “Hearts and Minds” in The National Interest, No. 69, 2002, pp. 13-16  
664J. Mearsheimer et al., “War with Iraq Is Not in America’s National Interest” in New York Times 
(paid advertisement), 26 September, 2002; J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “An Unnecessary War” in 
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strand of neo-conservatism that focuses on the superiority of American military power and assumes 
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“Missing the point” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005: pp. 337-340. Similarly, despite 
recognising that Mearsheimer has a strong preference for offshore balancing, E. May drawing from an 
identification of realism with the power maxims of the Melian dialogue claimed that after the and of 
the Cold War and including the war in Iraq the United States behaved “as hard realism would have 
predicted”. E. May, “ The United States’ underuse of military power”, p. 244 
666 Excellent summaries of their arguments are provided in the following works: M. Lacy, “A History 
of Violence: Mearsheimer and Walt’s Writings from ‘An Unnecessary War’ to the ‘Israel Lobby’ 
controversy” in Geopolitics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2008, pp. 100-119; B. Schmidt and M. Williams, “The 
Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists” in Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 
2, 2008, pp. 191-220 
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variance with that theory.667 Neither was the war in Iraq an isolated case that could 
be claimed as an anomaly. As Mearsheimer noted in 2011, since the end of the Cold 
War, the United States found itself in war “two out of every three years” by pursuing 
the erroneous policy of making the most of the “unipolar moment” to embark on an 
imperial project and export democracy.668 This policy that found the United States 
entangled in prolonged and largely unwinnable conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq was 
not particular to neoconservatives. Mearsheimer believes that the quest for global 
domination was also pursued, albeit more cautiously, by the Clinton administration. 
He identified the same tendency for “liberal imperialism” in Obama’s administration, 
a tendency he confirmed when discussing the latter’s involvement in Libya and 
willingness to go to war in Syria.669 
For Mearsheimer the policy-makers in Washington can still afford to act foolishly in 
the international arena because the United States enjoys an unprecedented 
predominance which is unlikely to be challenged in the near future.670 As such, when 
he is chastising the hubris of the “indispensable nation”671, he is not doing so with 
the sense of urgency that characterised earlier realists during the fierce competition 
of the Cold War. In fact, for Mearsheimer, despite risking failure and extreme human 
and economic costs, the biggest risk from United States folly is not losing its position 
in the world but rather the undermining of democracy at home.672  Mearsheimer 
identified lying, and in particular fearmongering, as particularly perilous for 
domestic policy since it reveals a disturbing contempt for the public on behalf of the 
leadership which can easily spill over to national issues.673 This is for Mearsheimer 
part of a broader issue: in its quest for global hegemony, and by remaining constantly 
in a state of war or in anticipation of war, the United States is gradually becoming a 
“national-security state”. Such a development, he claims, erodes the inherent checks 
and balances that were built in American democracy and challenges the very 
                                                 
667Toft summarised the discrepancy succinctly when, in 2005, he commented that “although 
Mearsheimer’s policy advice was undoubtedly correct in most people’s view today, US foreign policy 
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671 J. Mearsheimer, “Introduction”, pp. xxiii-xxviii  
672 J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged”, p. 23-29 
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principles that lie at the core of liberal order.674 In that respect, Mearsheimer’s efforts 
appear –to an extent- similar to Williams’ reading of mid-twentieth century realism 
as an effort to insulate rather than undermine American liberalism.675 
As such, for Mearsheimer, the primacy of the United States allows it to behave in a 
strategically unwise way without risking much, at least in terms of the balance of 
power. This primacy, however, does not explain why the United States do not simply 
return to offshore balancing as Mearsheimer’s theory predicts. In trying to explain 
this behaviour Mearsheimer developed arguments that invariably focus on domestic 
factors. Be it the influence of the Israel Lobby, the ideology of elites, or their 
inability to select the right strategy from the toolkit Mearsheimer’s explanation is 
based on developments within the United States themselves rather than systemic 
constraints.676 Of course, the past 25 years might be one of those anomalies that 
offensive realism cannot explain adequately, albeit a rather long one. In the 
meanwhile, however, Mearsheimer’s insightful commentary on the interplay between 
American foreign policy and domestic factors seems to be doing justice to Snyder’s 
call to abandon parsimony in order to reclaim realism.677 
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shift of attention from neo-conservative self-deception to foreign penetration as exemplified in 
Mearsheimer’s engagement with the Israel Lobby represented an effort to postpone “an interrogation 
of the domestic, internal problems of democracy and war”. M. Lacy, “A History of Violence”, passim; 
quote in p. 104. Given Mearsheimer’s return to those issues in later works, Lacy’s concern seems to 
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Mearsheimer’s offensive realism represents an effort to reconnect Waltz’s structural 
theory to reality by accounting for foreign policy while maintaining the core 
assumptions and the parsimony of the theory intact. Consistently with such an 
approach, Mearsheimer offers a clearly defined and narrow definition of power 
which is expected to perform the role of currency in international relations. 
Compared to the realists examined so far, he offers the most rigid conceptualisation 
of power. This clarity is also evident in his account of the emergence of the nation-
state which is predominantly focused on the impact of military power. Nationalism, 
the ideological corollary of the nation-state, can be accommodated with such an 
approach inasmuch as it is dealt with as a power multiplier.  
Yet the balance that Mearsheimer attempts to form between his structural theory, the 
development of the nation-states and the role of nationalism remains uneasy. 
Through his writings nationalism does not only acquire a transformative role in the 
international system, but also is identified as a key factor behind the survival of the 
state in the foreseeable future and is limiting the premise of offensive realism that 
conquest generally pays. Nationalism then appears to be moderating the implications 
of his structural theory in a way that a non-structural force should not be able to. 
Neither is nationalism the only qualifier that Mearsheimer integrates to his theory. 
Apart from the stopping power of water that was playing a moderating role even in 
the initial formulation of the theory, Mearsheimer’s engagement with American 
foreign policy as a public intellectual seems to be increasingly taking into account 
domestic factors such as pressure groups, ideological commitments or 
miscalculations.  
It is this engagement of Mearsheimer with American foreign policy that is most 
illustrative of the tension between prediction and prescription in his theory. In his 
effort to influence the policy of the United States and change its direction, 
Mearsheimer echoed the criticisms raised by mid-century realists. Back in 1990, 
Waltz warned that the addition of “elements of practical importance” would signify 
                                                                                                                                          
overcome the gap between prediction and prescription in his theory, even though he believes they too 
are problematic: I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, pp. 290-294.  
 169 
the relapse from neorealism to realism: “The rich variety and wondrous complexity 
of international life would be reclaimed at the price of extinguishing theory”.678  In 
his effort to understand why the United States actually followed policies not 
accounted for by his model, Mearsheimer had to take seriously non-structural factors. 
In so doing he seems to be following, albeit very hesitantly it should be noted, the 
direction that Waltz cautioned against.    
                                                 





This thesis sought to address and make explicit the connection between realist 
conceptions of power and the nation-state. Both elements are of paramount 
importance for any realist research agenda since they are both perceived to represent 
key tenets of realism. While existing efforts which focused on the recovery of 
classical realism have dispelled the alleged state-centrism of realism, the connection 
between power and the nation-state has not been adequately explored. By focusing 
on the central for realism concept of power, this thesis aimed at exploring how 
different conceptions of power influenced the way different realists understood the 
nation-state. For that purpose, I focused on four key authors, E.H. Carr, H. 
Morgenthau, J. Herz and J. Mearsheimer that are representative not only of the 
diversity of realist tradition but also of the various stages in realism’s transformation 
from a traditional to a positivistic approach.  
This chapter is divided into two main parts. First, I offer a summary of the findings 
of the thesis. Second, I identify the distinct contribution of the thesis to our 
understanding of realism, power and the nation-state. This part is divided into three 
sections. In the first section, I examine the contribution of the thesis to our 
understanding of the role of power in realist thought. In the second section, I 
highlight what the thesis contributes to our understanding of the relationship between 
power and the nation-state and by extension, the role of the nation-state in realist 
thought. In the third section I offer an account of the theoretical implications of the 
thesis for the study of realism in international relations. A short final part summarises 
the conclusions drawn form the thesis.   
I. Findings of the thesis 
The first focal point of the thesis was to identify the role of power within the theory 
of international relations of each realist and more specifically their ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. Ontologically, despite the variety of intellectual 
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backgrounds displayed by the authors under examination, power plays a central role 
for all of them. In the peculiar dialectics of power and morality which underpins the 
work of E.H. Carr it is power that plays the dominant role, with morality being 
largely derivative. Similarly, in H. Morgenthau’s approach to politics as tragedy the 
lust for power is inseparable from politics, rooted as it is in the anthropological 
assumption of the animus dominandi. While rejecting assumptions about human 
nature, Herz still granted to power great importance as a means of overcoming a 
persistent social condition, namely the security dilemma. Finally, in Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism power is also grounded on the security dilemma, albeit differently 
understood, and is expected to play the function of currency in international 
relations. 
The diversity of realist visions of power is more pronounced when it comes to its role 
in epistemology. In the sociology of knowledge employed by Carr, power conditions 
the very process of theorising and therefore political thought cannot be neatly 
separated by power. Morgenthau’s approach is narrower in that he employs power as 
a means to analytically insulate the political sphere for the purpose of its study in 
isolation by means of ideal types. For Herz the epistemological importance of power 
is founded upon the reaction of the human mind to the security dilemma. His 
eclecticism places him between the two classical realists. He employed ideal types, 
like Morgenthau, but instead of using them to create an abstraction of politics as the 
exclusive domain of power he sought to achieve a dialectical synthesis through 
“realist liberalism”. In the case of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, however, his 
heavily deductive epistemology is devoid of any entanglement with power. As such, 
it misses some of the reflexivity and self-awareness displayed to a varying degree by 
older realists.  
The second focal point of the thesis was the examination of the realist 
conceptualisations of power derived from the assumptions outlined above. If one 
takes Carr’s multi-faceted and malleable conceptualisation as a starting point, there is 
a considerable narrowing down of the notion of power by the time Mearsheimer’s 
minimalist understanding of power as material capabilities is reached. Carr’s 
inexplicit conceptualisation of power was focused on its three interconnected facets 
of military, economic and ideational power. Morgenthau was more explicit in that he 
 172 
defined power as a psychological relationship which establishes and maintains 
control and listed various elements of power that can be evaluated by policy makers. 
In moving closer to deductive approaches and systems’ theory Herz would be 
expected to continue this tendency.  
By disconnecting power from Morgenthau’s anthropological assumptions and 
connecting it to a social condition he certainly paved the road for structural realism. 
Yet his notion of power is essentially protean and its meaning is bound to change as 
the world moves from one form of underlying structure to the other. As such, the 
elements of power and its measurability cannot be understood as static but can only 
make sense in the context of territoriality. In Mearsheimer’s variant of realism the 
move initiated by Morgenthau is completed. Power is reduced to a conceptualisation 
that equates it with material capabilities, and such capabilities are clearly organised 
in hierarchical order. Military power is more important than latent, and land power is 
its most important aspect.  
Such diverse conceptualisations of power have a profound impact on the way realists 
understood the nation-state. Starting from a fuzzy notion of power, Carr was able to 
produce a detailed account of the emergence of the nation-state as a result of the 
interplay between domestic and international factors. His emphasis on the multi-
faceted character of power and the power of ideas in particular allowed him to 
understand nationalism as a dynamic ideology in constant dialogue with shifts in 
realities of economic and military power. Morgenthau, drawing from a narrower 
conceptualisation of power, approached the nation-state as the main vehicle for the 
projection of the lust for power at the international level. Despite being, like Carr, 
mindful of the historically conditioned nature of the nation-state and studying the 
interaction between nationalism and power, Morgenthau never produced a nuanced 
account of the emergence of the nation-state. As such, he faced difficulties in 
disassociating the timeless from the ephemeral. Both realists, however, were 
sceptical about the prospects of the nation-state to survive intact developments in the 
field of power and sought to theorise beyond it. 
The account of the nation-state offered by Herz is informed by his concern with the 
security dilemma. For him the variations throughout history in what constitutes the 
higher political unit can be accounted for by technological developments and most 
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importantly those in the field of military power. What makes a political unit the 
dominant one in any given time is its capacity to protect its subjects and the nation-
state is no exception having been established at the wake of the gunpowder 
revolution. Similarly to Morgenthau, Herz initially believed that developments in the 
field of power and more specifically the emergence of nuclear weapons would make 
the nation-state obsolete since they amounted to the obliteration of its protective 
shell. Faced with the apparent resilience of the nation-state, Herz provided a more 
nuanced account of its characteristics as a unit of protection, one that somewhat de-
emphasised military power and focused on additional factors such as nationalism and 
welfare.  
Herz might have nuanced his account of the nation-state on the way but his emphasis 
on the close connection between military power and the nation-state was revealing a 
tendency that was to be followed by subsequent realists. Given the primacy he 
attributes to military power, it is of little surprise that Mearsheimer’s approach to the 
nation-state is remarkably similar to the initial formulation of Herz. The 
establishment of the modern nation-state came about through its capacity to better 
translate latent power to military might and the ability of nationalism to function as a 
power multiplier. The role of nationalism as a power multiplier is in theory 
compatible with Mearsheimer’s emphasis on a materialistic understanding of power 
and his structural approach. The balance, however, remains an uneasy one since 
Mearsheimer attributes to nationalism transformative functions that qualify the 
rigidity of his theory.  
The final element of the thesis comprised of an examination of the way the 
aforementioned realists engaged with the policies pursued by various states as an 
exemplification of their theories. Whether they sought to understand the history of a 
particular state, like Carr after he lost interest to international relations as a 
discipline, or combined historical accounts with a conscious effort to influence the 
foreign policy of the United States like the remaining three realists, all authors 
displayed significant consistency in employing their core theoretical assumptions to 
such an engagement. As regards the realists that tried to influence the foreign policy 
of the United States, their efforts have in most cases been unsuccessful. This 
however does not pose a significant problem for their theories with the exception of 
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Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. The problem with his variant of realism lies with 
his subscription to a methodology influenced by natural sciences in which prediction 
and prescription are artificially merged. Whenever a state fails to behave in the way 
that the theory predicts, this behaviour can only be registered as an anomaly that 
weakens the theory. Interestingly, Mearsheimer’s own account for such failures led 
him to explore in detail and provide nuanced arguments about non-structural factors 
that should have been excluded from his theoretical framework as inconsequential.  
 
II. Theoretical contribution of the thesis 
 
The role of power in realist thought 
As explained in the introduction, power plays a central role in realist theories of 
international relations.679 With the present thesis I sought to recover the diversity of 
realist conceptualisations of power in various authors representing different stages in 
the development of the tradition. I claim that such recovery is important for 
approaching realism in two interconnected aspects. First, I claim that different 
conceptualisations of power developed gradually in a way which reveals the trend to 
replace traditional approaches with positivism in contemporary realism. Second, I 
claim that the way different realists conceptualise power has profound implications 
for the success of their theory. I claim that the gradual replacement of multi-faceted 
and flexible conceptualisations of power with narrower ones signifies an 
impoverishment of realism in terms of analytical purchase.  
Ontologically, the thesis affirms and expands on the insights offered by some of the 
more nuanced commentators of realism. The centrality of power in realism’s 
ontology seems indeed to be the only element which the paradigmatic reading of 
realism actually got right, as Molloy observed.680 Whether power is grounded on 
anthropological assumptions as in the case of Morgenthau or on a social condition 
such as the security dilemma as in the cases of Herz and Mearsheimer it remains at 
the core of any realist ontology. Despite this similarity which signifies the bare 
                                                 
679 See supra  “Introduction”, especially  pp. 14-16 
680 S. Molloy, Hidden History of Realism, pp. 145-147 
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minimum of agreement between realists, however, there is a large variety of realist 
conceptualisations of power. In fact none of the examined realists offers a vision of 
power, its nature and its functions that is identical to another’s.  
This diversity has been mostly taken into account by existing literature on realism. 
Schmidt for instance took it seriously when he classified different realist 
conceptualisations of power in the three broad categories of classical, structural and 
modified realism.681 What this thesis revealed, despite its limited scope of four key 
authors, is that even a careful categorisation such as Schmidt’s is bound to be 
imperfect. Even between realists belonging to the same broad category there are 
significant differences. Both Carr and Morgenthau are classical realists but they did 
not both ground their analysis of power on human nature as is commonly assumed.682 
The same applies to realists who subscribe to systemic approaches and try to 
disassociate power from anthropological assumptions. Even though both Herz and 
Mearsheimer explicitly reject assumptions about human nature and connect power to 
the security dilemma, their conceptions of power as well as the role it is expected to 
perform in their theories are at variance with each other.  
Most existing accounts of power in realism focus on its ontological assumptions. By 
taking into account the role of power in realist epistemology, the thesis offers a 
synthesis of such accounts with works from authors who placed a particular 
emphasis on the importance of power in realist methodology. Authors like Oren and 
Barkin have already demonstrated the advantages of classical realist epistemology 
vis-à-vis its scientific counterpart in neorealism as regards the formers’ attentiveness 
to power and its influence on the process of theorising.683 Indeed as the present thesis 
demonstrated, despite the fact that the role of power was markedly different in each 
realists’ epistemology, there is a clear-cut distinction between the epistemologies of 
Carr, Morgenthau and Herz on the one hand, and Mearsheimer on the other.  
                                                 
681 B. Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of power”, passim. Molloy too, in the same section as above, 
provided a discussion of the variety of realist notions of power: S. Molloy, Hidden History of Realism, 
pp. 145-147 
682 The view that classical realism relates the struggle for power to human nature while structural 
realism distances itself from such assumptions is widespread. See B. Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of 
power”, p. 50 
683 I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, passim; S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and 
Foreign Policy”, passim 
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Between classical realists like Carr and Morgenthau or the transitional realism of 
Herz the epistemological variation is noteworthy. The role power is awarded in 
realist epistemology seems to be organically connected to the conceptualisation of 
power with which each realist starts as well as its place in their ontology. As such, 
Carr’s indeterminate and broad conceptualisation of power with its overlapping with 
post-structural interpretations permeates every aspect of his theory of international 
relations. The importance he attributes to the sociology of knowledge is indicative of 
an understanding of power that is attentive to its complexities and signifies self-
awareness on behalf of the theorist. In a similar fashion, Herz’s approach to power as 
being an essentially protean concept and in a state of constant flux is connected to an 
epistemology according to which the theorist must be able to appraise power at any 
given instant and at the same time try to devise attainable compromises between 
power and power-alien considerations. 
Morgenthau did not share the explicitly dialectical framework of Carr and Herz and 
represented one of the early efforts to isolate analytically the concept of power. In his 
effort to define power and its elements clearly, Morgenthau offered a narrower and 
less flexible conceptualisation than Carr or Herz. Yet despite his similarity to later 
efforts to narrow down the concept of power, Morgenthau’s epistemological choice 
rather than signifying a step towards positivism demonstrated a conscious effort to 
insulate the political sphere from the intrusion of violence. It is only with the 
adoption of positivism by realists, as exemplified by Mearsheimer in the present 
thesis, that the concept of power is restricted to the sphere of ontology. 
Mearsheimer’s positivistic epistemology is impenetrable by the concept of power 
and as such cannot account for any influence the theorist can possibly play in the 
formation of foreign policy.  
The primacy of power is indeed the core tenet of realism. Yet power means different 
things to different realists and performs different functions in their theories. The 
transition from a broad and multifaceted vision of power that permeates realism both 
ontologically and epistemologically, to a narrow conception of power as measurable 
material capabilities which can only perform the role of currency in a heavily 
deductive theory is by no means a linear one. Classical realists like Morgenthau for 
instance might be closer to the latter than transitional to neorealism figures like Herz. 
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It is only with the explicit and unreserved embrace of a scientific approach to 
politics, as with the case of Mearsheimer, that the full implications of this transition 
can be felt. This transition left realism with a more easily manageable concept of 
power, but also a concept of power which is crippled and devoid of much of its 
analytical purchase. This is evident in the way different conceptualisations of power 
translated to different understandings of the nation-state as will be discussed in the 
following section.   
 
 
The interplay between power and the nation-state 
When it comes to the question of the nation-state the main contribution of the thesis 
is that it makes explicit the connection between the two important for realism 
concepts of power and the nation-state. By approaching the nation-state through the 
lens of the ontological primacy of power, the thesis established the close dependence 
on power that all realist conceptualisations of the nation-state share. As such, the 
thesis not only supplements recent works on realism that disassociated realism from 
its alleged state-centrism but also expands their findings to also include structural 
realism as will be explained in the following paragraphs. Second, through 
examination of the differences between realist views of the interplay between power 
and the nation-state, the thesis identifies the cardinal importance that a broad 
conceptualisation of power plays for any realist project aiming to meaningfully 
engage with the concept of the nation-state. 
Recent efforts to recover the insights of classical realists, notably by Molloy and 
Scheuerman, have effectively dissociated those realists from their alleged state-
centrism.684 The study of realist approaches to the nation-state through the lens of 
power confirmed this previous research, and in particular Scheuerman’s overview.685 
Changes in the domestic and international distribution of power played a crucial role 
in bringing about the nation-state in the narratives offered by Carr, Morgenthau and 
Herz. Such changes in the middle of the twentieth century also led them to assume 
that the nation-state would no longer be able to perform its main functions and 
                                                 
684 W. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 39-66; S. Molloy, Hidden History of 
Realism, pp. 139-143 
685 W. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 39-66 
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should give way to other forms of political organisations. Scheuerman, however, is 
only concerned with classical realists. Mearsheimer, whilst not sharing the latter’s 
scepticism about the prospects of the nation-state, shares their view that it is 
developments in the field of power that paved the way for the emergence and 
predominance of the nation-state. Consequently, even for Mearsheimer’s variant of 
neorealism the nation-state is a historically conditioned entity. The nation-state then, 
due to its dependence upon the ontologically central concept of power, is for all 
realism but an unfixed manifestation of power. 
This does not imply, however, that the relationship between the two concepts is the 
same for all realists. Scheuerman is primarily concerned with ‘progressive realists’ 
and their efforts to transcend the nation-state. As such, he tends to group them 
together and provides an account of the relation between the nation-state and power 
which emphasises their similarities rather than their differences.686 In fact realists 
produced a variety of approaches of the interplay between power and the nation-
state, ranging all the way from a unit of protection in military terms to broad 
accounts that include the interplay between military, economic and ideational factors 
both domestically and internationally. The present thesis thus goes beyond 
Scheuerman’s analysis through the exploration of that relationship to reveal that 
approaches to the nation-state that are backed by more flexible conceptualisations of 
power are in a better position to account both for the emergence of the nation-state 
and the characteristics that differentiate it from previous forms of political 
organisation. 
In the heavily deductive model of Mearsheimer it is international anarchy that creates 
the preconditions for the behaviour of the political units. The latter, being essentially 
treated as billiard balls that can only react to external constraints, can vary in form 
but are always expected to behave in the same way.687 In such a model, power as a 
sum of material capabilities is always expected to perform the role of currency and 
can only account for variation between different historical units in terms of 
capabilities. As a result, whatever characteristic differentiates the nation-state from 
preceding forms of organisation – like, say, the ideology of nationalism -  has to be 
subsumed to such a conception of power and be understood as a force multiplier. 
                                                 
686 Idem  
687 Similar to the paradigmatic reading outlined in the Introduction. See supra pp. 16-18 
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Mearsheimer follows broadly this path but not entirely consistently. For he 
eventually approaches nationalism as a phenomenon that can not only transform the 
international system but can also influence the odds of survival of the nation-state. 
As such, he is forced to be more attentive to ideational power than his theoretical 
framework would allow. 
This uneasy, even contradictory at places, relationship between the key concepts of 
power and the nation-state is less pronounced or even absent in the rest of the realists 
who possessed broader conceptualisations of power and whose notion of power was 
not as strictly analytically separated from the nation-state as in Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism. Despite having too a relatively narrow conceptualisation of power 
Morgenthau managed to somewhat overcome this analytical separation by 
organically connecting the political unit to power through the mechanism of 
projection of the animus dominandi. Furthermore, by having a distinct notion of 
ethics he produced a narrative of nationalism that could account for the qualitative 
differences between the nation-state and the units that preceded it. Similarly Herz, 
despite sharing at places with Mearsheimer an emphasis on the role of military power 
and military technology in the development of political units as well as favouring a 
structural approach, offered a more nuanced account because of his reliance on a 
volatile conceptualisation of power.   
His interpretation of the political units and power as existing in a dialogical 
relationship allowed him to account for variation through history in a way that an 
approach focused solely on the impact of international anarchy cannot. For Herz, 
power might have influenced the emergence of the territorial state, but after the latter 
prevailed the very way power was organised and understood also changed. This 
flexible framework allowed Herz to account for variation both in the behaviour of 
different historical units and the implications of international anarchy at any given 
period. 
For Mearsheimer, Morgenthau and Herz, nationalism as the ideological corollary of 
the nation-state operates mainly in two forms, one benign and defensive and one 
aggressive and the prevalence of each form might or might not be associated with a 
particular historical period. It is in the realism of Carr, however, that the intimate 
connection between nationalism as an ideology and the concept of power is more 
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carefully explored and he was supported in this quest by a flexible and broad 
conceptualisation of power. The most important aspects of such a conceptualisation 
were his insistence that power is multi-faceted but also indivisible on the one hand 
and that it is in a dialectical relation with morality on the other. As such, Carr was 
able to produce an account of the nation-state that although attentive to the protective 
functions performed by the political unit is not reducible to their operation alone. By 
looking at the developments in political power both domestically and internationally, 
he was able to understand the establishment of the nation-state and its transformation 
through the interplay of the two. By approaching the nation-state in an evolutionary 
fashion and connecting nationalism to both power and morality, he provided a 
nuanced account of the development of the phenomenon and its impact on 
international and domestic politics.  
It is thus, Carr’s conceptualisation of power with its remarkable flexibility that offers 
the richer background for a distinctively realist perspective of the nation-state and 
nationalism. Such an approach of course cannot substitute for and is not superior to 
the wide range of research that has been already conducted on the nation-state by 
scholars whose focus it is to study the state and nationalism. When it comes to 
international relations and realism in particular, however, Carr’s nuanced approach 
can form a good starting point that can get realism beyond the subordination of 
nationalism to a materialistic notion of power and its reduction to a force multiplier, 
as recent commentators complained.688 Despite its premature assumptions about the 
future of the nation-state, such a framework can provide a vision of the nation-state 
and nationalism that integrates both domestic and international factors and as such 
carries more analytical purchase than structural approaches that dominate 
contemporary realism.  
 
Implications of research on the study of realism 
In the previous two sections I claimed that, based on the findings of the present 
thesis, classical realists offer approaches to power and the nation-state that carry 
more analytical purchase than modern variants of realism such as Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism. This section examines the broader implications of the conducted 
                                                 
688 B. Kadercan, “Military Competition and the emergence of Nationalism”, passim 
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research for realist theorisation. I argue that, as some of the commentators of 
contemporary realism already suspected, the claims of scientific enquiry that most 
modern realists subscribe to create for realists more problems than they solve. As 
such, the main epistemological contribution of the thesis is to complement existing 
research that calls for a return to the more reflexive epistemologies displayed by 
classical realists. 
The ‘practical’ component of the thesis, which comprised of an examination of the 
selected realists’ engagement with the policies followed by states that were of 
particular importance for their agenda, highlights this point. As has been shown in 
the present thesis it is Mearsheimer’s theory that faces the most significant 
challenges in terms of its practical application. The main reason for those problems 
lies with the fact that his ontology is often at odds with his epistemological 
commitment to positivism. Not only when he tries to prescribe policies that are at 
variance with the policies actually pursued as Barkin and Oren observed, but also 
when he is trying to make sense of the nation-state and nationalism by expanding his 
ontological assumptions, Mearsheimer has to go beyond his epistemology. 
Conversely, the ontological and epistemological assumptions of classical realists 
seem to be operating more harmoniously.  
This is not to suggest that the tendencies they outlined and the predictions they made 
always materialised. The Soviet Union did not after all represent the agent of change 
that Carr hoped would inspire the Western World to navigate through its multiple 
crises or transcend the nation-state. But such an analysis was comfortably 
accommodated within the framework of purposeful thinking that for Carr 
characterises all political science and resonated well with the necessity for the 
political scientist to propose uneasy compromises between reality and utopia he 
suggested. In a similar fashion, Morgenthau’s warnings against the risks of hubris 
resonated well with his insistence that sound political thought entails speaking “truth 
to power”. Herz’s effort to make sense of international politics was characterised by 
a concern about the security dilemma that permeated both the ontology and 
epistemology of his theory. As such, when he proposed policies that could 
consciously alleviate the security dilemma he was not acting at variance with his 
epistemological commitments.  
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This harmony between epistemology and ontology is the more important in an age 
when the nation-state remains the main form of political organisation because of its 
particularistic morality. Barkin touched upon the crucial importance of such a factor 
in his call for more reflexivity on contemporary realism, when he claimed that the 
recognition of the fact that there are no universal moral standards allowed realists to 
“reflect on how foreign policy is likely to look through the eyes of relevant 
others”.689 The classical realists examined here challenged this particularistic 
morality of the nation-state and identified it as the culprit behind what Bell described 
as the “horrors of the twentieth century”.690 At the same time, however, by not 
disassociating artificially morality from their theories of international politics as 
Mearsheimer does, they demonstrate an acute awareness of the importance different 
worldviews play in the formulation of foreign policy.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I summarised the findings of the thesis and identified its contribution 
to the study of realism. I claimed that the primacy of power in realist theorising is of 
profound importance for understanding realist conceptions of the nation-state. In all 
realists examined, the nation-state is understood as an unfixed in time manifestation 
of power. The success of each realist theory in accounting for the emergence of the 
nation-state and its characteristics largely depends on its underlying 
conceptualisation of power. As such, I found that flexible and multi-faceted 
conceptualisations of power like the one offered by Carr offer better ground for a 
nuanced account of the nation-state. Neorealist formulations of power, in contrast, 
while offering a more manageable concept of power lack in analytical purchase. 
Future realist scholarship will certainly benefit by returning to the reflexivity and 
richness of insights displayed in earlier realists.  
Perhaps the most encouraging development in that direction comes from 
contemporary realists themselves. In his effort to engage with foreign policy and 
approach the question of the nation-state Mearsheimer had to at least partially 
compromise the narrow framework of his structural theory. In so doing, he might 
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have added some additional anomalies to his theory but at the same time he 
recovered some of the nuance and attentiveness to complexity that earlier realists 
displayed. This move, I believe, is in the right direction. It is through the recovery of 
classical realist insights on the complexity of power and its intricate relation with the 
nation-state and nationalism, that contemporary realists can turn to in order to 







Ashley, R. “Political Realism and Human Interests” in International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1981, pp. 204-236 
 
Ashley, R. “The Poverty of Neorealism” in Keohane, R. (ed), Neorealism and its 
Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 255-300 
 
Ashworth, L. Creating international studies: Angell, Mitrany and the liberal 
tradition, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999 
 
Ashworth, L. “Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? a Revisionist 
History of International Relations” in International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2002, 
pp. 33-51 
 
Babík, M. “Realism as Critical Theory: The International Thought of E. H. Carr” in 
International Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2013, pp. 491-514 
 
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S. “Two Faces of Power” in The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1962, pp. 947-952 
 
Bain, W. “Deconfusing Morgenthau: moral inquiry and classical realism 
reconsidered” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, pp. 445-464 
 
Baldwin, D. “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old 
Tendencies” in World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1979, pp. 161-194 
 
Baldwin, D. “Power and International Relations” in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and 
Simmons, B. (eds) Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, 2013, pp. 
273-297 
 
Barkawi, T. “Strategy as a vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and modern strategic 
studies” in Review of International Studies, vol. 24, 1998, pp. 159-184 
 
Barkin, S. “Realism, Prediction, and Foreign Policy” in Foreign Policy analysis, Vol. 
5, No. 3, 2009, pp. 233-246 
 
Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. “Power in International Politics” in International 
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2005, pp. 39-75 
 
Barnhart, M. “Domestic politics, interservice impasse, and Japan’s decisions for 
war” in May, E., Rosecrance, R. and Steiner, Z. (eds), History and Neorealism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 185-200 
 
Behr, H. and Molloy, S. (eds) “Realism Reconsidered: New Contexts and Critiques” 
in International Politics, Vol. 50, No. 6, 2013, pp. 735-894 
 185 
 
Bell, D. “International relations: the dawn of a historiographical turn?” in British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2001, pp. 115-126 
 
Bell, D. “Anarchy, power and death: contemporary political realism as ideology” in 
Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002, pp. 221-239: pp. 230-234 
 
Bell, D. (ed), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist 
Theme, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 
 
Bell, D. “Introduction: Under an Empty Sky – Realism and Political Theory” in Bell, 
D. (ed), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist 
Theme, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 1-25 
 
Bell, D. “Writing the World: disciplinary history and beyond” in International 
Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2009, pp. 3-22 
 
Berenskoetter, F. and Williams, M. J. (eds), Power in World Politics, London: 
Routledge, 2007 
 
Berenskoetter, F. “Thinking about power” in Berenskoetter, F. and Williams, M. J. 
(eds), Power in World Politics, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1-22 
 
Bliddal, H., Sylvest, C. and Wilson, P. (eds) Classics of international relations: 
essays in criticism and appreciation, Oxon: Routledge, 2013 
 
Bliddal, H., Sylvest, C. and Wilson, P., “Introduction” in Bliddal, H., Sylvest, C. and 
Wilson, P. (eds) Classics of international relations: essays in criticism and 
appreciation, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, pp. 1-12 
 
Booth, K. “Offensive realists, tolerant realists and real realists” in International 
Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 350- 354 
 
Booth, K. and Wheeler, N. The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in 
World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008 
 
Booth, K. “Navigating the ‘Absolute Novum’: John H. Herz’s Political Realism and 
Political Idealism” in International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 510-526 
 
Booth, K. “Introduction” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2009, pp. 179-
181 
 
Brooks, S. “Dueling Realisms” in International Organisation, Vol. 51, no. 3, 1997, 
pp. 445-477 
 
Brown, C. “’The Twilight of International Morality’? Hans J. Morgenthau and Carl 
Schmitt on the end of the Jus Publicum Europaeum” in Williams, M.C. (ed), 
 186 
Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 42-61 
 
Bull, H. “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach” in World 
Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1966, pp. 361-377 
 
Bull, H. “The Twenty Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On” in International Journal, Vol. 
24, No. 4, 1969, pp. 625-638 
 
Buzan, B. “The timeless wisdom of realism?” in Smith, S., Booth, K. and Zalewski, 
M. (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996 
 
Buzan, B. and Little, R. “Waltz and World History: The Paradox of Parsimony” in 
International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2009, pp. 446-463 
 
Buzan, B., Jones, C. and Little, R. The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural 
Realism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993 
 
Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simmons, B. (eds) Handbook of International Relations, 
London: Sage, 2013 
 
Carr, E. H. Conditions of Peace, London: Macmillan, 1942 
 
Carr, E. H.  Nationalism and After, London: Macmillan, 1945 
 
Carr, E. H. The Soviet Impact on the Western World, London: Macmillan, 1947 
 
Carr, E. H. German – Soviet Relations 1919-1939, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1951 
 
Carr, E. H. The New Society, London: Macmillan, 1951 
 
Carr, E. H. “Stalin” in Soviet Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1952, pp. 1-7 
 
Carr, E. H. A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1966 
 
Carr, E. H. 1917: Before and After, London: Macmillan, 1969 
 
Carr, E. H. The Twilight of the Cominern, New York: Pantheon Books, 1982 
 
Carr, E. H. The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War, London: Macmillan, 1984 
 
Carr, E. H. What is History?, London: Penguin, 1987 
 
Carr, E. H. “An Autobiography” in Cox, M. (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. xiii-xxii 
 187 
 
Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis: an Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 
 
Carr, E. H. From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003 
 
Chong, A. “Lessons in International Communication: Carr, Angell and Lippmann on 
human nature, public opinion and leadership” in Review of International Studies, 
Vol. 33, No. 4, 2007,  pp. 615-635 
 
Connor, W. “A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a…” in Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1978, pp. 377-400 
 
Cornford, F. M. Thucydides Mythistoricus, London: Edward Arnold, 1907 
 
Cox, M. “Will the real E.H. Carr Please stand up?” in  International Affairs, Vol. 75, 
No 3, 1999, pp. 643-653 
 
Cox, M. (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2000 
 
Cox, M. “E. H. Carr and Isaac Deutscher: a Very ‘Special Relationship’” in Cox, M. 
(ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 
125-144 
 
Cox, M. “Hans J. Morgenthau, realism, and the rise and fall of the Cold War” in 
Williams, M.C. (ed), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in 
International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 166-194 
 
Cox, R. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory” in Keohane, R. (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986, pp. 204-254 
 
Cozette, M. “What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International 
Relations” in International Studies Review, Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 667-679 
 
Craig, C. “Hans Morgenthau and the world state revisited” in Williams, M.C. (ed), 
Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 195-215 
 
Crawford, N. “Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking ‘Man’” in 
International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2009, pp. 271-288 
 




Davies, R. W.  ‘Carr’s changing views of the Soviet Union’ in Cox, M. (ed.) E.H. 
Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 91-107 
 
Deutscher, I. Heretics and Renegades, and Other Essays, London: Cape 1969 
 
Digeser, P. “The Fourth Face of Power” in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 4, 
1992, pp. 977-1007 
 
Duke, D. F. “Edward Hallett Carr: Historical Realism and the Liberal Tradition” in 
Past Imperfect, Vol. 2, 1993, pp. 123-136 
 
Edkins, J. and Vaughan-Williams, N. (eds), Critical theorists and international 
relations, London: Routledge, 2009 
 
Erskine, T. and Lebow, R. N. (eds), Tragedy and International Relations, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 
 
Euben, P. “The Tragedy of Tragedy” in Erskine, T. and Lebow, R. N. (eds), Tragedy 
and International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 86-96 
 
Evans, G. “E. H. Carr and international relations” in British Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1975, pp. 77-97 
 
Falk, R. “The critical realist tradition and the demystification of interstate power: E. 
H. Carr, Hedley Bull and Robert W. Cox” in S. Gill and J. H. Mittelman (eds), 
Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, pp. 39-55 
 
Feaver, P. et al. “Brother, Can you Spare me a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody ever a 
Realist?)” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 165-193 
 
Fox, W. “E. H. Carr and political realism: vision and revision” in Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1985, pp. 1-16 
 
Fozouni, B. “Confutation of Political Realism” in International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 39, No. 4, 1995, pp. 479-510 
 
Frei, C. Hans J. Morgenthau: an intellectual biography, Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
University Press, 2001 
 
Fromkin, D. “Remembering Hans Morgenthau” in World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, 
No. 3, 1993, pp. 81-88 
 
Gellner, E. “Nationalism reconsidered and E. H. Carr” in Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1992, pp. 285-293 
 
Gill, S. and Mittelman, J. H. (eds), Innovation and Transformation in International 
Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 
 189 
 
Gilpin, R. “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” in Keohane, R. (ed), 
Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 301-
321 
 
Gismondi, M. “Tragedy, Realism and Postmodernity: Kulturpessimismus in the 
Theories of Max Weber, E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger” in 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 15, No 3, 2004, pp. 435-463 
 
Graham, K. “‘Survival Research’ and the ‘Planetary Interest’: Carrying Forward the 
Thoughts of John Herz” in International Relations,  Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 457-
472 
 
Gray, C. “Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the past: With GPS” in Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 25, Special Issue, Dec 1999, pp. 161-182 
 
Griffiths, M. and Sullivan, M. “Nationalism and International Relations Theory” in 
Australian Journal of Politics & History, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1997, pp. 53-66 
 
Guilhot, N. “American Katechon: When Political Theology Became International 
Relations Theory” in Constellations, Vol. 17, No 2, 2010, pp. 225-253 
 
Guzzini, S. “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations” in 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2004, pp. 533-568 
 
Guzzini, S. Power, Realism and Constructivism, London: Routledge, 2013 
 
Hacke, C. and Puglierin, J. “John H. Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality” in 
International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2007, pp 367-382 
 
Haslam, J. “E.H. Carr and the History of Soviet Russia” in The Historical Journal, 
Vol. 26, No. 4, 1983,  pp. 1021-1027 
 
Haslam, J. The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892-1982, London: Verso, 1999 
 
Haslam, J. “Carr’s Search for Meaning” in Cox, M. (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical 
Appraisal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 21-35 
 
Haslam, J. “John Mearsheimer’s ‘elementary geometry of power’: Euclidean 
moment or an intellectual blind alley?” in May, E., Rosecrance, R. and Steiner, Z. 
(eds), History and Neorealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 
322-340 
 
Heath, A. “E.H. Carr: Approaches to Understanding Experience and Knowledge” in 
Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied 
Contemporary Thought, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2010, pp. 24-46 
 
 190 
Herz, J. “The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problems of 
International Organisation” in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1939, 
pp. 536-554 
 
Herz, J. “Alternative Proposals to Democracy: Naziism” in The Journal of Negro 
Education, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1941, pp. 353-367 
 
Herz, J. “Power Politics and World Organization” in The American Political Science 
Review”, Vol. 36, No. 6, 1942, pp. 1039-1052 
 
Herz, J. “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” in World Politics, Vol. 
2, No. 2, 1950, pp. 157-180 
 
Herz, J. Political Realism and Political Idealism: A study in theories and realities, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951 
 
Herz, J. “Rise and demise of the territorial state” in World Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, 
1957, pp. 473-493 
 
Herz, J. International Politics in the Atomic Age, New York & London: Columbia 
University Press, 1962 
 
Herz, J. “The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-
State” in Polity, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1968, pp. 11-34 
 
Herz, J. “Relevancies and Irrelevancies in the Study of International Relations” in 
Polity, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1971, pp. 25-47 
 
Herz, J. The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, New York: David McKay, 
1976 
 
Herz, J. “Legitimacy: Can we retrieve it?” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 
1978, pp. 317-343 
 
Herz, J. “Political Realism Revisited” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, 
No. 2, 1981, pp. 182-197 
 
Herz, J. “[Political Realism and Human Interests]: Comment” in International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, pp. 237-241 
 
Herz, J. “Foreign Policy in the Framework of an Open-Society Bloc” in American 
Foreign Policy Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1982, pp. 2-7 
 
Herz, J. “The president’s error on covert action” (1983, 26 October) in New York 
Times 
 




Herz, J. “Reflections on Hans Morgenthau’s Political Realism” in American Foreign 
Policy Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1984, pp. 1-10 
 
Herz, J. “Iran-Contra hearings may help to cleanse foreign relations” (1987, 14 June) 
in New York Times 
 
Herz, J. “U.S. must join world in the rule of law” (1988, 23 April) in New York 
Times 
 
Herz, J. “Looking at Carl Schmitt from the Vantage Point of the 1990s” in 
Interpretation, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1992, pp. 307-314 
 
Herz, J. “Reflections on my century” in International Journal of Applied Economics 
and Econometrics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2002, pp. 151-163 
 
Herz, J. “On Human Survival: reflections on survival research and survival policies” 
in World Futures, Vol. 59, 2003, pp. 135-143 
 
Herz, J. “The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present 
problems” in International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, pp. 412-416 
 
Hirst, P. “The eighty years’ crisis, 1919-1999— power” in Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, 1998, pp. 133-148 
 
Hobson, J. M. The State and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000 
 
Hobson, J. M. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International 
Theory, 1760–2010, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 
 
Holden, G. “Who contextualizes the contextualizers? Disciplinary history and the 
discourse about the IR discourse” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 
2, 2002, pp. 253-270 
 
Howe, P. “The utopian realism of E.H. Carr” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 
20, No. 3, 1994, pp. 277-297 
 
Jackson, P.T. and Nexon, D. “International theory in a post-paradigmatic era: From 
substantive wagers to scientific ontologies” in European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2013, pp. 543-565 
 
Jenkins, K. On ‘What is History?’ From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White, London: 
Routledge, 1995 
 
Johnston, W. “E.H. Carr’s Theory of International Relations: A Critique”, The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 29, No 4, 1967, pp. 861-884 
 
 192 
Jones, C. “Carr, Mannheim, and a Post-positivist Science of International Relations” 
in Political Studies. XLV, 1997, pp. 232-246 
 
Jones, C. E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998 
 
Kadercan, B. “Military Competition and the emergence of Nationalism: Putting the 
Logic of Political Survival into Historical Context” in International Studies 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2012, pp. 401-428 
 
Karis, T. “A Life of Passionate Scholarship” in International Relations,  Vol. 22, No. 
4, 2008, pp.405-409 
 
Kenealy, D and Kostagiannis, K. “Realist Visions of European Union: E.H. Carr and 
Integration” in Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2013, 
pp. 221-246 
 
Kennan, G. F. American Diplomacy, (extended ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2012 
 
Keohane, R. (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986 
 
Keohane, R. “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” in 
Keohane, R. (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986, pp. 158-203 
 
Kostagiannis, K. “Mind the gap between nationalism and international relations: 
Power and the nation-state in E.H. Carr’s realism” in International Politics, Vol. 
50, No. 6, 2013, pp. 830-845 
 
Kostagiannis, K. “Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation-State” in 
International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2014, pp. 513-529 
 
Lacy, M. “A History of Violence: Mearsheimer and Walt’s Writings from ‘An 
Unnecessary War’ to the ‘Israel Lobby’ controversy” in Geopolitics, Vol. 13, No. 
1, 2008, pp. 100-119 
 
Lake, D. “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as 
Impediments to Understanding and Progress” in International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 55, No. 2, 2011, pp. 465-480 
 
Lang, A. “Morgenthau, agency, and Aristotle” in Williams, M. (ed.) Realism 
Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 18-41 
 
Lawson, S. “Political Studies and the Contextual Turn: A Methodological/Normative 
Critique” in Political Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2008, pp. 584-603 
 193 
 
Layne, C. “The ‘Poster Child for offensive realism’: America as a global hegemon” 
in Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2002, pp. 120-164 
 
Lebow, R. N. The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 
 
Lebow, R. N. “Tragedy, Politics, and Political Science” in International Relations, 
Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 329-336 
 
Lebow, R. N. “Identity and International Relations” in International Relations, Vol. 
22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 473-492 
 
Lebow, R. N. “The Ancient Greeks and Modern Realism: Ethics, Persuasion, and 
Power” in Bell, D. (ed), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations 
on a Realist Theme, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 26-39 
 
Legro, J. W. and Moravcsik, A. “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” in International 
Security, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1999, pp. 5-55 
 
Linklater, A. “The transformation of political community: E. H. Carr, critical theory 
and international relations” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, 
1997, pp 321 – 338 
 
Linklater, A. “E.H. Carr, Nationalism and the Future of the Sovereign State” in Cox, 
M. (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, 
pp. 234-257 
 
Little, R. “Turning back the clock: Mearsheimer resurrects the first great debate” in 
International Relations, Vol. 19, No 3, 2005, pp. 341-344 
 
Little, R. “The balance of power in Politics Among Nations” in Williams, M.C. (ed), 
Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 137-165 
 
Lu, C. ‘Tragedies and International Relations’ in  Erskine, T. and Lebow, R. N. 
(eds), Tragedy and International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, pp.158-171 
 
Lukes, S. Power: A Radical View, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 
 
Lukes, S. “Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft 
Power” in Berenskoetter, F. and Williams, M. J. (eds), Power in World Politics, 
London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 83-97 
 
Lundestad, G. (ed.), No End To Alliance: The United States and Western Europe, 
New York: St. Martin’s, 1998 
 
 194 
May, E., Rosecrance, R. and Steiner, Z. (eds), History and Neorealism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010 
 
May, “The United States’ underuse of military power” in May, E., Rosecrance, R. 
and Steiner, Z. (eds), History and Neorealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, pp. 228-245 
 
Mearsheimer, J. Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983 
 
Mearsheimer, J. Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, London: Brassey’s, 1988 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Shrink Bosnia to Save it”, The New York Times, 31 March 1993 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “The False Promise of International Institutions” in International 
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1995, pp. 5-49 
 
Mearsheimer, J. and Van Evera, S. “Hateful Neighbours”, The New York Times, 24 
September 1996 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “The Only Exit From Bosnia”, The New York Times, 7 October 1997 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “The Future of America’s Continental Commitment” in Lundestad, 
G. (ed.), No End To Alliance: The United States and Western Europe, New York: 
St. Martin’s, 1998, pp. 221-242 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “A Peace Agreement That’s Bound to Fail”, The New York Times, 
19 October 1998 
 
Mearsheimer, J. and Van Evera, S. “Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing”, The New 
York Times, 19 April 1999 
 
Mearsheimer, J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, 2001 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “The Future of the American Pacifier” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, 
No. 5, 2001, pp. 46-61 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Hearts and Minds” in The National Interest, No. 69, 2002, pp. 13-
16 
 
Mearsheimer, J. et al., “War with Iraq Is Not in America’s National Interest” in New 
York Times (paid advertisement), 26 September, 2002 
 
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. “An Unnecessary War” in Foreign Policy, No. 134, 
2003, pp. 50-59 
 
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. “Keeping Saddam Hussein in a Box” in New York 
Times, 2 February, 2003 
 
 195 
Mearsheimer. J. et. al., “Roundtable: The Battle Rages On” in International 
Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 337-360 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “E.H Carr vs Idealism” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2, 
2005, pp. 139-152 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “The more isms the better” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 
3, 2005, pp. 354-359 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-
Conservatism” opendemocracy.com, 2005, available through the author’s 
webpage: http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/all-pubs.html 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “China’s Unpeaceful Rise” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690, 
2006, pp. 160-162 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John. J. 
Mearsheimer (Part I)” in International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2006, pp. 105-123 
 
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” in  Middle 
East Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2006, pp. 29-87 
 
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Reckless States and Realism”, in International Relations, Vol. 23, 
No. 2, 2009, pp. 241-256 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia” in 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2010, pp. 381-396 
 
Mearsheimer, J. Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics, 
London: Duckworth Overlook, 2011 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Imperial by design” in The National Interest, No. 111, 2011, pp. 
16-34 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Realists as Idealists” in Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2011, pp. 
424-430 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Kissing Cousins: Nationalism and Realism”, Prepared for Yale 
Workshop of International Relations, 5 May 2011. Accessed, 21 December 2013. 
Available from mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/recent.html 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “Introduction” in Kennan, G. F. American Diplomacy, (extended 
ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012, pp. Vii-xlvii 
 
 196 
Mearsheimer, J. “Power as the Currency of International Relations, Disciplining US 
Foreign Policy, and Being an Independent Variable”, interview with Theory Talks, 
2012, accessed from http://www.theory-talks.org/2012/06/theory-talk-49.html 
 
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. “Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis 
testing is bad for International Relations” in European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 19, No 3, 2013, pp. 427-457 
 
Mearsheimer, J. “America Unhinged” in The National Interest, No. 129, 2014, pp. 9-
30 
 
Minogue, K. R. “Methods in Intellectual History: Quentin Skinner’s Foundations” in 
Philosophy, Vol. 56, No 218, 1981, pp. 533-552 
 
Mitrany, D. A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966 
 
Mollov, M. B. Power and Transcendence: Hans Morgenthau and the Jewish 
Experience, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002 
 
Molloy, S. “Dialectics and Transformation: Exploring The International Theory of E. 
H. Carr” in International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 17, No. 2, 
2003, pp. 279-306 
 
Molloy, S. The Hidden History of Realism: a Genealogy of Power Politics, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 
 
Molloy, S. “Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser 
Evil” in Journal of International Political Theory, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, pp. 94-112 
 
Molloy, S.  “Hans J. Morgenthau Versus E.H. Carr: Conflicting Conceptions of 
Ethics in Realism” in Bell, D. (ed), Political Thought and International Relations: 
Variations on a Realist Theme, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 83-104 
 
Molloy, S. “Spinoza, Carr, and the ethics of The Twenty Years’ Crisis” in Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2013, pp. 251-271 
 
Morgenthau, H. “The evil of politics and the ethics of evil” in Ethics, Vol 56, no. 1, 
1945, pp. 1-18 
 
Morgenthau, H. “The Political Science of E.H. Carr” in World Politics, Vol. 1, No 1, 
1948, pp 127-134 
 
Morgenthau, H. “The Twilight of International Morality” in Ethics, Vol. 58, No. 2, 
1948, pp. 79-99 
 
Morgenthau, H. “World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century” in The Review of 
Politics, Vol 10, No 4, 1948, pp 154-173 
 
 197 
Morgenthau, H. letter to Oakeshott, 22 May 1948, University of Chicago, 
Morgenthau Papers, B44 
 
Morgenthau, H. American Foreign Policy: a critical examination, London: Methuen 
& Co, 1952 
 
Morgenthau, H. Dilemmas of Politics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958 
 
Morgenthau, H. Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic 
Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962 
 
Morgenthau, H. Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Impasse of American Politics, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1962 
 
Morgenthau, H. Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Restoration of American 
Politics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962 
 
Morgenthau, H. “Love and Power” in Commentary, Vol. 33, No 3, 1962, pp. 247-
251 
 
Morgenthau, H. “The impotence of American power” in Commentary, Vol. 36, No. 
5, 1963: pp. 384-386 
 
Morgenthau, H. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1965 
 
Morgenthau, H. “Introduction” in Mitrany, D. A Working Peace System, Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1966 
 
Morgenthau, H. “Truth and Power: The Intellectuals and the Johnson 
Administration” in The New Republic, Vol. 155, 1966, pp. 8-14 
 
Morgenthau, H.  A new foreign policy for the United States, London: Pall Mall, 1969 
 
Morgenthau, H. Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970, London: Pall 
Mall Press 1970 
 
Morgenthau, H. Science: servant or master?, New York: New American Library, 
1972 
 
Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973 
 
Murray, A. J. H. “The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau” in The Review of Politics, 
Vol. 58, No 1, 1996, pp. 81-107 
 
 198 
Nau, H. “No Alternative to ‘isms’” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 
2, 2011, pp. 487-491 
 
Neacsu, M. Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: 
Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment, Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 
 
Neal, A. “Michael Foucault” in Edkins, J. and Vaughan-Williams, N. (eds), Critical 
theorists and international relations, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 161-170 
 
Nishimura, K. “E. H. Carr, Dostoevsky, and the Problem of Irrationality in Modern 
Europe” in International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2011, pp.45-64  
 
Oakeshott, M. “Scientific Politics” in Cambridge Journal, Vol. 1, 1948, pp. 347-358 
 
Oren, I. “The Unrealism of Contemporary Realism: The Tension between Realist 
Theory and realists’ Practice” in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, no. 2, 2009, pp. 
283-301 
 
Pashakhanlou, A. H. “Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive Realism” 
in International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2013, pp. 202-225 
 
Payne, R. A. “Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign Policy 
Debate” in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2007, pp. 503-514   
 
Peterson, U. E. “Breathing Nietzsche's air: New reflections on Morgenthau's 
concepts of power and human nature” in Alternatives, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, pp. 83-
118 
 
Pichler, H. K. “The godfathers of ‘truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in 
Morgenthau’s theory of power politics” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, 
1998, pp. 185-200 
 
Pin-Fat, V. “The metaphysics of the national interest and the ‘mysticism’ of the 
nation-state: reading Hans J. Morgenthau” in Review of International Studies, vol. 
31, 2005, pp. 217-236 
 
Puglierin, J. (ed) “A Universalist in Dark Times: John H. Herz, 1908-2005” in 
International Relations, Vol. 22, No.4, 2008, pp. 403-528 
 
Puglierin, J. “Towards being a ‘Traveler between All Worlds’” in International 
Relations,  Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp.419-425 
 
Rafshoon, E. G. “A realist’s moral opposition to war” in Peace & Change, Vol. 26, 
No. 1, 2001, pp. 55-77 
 
Recchia, S. “Restraining imperial hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International 
Relations Theory” in Constellations, Vol. 14, No. 4,  2007, pp. 531-556 
 
 199 
Rengger, N. “Realism, tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian imagination in international 
political thought” in M. Williams (ed.) Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans 
J. Morgenthau in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 
pp. 118-136 
 
Ringmar, E. “Empowerment among nations: a sociological perspective” in 
Berenskoetter, F. and Williams, M. J. (eds), Power in World Politics, London: 
Routledge, 2007, pp. 189-203 
 
Rogers, P. “Missing the point” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005: pp. 
337-340 
 
Rose, G. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” in World Politics, 
Vol. 51, No. 1, 1998, pp. 144-172 
 
Rosecrance, R. N. “War and Peace” in World Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2002, pp. 137-
166 
 
Ruggie, J. “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist 
Synthesis” in Keohane, R. (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986, pp. 131-157 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and beyond” in 
Williams, M.C. (ed), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in 
International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 62-86 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. “Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man Vs. 
Power Politics” in Constellations, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2007, pp. 506-530 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. “A Theoretical Missed Opportunity? Hans J. Morgenthau as 
Critical Realist” in Bell, D. (ed), Political Thought and International Relations: 
Variations on a Realist Theme, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 41-57. 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. “Realism and the critique of technology” in Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2009, pp. 563-584 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2009 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. “The (classical) Realist vision of  global reform” in International 
Theory, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2010, pp. 246-282 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. The Realist Case for Global Reform, Cambridge: Polity, 2011 
 
Scheuerman, W. E. “Realists Against the Nation-State”, Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 20, 2011, pp. 67-105 
 
 200 
Schmidt, B. “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power” in Millennium – Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, pp 523-549 
 
Schmidt, B. “Realist conceptions of power” in Berenskoetter, F. and Williams, M. J. 
(eds), Power in World Politics, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 43-63 
 
Schmidt, B. and Williams, M. C. “The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: 
Neoconservatives Versus Realists” in Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2008, pp. 
191-220 
 
Schmidt, B. (ed), International Relations and the First Great Debate, London: 
Routledge, 2012 
 
Schmidt, B. “Introduction” in Schmidt, B. (ed), International Relations and the First 
Great Debate, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 1-15 
 
Schmidt, B. “A modest realist in a tragic world: John J. Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics” in Bliddal, H., Sylvest, C. and Wilson, P. (eds) Classics of 
international relations: essays in criticism and appreciation, Oxon: Routledge, 
2013, pp. 230-239 
 
Schroeder, P. “Not even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: power and order 
in the early modern era” in May, E. Rosecrance, R. and Steiner Z. (eds), History 
and Neorealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 78-102 
 
Schuett, R. Political realism, Freud, and human nature in international relations: the 
resurrection of the realist man. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
 
Schupmann, B. A. “A Pessimism of Strength? Tragedy and Political Virtue” in 
Erskine, T. and Lebow, R. N. (eds), Tragedy and International Relations, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 129-143 
 
See, J. W. “A prophet without honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 
1955–1965” in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2001, pp. 419-448 
 
Skinner, Q. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” in History and 
Theory, Vol. 8, No 1, 1969, pp. 3-53 
 
Smith, S., Booth, K. and Zalewski, M. (eds), International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 
 
Snyder, G. “Mearsheimer’s World – Offensive Realism and the Struggle for 
Security: A Review Essay” in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2002, pp. 
149-173 
 
Sørensen, G. “‘Big and Important Things’ in IR: Structural Realism and the Neglect 




Speer II, J. P. “Hans Morgenthau and the World State” in World Politics, Vol. 20, 
No. 2, 1968, pp. 207-227 
 
Steele, B. J. “‘Eavesdropping on honoured ghosts’: From classical to reflexive 
realism” in Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 10, No. 3, 
2007, pp. 272-300 
 
Steiner, G. In Bluebeard’s Castle: Some Notes Towards the Re-definition of Culture, 
London: Faber and Faber, 1971 
 
Stephanson, A. “The Lessons of What is History?” in Cox, M. (ed.) E.H. Carr: A 
Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 283-303 
 
Sterling-Folker, J. and Shinko, R. E. “Discourses of power: traversing the realist-
postmodern divide” in Berenskoetter, F. and Williams, M. J. (eds), Power in World 
Politics, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 244-264 
 
Stirk, P. “John H. Herz: realism and the fragility of the international order” in Review 
of International Studies, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 285-306 
 
Stirk, P. “John H. Herz and the International Law of the Third Reich” in 
International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 427-440 
 
Strong, T. “Nietzsche and Questions of Tragedy, Tyranny and International 
Relations” in Erskine, T. and Lebow, R. N. (eds), Tragedy and International 
Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 144-157 
 
Sylvest, C. “John H. Herz and the Resurrection of Classical Realism” in 
International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 441-455 
 
Sylvest, C. “Realism and international law: the challenge of John H. Herz” in 
International Theory, Vol. 2, no 3, 2010, pp. 410-445 
 
Sylvest, C. “Technology and Global Politics: The Modern Experiences of Bertrand 
Russell and John H. Herz” in The International History Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, 
2013, pp. 121-142 
 
Sylvest, C. “The conditions and consequences of globality: John H. Herz’s 
International Politics in the Atomic Age” in Bliddal, H., Sylvest, C. and Wilson, P. 
(eds) Classics of international relations: essays in criticism and appreciation, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2013, pp. 89-98 
 
Sylvest, C. “Russell’s Realist Radicalism” in The International History Review 
(forthcoming) 
 
Taliaferro, J. “Security Seeking under Anarchy” in International Security, Vol. 25, 
No. 3, 2000, pp. 128-161 
 202 
 
Thayer, B. A. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International 
Politics” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2010, pp. 124-151 
 
Thompson, K. “Review: The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics” in The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 3, 1979, pp. 941-942 
 
Ticktin, H. “E.H. Carr, the Cold War and the Soviet Union” in Cox, M. (ed.) E.H. 
Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 145-161 
 
Toft, P. “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power” 
in Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 381-408 
 
Turner, S. P. “Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Max Weber” in Bell, D. (ed), 
Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 63-82 
 
Vasquez, J. “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Vs Progressive Research 
Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing 
Proposition” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, pp. 
899-912 
 
Vasquez, J. The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to 
Neotraditionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 
 
Walker, R. B. J. “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory” in 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1987, pp. 65-86 
 
Walt, S. “The Progressive Power of Realism” in The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, pp. 931-935 
 
Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979 
 
Waltz, K. “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A response to my critics” 
in Keohane, R. (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986, pp. 323-345 
 
Waltz, K. “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory” in Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, pp. 21-37 
 
Waltz, K. “International politics is not foreign policy” in Security Studies, Vol. 6, 
No. 1, 1996, pp. 54-57 
 
Waltz, K. “Structural Realism after the Cold War” in International Security, Vol. 25, 
No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-41 
 
Welch, D. A. “Why International Relations theorists should stop reading 
Thucydides” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2003, pp. 301-319 
 203 
 
Wheeler, N. “‘To Put Oneself into the Other Fellow’s Place’: John Herz, the Security 
Dilemma and the Nuclear Age” in International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, 
pp. 493-509 
 
Williams, M. C. “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, 
Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics” in International 
Organization, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2004, pp. 633-665 
 
Williams, M. C. The realist tradition and the limits of international relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 
 
Williams, M. C. (ed), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in 
International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 
 
Williams, M. C. “Morgenthau now: Neoconservatism, national greatness, and 
realism” in Williams, M.C. (ed), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans 
Morgenthau in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 
216-240 
 
Williams, M. C. “Waltz, Realism and Democracy” in International Relations, Vol. 
23, No. 3, 2009, pp. 328-340 
 
Williams, M. C. “In the beginning: The International Relations enlightenment and 
the ends of International Relations theory” in European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 19, no. 3, 2013, pp. 647-665 
 
Williamson, S. “Austria-Hungary and the coming of the First World War”, in May, 
E., Rosecrance, R. and Steiner, Z. (eds), History and Neorealism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 103-128 
 
Wilson, P. “The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate’” in Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 24 (special issue), 1998, pp. 1-15 
 
Wilson, P. “Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to the Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1939-
46” in Cox, M. (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000, pp. 165-197 
 
Wilson, P. “Radicalism for a Conservative Purpose: The Peculiar Realism of E. H. 
Carr” in Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2001, pp. 
123-136 
 
Wilson, P. “Where are we now in the debate about the first great debate?” in 
Schmidt, B. (ed), International Relations and the First Great Debate, London: 
Routledge, 2012, pp. 133-151 
 
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1968 
 
 204 
Zambernardi, L. “The impotence of power: Morgenthau’s critique of American 
intervention in Vietnam” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2011, 
pp. 1335-1356 
 
Zimmer, L. B. The Vietnam War Debate: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Attempt to 
Halt the Drift into Disaster, Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
